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1Summary
The thesis investigates David Hume’s concept of the self as it is presented in 
Book One and Two of the Treatise of Human Nature. The center point of the 
discussion is Hume’s understanding of the self as the bundle of perceptions. It 
will be shown that such an account can maintain identity of the self as an 
imperfect identity. It will be argued that a distinction must be drawn between self 
and personhood, both are distinct but interdependent aspects of the individual. 
These two aspects correspond to the different topics of the two first books of the 
Treatise and are in accordance with Hume’s own division of the subject 
expressed in Book One. The necessity of the distinction will become apparent 
through the discussion of the problem of self identity in the light of Hume’s 
epistemology and ontology. Considering Hume’s theory of perception and his 
account of the acquisition of the idea of identity it will be argued that memory 
has to be a criterion of self- as well as of personal identity.
A general discussion of main stream theories of self- and personal identity will 
provide a contemporary context to which Hume’s account of identity can be 
allocated. It will be shown that Hume’s theory of identity can accommodate the 
combined theory of identity, which maintains mental as well as bodily criteria of 
self- and personal identity. Therefore it is necessary to establish Hume as a 
Basic Realist. This can be achieved by firstly, a strict distinction between 
epistemology and ontology and secondly, by interpreting the first two books of 
the Treatise as a unity. The Treatise will also be placed within the context of 
Hume’s other philosophical writings, such as the Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding and the Essays.
After establishing Hume’s account of self- and personal identity and his Basic 
Realism the discussion focusses on the principle of unity of perceptions. 
Several candidates will be investigated, by method of elimination. It will be 
argued that the body can serve as the principle of unity of perceptions. It will be 
shown that such an understanding of the body accommodates Hume’s 
epistemology and does not contradict the fundamental claims of Hume’s 
philosophy.
2The investigation presented in this thesis will show the compatibility of Books 
One and Two of the Treatise. It will become apparent that the failure of Hume’s 
theory of identity does not result from inconsistencies or contradictions between 
these two Books, but results from the theory of perception itself, which renders 
memory, one of the criteria of self- and personal identity, theoretically and 
practically impossible.
The thesis shall contribute to the current debate concerning the philosophy of 
David Hume. It is its main task to re-direct the criticism of his account which has, 
so far, concentrated on the problem of the Real Connection or on alleged 
inconsistencies between Book One and Two of the Treatise. The thesis 
attempts to show that such criticisms are misplaced and sometimes result from 
a misinterpretation of Hume’s writings. Instead, criticism must be placed on 
Hume’s strict empiricist version of perception which understands perceptions as 
fleeting existences. The problems resulting from such an understanding are 
apparent already in Book One and concern not only the concept of the self, they 
also render the concept of causation, one of the pillars of Hume’s system, 
unaccountable.
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6Introduction
The topic of this work is a discussion of the concept and the account of the self 
David Hume gives in Book One and Two of the Treatise of Human Nature. I 
attempt to show that the understanding of the self underlying Hume’s theory of 
the passions in Book Two accommodates the account of the self presented in 
Book One. The difficulties encountered by the solitary self of the first book can 
be overcome once the self is placed within a social context, once we understand 
ourselves not only as reasoning subjects, but as individuals amongst others, as 
the feeling, passionate beings we are. I will argue that self and personhood are 
two interdependent aspects of the individual. The difference between these two 
aspects is a difference of emphasis .Personhood or being a person is the social, 
the public aspect, whereas the self is the private aspect of an individual. 
However, both aspects are not exclusive, there is a public side of the self just as 
there is a private side of being a person. In my discussion I will explain how 
exactly I wish privacy to be understood and I will argue that there is 
epistemological privacy of experiences. I will not inquire, however, whether 
privacy of experiences is generally possible or not.
I will also attempt to put David Hume’s account of the self into the context of 
the present debate concerning theories of personal identity and self identity. My 
discussion of contemporary theories in this field does not claim to be 
exhaustive. I consider theories in so far as they appear relevant to my purpose, 
which is the investigation of Hume’s theory. Some theories, such as 
functionalism, will not be discussed explicitly, although I may present arguments 
the theory can be applied to. My choice of examples and counter examples also 
is selective, I have not included every such example I could think of, such as, for 
instance, mind-melt scenarios. If there are any challenging examples I have 
missed, I will be very glad to know about them.
The last chapter is, so far as I am able to judge it, the most important one. 
In its center stands the problem of the principle of unity of perceptions. I hope I 
will be able to show that the body can serve as such a principle without
7contradiction to any major claims and postulates in the Treatise. The gravest 
difficulty I encountered in respect to the claim that the body can be understood 
as the principle of unity is the problem of the local conjunction. I became aware 
of the gravity of this problem through Don GARRETTs book on Hume which 
was published in June 1997. I have tried my best to weaken GARRETT’S 
objection but I also know that a more thourough investigation of Hume’s account 
concerning matter would be required to reach a conclusive verdict. Despite the 
fact that GARRETT’s book was published just two months before I had to 
submit this work I wanted to include its claims into my discussion, since they are 
relevant to my interpretation of the Treatise.
If the claims I wish to make can be accepted, we would have to conclude 
that Hume’s account of self (and personhood) is quite successful. It is my belief 
that Hume’s account does not fail because there cannot be an impression of the 
self or because there is no principle of unity. It also does not fail because the 
self is necessarily a solitary self or because the postulates of Book One and 
Two of the Treatise contradict each other. I will attempt to establish that none of 
these is the case. Hume’s account of the self fails because his theory of 
perception cannot provide for memory. Memory has to acquaint us with the 
succession of our perceptions, in that sense, memory is „the source of personal 
identity"1. Memory, to some extent, produces identity, but it also discovers it.2 
Hume’s theory of human nature works quite nicely if we take memory for 
granted. However, all perceptions are fleeting existences. This makes an 
account of memory difficult, if not impossible. I believe it is a big irony that the 
philosopher who placed reason, experience and the human mind under close 
scrutiny and who emphasized the creativity of the mind must fail in that he 
renders impossible one of the most important requirements of the creative mind.
1 T.I,IV,V I,261.
2 compare ibid., p.262.
81. The Concept of the Self in Book One 
I. Memory
l.l. Memory and Imagination
Hume gives his account of memory very early in the Treatise. He writes: „We 
find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it 
again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two 
different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable 
degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression 
and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The 
faculty by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the 
MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION."3 The difference is not only one of 
vivacity but also one of arrangement. Imagination possesses the power of 
variation whilst memory does not. „The chief exercise of the memory is not to 
preserve the simple ideas , but their order and position."4 The preservation of 
the simple ideas themselves cannot be the main exercise of the memory 
because both imagination and memory ‘receive’ their ideas from the same pool. 
Neither of the two can go beyond experience as the only source of simple ideas. 
This account of memory produces several problems rooted in Hume’s theory of 
perceptions. All perceptions, impressions as well as ideas, are „fleeting 
existences". Hume takes this into consideration by pointing out that the 
arrangement of ideas cannot be a sufficient criterion to distinguish memory from 
imagination because it is ..impossible to recal the past impressions, in order to 
compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their arrangement be 
exactly similar."5 However, the same difficulties arise in respect to the vivacity- 
criterion because it requires a comparison between different degrees of vivacity.
We also cannot store past ideas somewhere, since firstly, the mind- 
independent existence of a body which could offer this possibility (with whatever 
theoretical difficulties) can not be exploited theoretically because there are no
3 T.I,I,III,8-9.
4 ibid., p.9.
5 T.I,III,V ,85.
9reasonable grounds to verify any such belief.6 Secondly, perceptions are 
described as fleeting existences, so how can a past perception be repeated and 
how do I know about this repetition (which would be necessary)? How can the 
repeated perception even feel familiar without even a trace of the resembling 
past perception recognizable by me? This seems to be one of Hume’s most 
consequential problems resulting from his theory of ideas, not only in respect to 
the self and personal identity but also in respect to Hume’s account of causality, 
which is the backbone of his theory not only in Book One. „lf there are no lasting 
human brains to store our memories of constant conjunctions during our 
dreamless sleep, and during the time when we are not attending to them, then it 
becomes very hard to see how exactly past experience can causally operate on 
our mind in such an insensible manner as never to be taken notice of’ (T.218) 
Belief in unnoticed or secret causes will be ruled out if all we believe in is what 
we, whether individually or collectively, have kept strictly under our notice."7 
Moreover, how capable are we to attend continuously to the same perception? 
,,‘Tis impossible for the mind to fix itself steadily upon one idea for any 
considerable time; nor can it by utmost efforts ever arrive at such constancy. [...] 
‘Tis difficult for the mind, when actuated by any passion, to confine itself to that 
passion alone, without any change or variation."8 There are, however, links 
between our successive perceptions, including the passions which are also 
perceptions. „The rule by which they proceed, is to pass from one object to what 
is resembling, contiguous to, or produc’d by it."9 But it doesn’t look as if these 
links by relation can be sufficient for our purpose because there are perceptions 
which seem to be unrelated to each other. Although ideas can be related by
6 Though it will later be argued that Hume is a Basic Realist and also that the body can serve as the principle 
of unity of perceptions, the claim that the body is „storing“ past perceptions is much more difficult to 
establish. The latter claim seems to be an ontological claim about the nature of the body and it will be shown 
that no such claim can reasonably be made.
7 BAIER, A.C., A Progress o f Sentiments, Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 108.
8 T.II,I,IV ,283.
9
10
causation, resemblance and contiguity, impressions are only related by 
resemblance and everyone has experienced situations where non resembling 
impressions occurred in succession. However, that these perceptions don’t 
seem to be related to a foregoing perception doesn’t mean they aren’t.10 In 
respect to perceptions related to one another we could perhaps say that if I am 
unable to pay permanent attention to one perception because my attention is 
drawn to new perceptions related to my previous one by causation, 
resemblance and contiguity, then my previous perception is in some way, not as 
a recall, but as some memory or recognition, available to me by a reversed 
mechanism. But it seems that this also is not without problems and we have to 
notice that these problems occur even if we take here for granted that all 
perceptions are related, either by causality, contiguity or resemblance.11
If memory can be seen as the kind of recognition and familiarity we arrive at 
by tracing back the chain of successive perceptions the question arises: which 
point, or perhaps better, which element in the chain is the criterion for 
verification of particular memories? How do we know that we stumbled upon 
something that is memory and not just imagination? One might be tempted to 
say that every perception I had is a content of memory, that I really had to have 
this perception, otherwise it couldn’t be part of the chain of perceptions. This is 
certainly true, and it draws a light upon a distinction we obviously have to make. 
This distinction reaches all the way back to the different faculties of memory and 
imagination and to the nature of perception. To put it into plain words: all 
perceptions of memory generate from perceptions which were, as we usually 
think, either perceptions of something real, something „out there" or of 
something we really thought, did or felt; or were perceptions due to imagination 
and don’t represent something „real“ in the first sense. We are usually able to 
verify or falsify our memories of past perceptions. They either are proper 
memories, that is, they refer to something which really did occur or are not
10 For a proper discussion see Chapter The Principle of Unity o f Perceptions.
11 In a later chapter we will see that this is not so, i.e. that there are perceptions which cannot be related to one 
another by any of the principles of association and relation either of ideas and impressions. We will also find 
that the said principles are more or less interdependent.
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memories because they have no reference to any „real“ occurrence. Memory 
makes not only facts and past events that really did occur available for us but 
also all past perceptions we had, this includes perceptions of imagination (it 
doesn’t really matter if we can, in fact, remember all of them, it is sufficient that 
we could under certain circumstances. To use the term imagination here so 
freely is somehow problematic, because Hume’s concept of imagination and its 
function is complicated and contains more than we, in common use, ascribe to 
it. When I speak of perceptions of imagination here, I am referring to 
perceptions which do not represent any „reaP‘, external occurrences, but are 
only „imagined“ as dreams, hallucinations, inventions etc. are. As I just said, we 
are able to remember not only perceptions of facts but also perceptions of 
imagination. It is, as anyone knows, possible to remember dreams, 
hallucinations and so on. We are able to imagine situations we are not 
experiencing and we also know that, remembering past imaginations, these 
were „only“ imaginations. They are proper memories in the sense that these 
imaginations really did occur but they did occur as imaginations and they are 
remembered as such. It makes perfect sense to tell someone about my dream 
last night but I refer to it as a dream, not as something which did really happen.
There are, of course, memories I have which I can’t label either as the 
memory of some fact or as a memory of an imagination. I might even have 
some memories of things I refer to as having happened but in fact they didn’t. In 
the case where I have a perception of an event which really did happen and it 
happened in the way I remember it, in this case I have a true belief about this 
event. That is, I have a memory. If, however, my perception is not a perception 
of an event which did happen the way I believe it to have happened or didn’t 
happen at all, then I have a false belief concerning the occurrence or the nature 
of this particular event. In such case we would not employ the term memory to 
label the perception. It therefore seems to be the case that to determine 
whether a perception is a perception of memory or of imagination I need a 
criterion to verify or falsify my beliefs. Simply tracking back the chain of my 
perceptions does not provide me with such a criterion since all my perceptions
12
are part of this chain, the perceptions of memory as well as perceptions of 
imagination. I need therefore a criterion to distinguish the one from the other. 
Hume does think that we can, in the most instances, distinguish them by their 
vivacity, thereby avoiding to use a rational criterion of verification.12 Hume 
claims, as I stated earlier, that the perceptions of memory are generally more 
vivid and forceful than the ideas of imagination. Therefore, perceptions of 
memory can be identified as such by their greater vivacity and the force they 
have on our minds. However, this is not a sufficiently reliable criterion because 
ideas of memory can be faint and less vivid than the ideas of imagination, just 
as impressions can be sometimes fainter and less forceful than ideas. „Thus in 
sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas 
may approach to our impressions: As on the other hand it sometimes happens, 
that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from 
our ideas."13
We need to find a criterion which works reliably on two levels, the first I will 
call the level of direct origin, the second the level of indirect origin. I 
understand by direct origin present perceptions which can be identified as either 
perceptions of memory or perceptions of imagination. Indirect origin applies to 
perceptions which are presently perceptions of memory but have to be traced 
back to their roots, i.e. they are either proper memories or remembered 
perceptions of imagination. I must be able to label my present perception 
correctly as either one of imagination or memory, and if the latter I must also be 
able to identify this particular memory as a memory of an event having occurred 
or as a memory of a perception of imagination. Taking the first, common 
meaning of imagination, an example can be given as follows. I have the memory 
that my mother hit me when I was a child because I didn’t say ‘thank you’ after 
receiving a gift from my rich and unpleasant uncle. This would be a proper
12 I  would still like to use the term verification here because of the common meaning of the term memory 
which Hume acknowledges somehow by talking „original order“ and so on. Even if a memory must perhaps 
be understood rather as an image than a belief it still makes some sense to say that memory images are true 
images (as in true to...) of an earlier perception. This implies, however, an unorthodox (in respect to 
rationality) understanding of verification.
13 T.I,I,I,2. (Please note also that Hume is referring here obviously to dream-sleep, and not to the kind of 
dreamless, seemingly perception-less sleep he discusses later on in the Treatise.)
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memory if the described event really did occur in the way I remember it. But it 
would be a memory of an imagination if it didn’t, if I wasn’t hit or never received 
a gift from this person or if I did say ‘thank you’14. The perception would not be a 
memory perception if only one component of this perception didn’t occur in the 
perceived way. However, I may well not know that my perception is either a 
memory of an imagination or a even a completely new imagination. So, what is 
then a memory of imagination which I believe to be a memory of „real“ events - 
is it what one could call with all caution a false memory? In Hume’s account it 
certainly would be, for him a false memory must be due to imagination as he 
understands the latter. Memory, to be proper memory, has to maintain the 
original order of the events in question.The „right order1*, or the right 
arrangement, is the relationship all involved relata have and have had to each 
other. They are the elements, or components of the arrangement. Memory, as it 
is said, doesn’t have the power to alter this order, and therefore can’t alter the 
set of components whereas imagination has the power to do so. Both have the 
same pool of elements, neither of the two can receive material from beyond 
experience. His discussion concerning imagination and memory doesn’t indicate 
that both are also restricted to the same set of events. Imagination can take its 
material from all perceptions ever experienced and can arrange them in any 
conceivable order. Imagination also has its rules - but within these restrictions 
imagination can play freely, there is no restriction which players get to be 
appointed to play the game. Since there is no „right order1 there cannot be a 
„right“ set of relata either.
There are ways of association which apply to the relation of ideas, some 
ideas are naturally related to each other, some are not. „The principles of union 
among ideas, I have reduc’d to three general ones, and have asserted, that the 
idea or impression of any object naturally introduces the idea of any other 
object, that is resembling, contiguous to, or connected with it. These principles I 
allow to be neither the infallible nor the sole causes of an union among ideas. 
They are not the infallible causes. For one may fix his attention during some
14 This list is not claimed to be exhaustive.
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time on any one object without looking farther. They are not the sole causes. 
For the thought has evidently a very irregular motion in running along its 
objects, and may leap from the heavens to the earth, from one end of the 
creation to the other, without any certain method or order. But tho’ I allow this 
weakness in these three relations, and this irregularity in the imagination; yet I 
assert that the only general principles, which associate ideas, are resemblance, 
contiguity and causation."15 Once more it becomes clear that memory has to 
work within a certain set of relata and their relations whilst imagination can be 
creative with all available (by experience) possible relata and relate them in any 
possible way. There is a distinction between perceptions of memory and 
perceptions of imagination which cannot be reduced to vivacity alone.
It becomes also apparent that verification would seems to be necessary in 
respect to a possibility of distinction between memory and imagination. To talk 
about the „right“ set of relata and their „right“ order or arrangement makes sense 
only if we can determine what this „right“ is. Hume obviously wants to say that 
these two faculties of the human mind are different in their characteristic 
function and are also different in terms of their intrinsic mechanisms. To give the 
psychological account he has he would need to be able to distinguish them, 
generally and in particular, and most importantly, he needs to account for his 
conviction that mistakes can occur and can eventually be corrected. He would 
need to establish them as two different faculties (general distinction) and he 
needs also to distinguish between particular perceptions as belonging to either 
of the faculties (particular distinction). So far he has failed to offer one reliable 
criterion to do so and the question remains how he is not only able to make the 
distinction in respect to particular perceptions but how is he able to give an 
account, even to speak of two faculties at all? His epistemology, so far, cannot 
provide for the presence and the distinction of these faculties, it cannot provide 
for his psychology.
15 T.I,III,V I,92-93.
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l.ll. Implications for Ontology and Epistemology
To investigate the somehow strange clash between psychology and 
epistemology we need to consider the problem in the context of the possibility of 
real existence which is clearly implied in Book Two and Three of the Treatise. 
As I have already indicated we are used to distinguishing imagination from 
memory, on both levels, mostly by empirical verification. At least we do this in 
ordinary life. Ideas which can be verified as representing events which really did 
occur in the way they are represented are counted as ideas of memory. Ideas 
which cannot be verified are counted as belonging to imagination. There exists 
a variety of means of verification and we use these tools regularly. The difficulty 
arises because we cannot apply this ordinary procedure to Hume’s account. 
First of all, his theory of ideas is not a representational theory of ideas. Sense 
impressions cannot rationally be said to resemble their causes. Hume has to 
give this account because of his strict empirical approach to human nature. He 
claims that only perceptions, that is impressions and ideas, are available to us. 
They are therefore the only objects of perception. Even if they would resemble 
something beyond themselves, we have no possibility (at least not in the 
rationale of Book One) to know about it and cannot make any statements 
concerning the matter. „That our senses offer not their impressions as the 
images of something distinct, or independent, and external, is evident; because 
they convey to us nothing but a single perception, and never give us the least 
intimation of any thing beyond. A single perception can never produce the idea 
of a double existence, but by some inference either of the reason or 
imagination."16 Thus, to construct the very ideas of causation and externality for 
instance, we need either imagination or reason. To be strict we actually have to 
exclude even reason as not capable of doing the much needed job. Hume 
dedicates especially Part IV of Book One to the exploration of reason and its 
limits to provide for our most fundamental concepts, such as externality, 
causality and identity. Reason, turned on itself and turned towards these 
concepts, falls into absurdity and so does the reasoner. „For I have already
16 T.I,IV,II,189.
16
shewn, that the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most 
general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of 
evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life.“17 The 
consequences of a limited, alone almost powerless reason are devastating: 
„The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human 
reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject 
all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable 
or likely than another. Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my 
existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and 
whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I 
any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am confounded with all these 
questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition 
imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d of the use 
of every member and faculty."18 This leaves us entirely with imagination as 
being the last resort. The problems concerning the distinction of memory from 
imagination rise here once again. Verification of beliefs in the sense suggested 
by me seems to require imagination but imagination to be distinguished from 
memory requires verification.
Hume argues that „the belief or assent, which always attends the memory 
and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present; and 
that this alone distinguishes them from the imagination."19 It is, however, not 
only a perception of memory (or the senses) which can be attended by the 
belief and can thereby be identified as a perception of memory (or the senses). 
„And as an idea of the memory, by losing its force and vivacity, may degenerate 
to such a degree, as to be taken for an idea of the imagination; so on the other 
hand an idea of the imagination may acquire such a force and vivacity, as to 
pass for an idea of the memory, and counterfeit its effects on the belief and 
judgment."20 Thus, in our judgment we can mistake a less vivid perception of
17 T .I,IV ,V II,267-268.
18 ibid., p.268-269.; A. BAIER gives a thorough and sympathetic account of these problems in the chapter 
Philosophy in This Careless Manner, in: A Progress o f Sentiments.
19 T.I,III,V ,86.
20 ibid.
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memory for an idea of imagination and a very vivid idea of imagination for an 
idea of memory. Hume’s entire discussion of the issue suggests that an idea of 
imagination mistaken for an idea of memory is still, in fact, an idea of 
imagination and not of memory. The judgment, influenced by the vivid 
appearance of the perception in the mind, is mistaken but the perception itself 
doesn’t suddenly change it’s nature. But if it is, firstly, still an idea of imagination 
how can it give rise to a belief (of memory) when only ideas of memory can do 
so? Secondly, if it cannot give rise to such a belief because it is still an idea of 
imagination, how can we mistake it for an impression of memory? And finally, if 
it can give rise to such a belief how can we then not take it to be an idea of 
memory?
On the other hand, if any perception is just as what we perceive it, since it is 
the only „real“ object of perception itself, then how does it make sense to talk 
about a mistake? Something which appears to be an idea of memory because it 
is vivid and attended by the belief would be, and only could be, an idea of 
memory. Consequently, everything which appears to be an idea of imagination 
must then be an idea of imagination. A vivid idea of imagination, believed to be 
an idea of memory because of its force of vivacity can be nothing else than that. 
Within this scenario we wouldn’t have any difficulties to distinguish between 
imagination and memory, because everything is what it appears to be. The 
difficulties with the distinction only arise because mistakes are possible, Hume 
allows for them. And these mistakes are possible because Hume tacitly still 
makes the distinction between being and appearance. If one is to believe the 
positivist interpretation of Hume then his empirical approach to the nature of 
man should not allow for such a distinction. Epistemology and ontology should 
have to be one, this, however, is here not the case.
The same clash occurs, in a slightly different way, but with a similar 
outcome, in regard to Hume’s approach to the self in Book One. He talks about 
the concepts of self philosophers have, and these concepts are not alien to the 
non-philosopher either. Hume regards these concepts as being rationally 
unfounded: „There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment
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intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its 
continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a 
demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. [...] Unluckily all these 
positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for 
them, nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explain’d. For 
from what impression cou’d this idea be deriv’d? This question ‘tis impossible to 
answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity; and yet ‘tis a question, 
which must necessarily be answer’d, if we wou’d have the idea of self pass for 
clear and intelligible. It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every 
real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our 
several impressions and ideas are suppos’d to have a reference."21 He 
expresses the view that such concepts must, at least, be doubted, because they 
cannot be arrived at by experience and reason. Perceptions (impressions and 
ideas) as the objects of experience cannot account for the concept of the self 
put forward by those philosophers. The self appears to have continued 
existence, we seem to be aware of our self, but the mechanism by which we 
acquire these beliefs cannot be the one suggested by these philosophers, nor is 
it absolutely certain that the self is, indeed, what they believe it to be because 
experience, how Hume understands it, cannot provide for a self fitting the 
appearance of the self. The self is actually something else than it appears to 
be, especially, as it turns out, in regard to simplicity. The occurring clash 
between epistemology and ontology is of some importance. We have to note 
that the form of the argument here is very similar to the form of the argument 
concerning externality. Experience „of external objects" cannot provide for 
certainty concerning the mind-independent existence of the external world. It is, 
if Book One is taken in isolation, impossible to know, whether there exists an 
external world or not. However, it doesn’t follow that externality doesn’t exist and 
Hume never draws such a harsh conclusion, not even in Book One. It only 
follows that it might not, we simply don’t know and the kind of experience Hume 
discusses in Book One, married to reason alone cannot provide knowledge of
21 T.I,IV,VI,251.
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that kind.22 In the same manner, it doesn’t follow from the fact that experience 
and reason alone cannot provide for something other than a bodyless, isolated 
self that the self is bodyless and isolated. It might be that but it also might be 
something else, not to speak of the question how the bundle-definition must be 
understood.
It seems to be the case that Hume treats, in the discussion of Book One, 
the relation between epistemology and ontology quite differently when it occurs 
within different objects of investigation. It seems to be true that Hume 
sometimes, in the case of externality for instance, acknowledges that such a 
clash can occur and that epistemology and ontology don’t have to be one. The 
outcome of Book One is, as was said before, a highly sceptical one. The 
scepticism which creeps in is very disturbing and leaves the author and the 
reader in an almost inescapable despair, but Hume already indicates ways to 
overcome this kind of intellectual despair and loss. However, the possible 
difference between epistemology and ontology, underlying his account of 
externality and the distinction between memory and imagination for instance, is 
not allowed for when he talks about the self. Looking at the problem of real, 
continued existence of objects Hume’s argument takes the form:
1. experience and reason alone cannot provide the belief in real,
continued existence of objects
therefore:
2. such objects may or may not exist 
But in respect to the self he seems to argue:
1. experience and reason alone cannot provide the belief in the
existence of a simple self with perfect identity
therefore:
2. a simple self with perfect identity does not exist
221 have put it this way because the fundamental belief we do have in external existence, though it is rationally 
unfounded, is as a belief some kind of experience too.
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The difference in treatment is not purely accidental. It springs to mind that there 
is a fundamental difference between the external and the internal. The latter 
being imagination, memory and the self which are features of the mind. It seems 
to be the case that internal, i.e. mental events are immediately and directly 
accessible to the mind whilst external, i.e. physical events and entities are not. 
„Mental states and processes are (or are normally) conscious states and 
processes, and the consciousness which irradiates them can engender no 
illusions and leaves the door open for no doubts. A person’s present thinkings, 
feelings and willings, his perceivings, rememberings and imaginings are 
intrinsically ‘phosphorescent’ their existence and their nature are inevitably 
betrayed to their owner. The inner life is a stream of consciousness of such a 
sort that it would be absurd to suggest that the mind whose life is that stream 
might be unaware of what is passing down it.“23 If this is true and we have 
immediate „contact“ with our own mental life, or to strengthen the claim in a 
Humean way - actually are the stream of the conscious mental events (on 
whatever level of consciousness) then I cannot be mistaken about their 
existence. We find ourselves immediately in Cartesian company because it is 
conceivable now how one could claim that it is possible to doubt the existence 
of externality but that it is inconceivable to doubt the existence of one’s own 
mental events. Thus, our difficulties to explain the inconsistency of the theory of 
ideas in respect to the relation between ontology and epistemology have not 
decreased, instead they have become more complex. We have now an idea 
why Hume is making allowances, at this point of the discussion, for uncertainty 
concerning the existence of externality, we may also have an idea why he is 
positive about the self as being nothing but a bundle of perceptions, but the 
Cartesian twist doesn’t work in respect to his account of memory and 
imagination. If everything which was said about the availability of the mental 
were true then it would be impossible to mistake memory for imagination and 
vice versa.
23 RYLE, G. The Concept o f Mind, The University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 13-14.
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The detected inconsistency in Hume’s account is important towards an 
assessment of his theory. Firstly, it is a mistake to think that Book One and Two 
of the Treatise rest upon fundamentally different and even contradictory 
premisses and that it is Book One alone which is philosophically interesting and 
original. BAIER argues that the philosophy of Book Two and Three has been 
widely underestimated and only Book One received proper philosophical 
attention resulting in its destruction because it has been taken in isolation. But it 
is also a mistake to overestimate the two later Books of the Treatise and to 
disregard the foundations of Hume’s solutions set out in Book One. One doesn’t 
have to be a Cartesian to have problems with certainty concerning externality. 
Hume’s own theory of perception, fundamental to Book One, doesn’t account 
for the possibility of rationally gained knowledge about external existences 
either. His strict empiricism, strongly connected with the theory of perceptions 
cannot, on its own, account for causality. To introduce the idea of necessary 
connection Hume has to make use of imagination. Imagination therefore is a 
key issue for Hume and it seems to be important to distinguish it properly from 
memory and from any other feature of the mind.
Secondly, Hume needs a proper account of memory to explain and to 
establish the concepts of externality, causality and identity. Memory and 
imagination play different and distinct parts in respect to these concepts. 
Memory alone (together, of course, with experience and reason) cannot account 
for the concept of externality, the idea of necessary connection and the concept 
of identity, neither can imagination, on its own. Hume’s concept of the self as a 
bundle of perceptions also requires memory. We have to be able to recognize 
the required succession of perceptions. We will need to remember previous 
perceptions, perhaps not necessarily their content, but certainly that we had 
them. Otherwise a definition of the self as a bundle of successive perceptions is 
not possible. Memory in itself becomes very difficult, given Hume’s theory of 
perceptions, because perceptions are fleeting existences. How can past 
perceptions be accessible to the mind? Most importantly: since each present 
perception, even if it is a perception of memory, is by definition an entirely new
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perception how then can perceptions of memory be recognized as images of 
past perceptions? If the „knowledge“ that I have had past perceptions would 
only be a construct by imagination, positive statements concerning the 
existence of the self cannot be made at all, not even of it’s existence as a 
bundle of perceptions, as they cannot be made about the existence of 
externality either. (Hume uses imagination to establish the concept of 
externality and the idea of necessary connection, but he himself finds it 
necessary to introduce sentiment, which goes beyond imagination, to free these 
concepts from the impression that they are nothing but constructs of the human 
mind.) It becomes clear, that Hume needs a clear and reliable distinction 
between memory and imagination to arrive at any positive statements about 
externality, causality, identity and the self.
We have seen that Hume does not provide us with such a reliable criterion 
to make a clear distinction between memory and imagination. The implications 
for a positive account of the self in Book One as a bundle of perceptions are 
serious, even if the self and memory and imagination are interrelated. We need 
to establish the self as a unity but the bundle definition, so far, cannot fulfill this 
function, because we cannot account for the claim that there is a succession of 
perceptions. We would need a proper account of memory to do this. Such 
account can only be given if a) memory is theoretically possible and b) if it can 
be distinguished from imagination successfully and reliably. Neither seems to be 
possible.
We also face another problem the bundle definition poses, namely the 
problem of what it is that unites the different perceptions of the bundle. These 
perceptions are not only united in the sense of a unity stringent in time, i.e. 
succession. We also have different co-existing perceptions. When I sit and read 
a book I perceive the letters in the book, perceive the whiteness and paperness 
of the page, feel the solidity of the book I hold, feel also the solidity of the chair 
and so on, but at the same time I also perceive that I sit outside, that it is a bit 
windy and the trees smell etc. I don’t have to pay any attention to these things to
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perceive them. Nevertheless, these perceptions are elements of the bundle of 
perceptions I experience, or, in Humean terms, the bundle that I am.
I. III. The Relation of Self and Memory
Although we have seen the difficulties of Hume’s theory in respect to his 
account of memory, I will take for granted, from now on, that memory is possible 
and that we do have perceptions of memory and that we are usually able to 
recognize them as such. It is the purpose of this chapter to establish a 
necessary link between memory and the self in the sense that we cannot have a 
self without having memory. I wish therefore to establish memory as a 
necessary feature of the self.
There has been , and there still is much discussion about the constituents of 
the self, or, in other words, about the criteria or the criterion of personal 
identity.24 The discussion is mainly revolving around competing theories, one 
putting forward memory as being the criterion, the other favoring bodily 
continuity. I don’t wish to make strict claims as they are needed to support one 
or the other of the two main stream theories. By strict claims I understand 
claims which maintain that memory (or the body) is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the self. It will be sufficient for my present purpose to show that 
memory is a necessary condition, although I also hope to show that memory is 
not the only criterion. To establish this claim I will need to take references to the 
competing theories, and especially take recourse to the memory-theory. But it is 
my belief that the discussion of the problem of personal identity in terms of 
either being a matter of memory or bodily continuity or both is generally 
misplaced because it fails to overcome the Cartesian Real distinction, which is 
still lying at the heart of the matter.
Before we can start to look into existing memory-theories and the accounts 
they give I have to clarify what kind of memory we are here concerned with
24 Here I  treat self identity and personal identity synonymously, though we will see later on that there is a 
distinction between them.
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because the term memory has its ambiguities. As I understand memory here it 
can be described as event-memory or experience-memory. These events or 
experiences are not only restricted to events or experiences we make with the 
outside world and our bodies, but include also mental events or experiences of 
the so called internal life. The kind of memory I wish to discuss is also 
exclusively human memory. We might want to draw some parallels, perhaps, to 
animal life or intelligent life forms other than human, but they remain 
momentarily outside the area I restrict for the present purpose. I am also not 
concerned with the kinds of memory we find in artificial intelligence, notebooks, 
diaries and so on.
The theory which places memory in the very centre of personal identity was 
initiated by John LOCKE who defines personal identity in terms of memory.25 
LOCKE writes: „For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ‘tis 
that, which makes every one to be, what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes 
himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, 
i.e., the sameness of a rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be 
extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity 
of that Person; it is the same self now it was then; and ‘tis by the same self with 
this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done."26 This 
backwards reaching consciousness is memory. For LOCKE, to think and to 
perceive was to be conscious, according to his theory of perception. This poses 
certain problems in respect to personal identity, because human beings are not 
permanently in a conscious state: they sleep, faint, fall into comata and come 
out of them again without losing their personal identity and without ceasing to 
perceive themselves as being themselves afterwards. LOCKE recognizes the 
problem and offers a solution. Although we are unconscious, possibiliter we 
could remember past events we had experienced. PERRY formulates LOCKE’s 
solution like this: „A does contain or could contain a memory of an experience
25 PERRY, J. The Problem of Personal Identity, in: PERRY, J. (ed.) Personal Identity, University of 
California Press, 1975, p. 12.
26 LECHU.II,XXVII,9,335.
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contained in B.“27 A and B are something PERRY calls Person-stages occurring 
at different times. When I go to bed Tuesdays at 11p.m. having just watched 
Mulder and Scully investigating another strange incident I am in person-stage B. 
I fall asleep and wake up again Wednesday at 7a.m.; now the person stage A 
can be ascribed to me. If we can connect stage A with stage B, that is if we can 
establish a unity of A and B, we can know that the person in A is the same 
person it was in B. I would be able to say that the experiences gained in B and 
the ones newly acquired in A are my experiences, I am the same person on 
Wednesday as I was on Tuesday. „Person-stages belong to the same person, if 
and only if the later could contain an experience which is a memory of a 
reflective awareness of an experience contained in the earlier.4'28
This solution is not without serious flaws. There are experiences we actually 
had but cannot remember, even if we try very hard. We all know situations 
where our mothers, who like to do that sort of thing especially at family 
gatherings, tell stories about the most awful things we did and even when we 
are told that we did do such and such a thing we cannot remember the 
described incidents at all. We even, in some cases, would deny to ever have 
behaved in the suggested ways. It is not only that our memory cannot recall the 
situations we are told about but we are also convinced, against evidence from 
everyone around agreeing with our mother, that the event she is getting excited 
about didn’t really occur and she is making up a story to enjoy our 
embarrassment. THOMAS REID gives a counter-example to LOCKE’s solution 
which points out these problems: ..Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged 
when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the 
enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: 
Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that, when he took the 
standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when 
made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely 
lost the consciousness of his flogging. These things being supposed, it follows, 
from Mr Locke’s doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person
27 PERRY, J. ibid., p. 16.
28 ibid., p. 15.
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who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person 
who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that 
the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the 
general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging - therefore, 
according to Mr Locke’s doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. 
Therefore, the general is, and at the same time is not the same person with him 
who was flogged at school...“29
To overcome this sort of problem and to strengthen the memory-theory 
QUINTON developed the person-stage account in a way where the sequence of 
person-stages starting with a stage A and finishing with a stage B must be 
understood as follows: A contains a memory which is contained in A+1, A+1 
contains a memory (it doesn’t have to be the same one) which is contained in 
A+2 and so on until B.30 Here, person-stages and the sequence as a whole are 
taken to be in a chronological order, that is one stage succeeds another in the 
sequence as time advances. Stage A is at time t1, A+1 at t2 and so on until B. 
This, however, creates a new problem because our memories might not go 
along with a chronological order, for instance the general remembers being 
flogged as a schoolboy but doesn’t remember taking the standard as a young 
officer. PERRY also points out31 that the QUINTON-solution faces the same 
problems as the first account by taking only actual memories into consideration. 
But this problem is not very serious because we can just introduce, like we did 
in the first case, a „could“-condition and therefore rid ourselves of the problem. 
The problem of chronology is a bit more difficult to solve but GRICE offers a 
way out of it which is formulated by PERRY like this: „There is a sequence of 
person-stages (not necessarily in the order they occur in time, and not excluding 
repetitions), the first of which is A and the last of which is B, such that each 
person-stage in the sequence either (i) contains, or could contain, a memory of
29 REID, T. Essays on the Intellectual Power o f Man, in: Inquiry and Essays, Hackett Publishing Company, 
Indianapolis, 1983, p.217-218.
30 compare PERRY, J. ibid., p. 17.
31 ibid., p.18.
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an experience contained in the next, or (ii) contains an experience of which the 
next person-stage contains a memory, or could contain a memory."32
The problems described in REID’s example are overcome by the account of 
personal identity by unity of memory which GRICE gives, but it looks as if there 
are other remaining problems. One I have already mentioned. It is the problem 
of the „forgotten memory". This problem can also be applied to REID’s officer- 
example. Let’s say the general does not remember being flogged when a 
schoolboy, and though he remembers the orchard he does not remember that 
he stole from it. In fact, he never remembered this particular incident throughout 
his entire adult life. He only remembers that there was an orchard where he 
used to play. We now would have to answer the question: is the general 
identical with the boy who stole from the orchard and was consequently 
flogged? I think GRICE’s solution can be applied to this situation as well. If the 
boy could still remember the stealing and the flogging a week or a day after it 
happened, and we usually remember things which happened a week or a day 
earlier, then GRICE’s sequence would remain intact. In my interpretation of the 
account GRICE gives it wouldn’t matter what exactly we remember, it only 
matters that we remember at least something. The memory of the incident is 
carried by the sequence through the succession of time, it might be forgotten at 
one point in time and is forgotten in such a way that it will never be accessible 
again to the individual whose memory it was, but there will be other memories 
which carry through the temporal succession to the present stage and reach 
back, directly or indirectly, to a time the individual still had access to the 
„forgotten memory". If my interpretation is right then personal identity remains.
Another, more fundamental and more serious problem is formulated by 
BUTLER and might be found also in some of the statements REID makes when 
talking about identity. REID writes: „There can be no memory of what is past 
without the conviction that we existed at the time remembered. There may be 
good arguments to convince me that I existed before the earliest thing I can
32 ibid., p. 19., compare also GRICE, H.P. Personal Identity, in: PERRY, J. (ed.) The Problem o f Personal 
Identity, University of California Press, 1975.
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remember; but to suppose that my memory reaches a moment farther back than 
my belief and conviction of my existence, is a contradiction. [...] From this it is 
evident that we must have the conviction of our own continued existence and 
identity, as soon as we are capable of thinking or doing anything, on account of 
what we have thought, or done, or suffered before; that is, as soon as we are 
reasonable creatures."33 We have to interpret the statement in the sense that 
the conviction of my existence has to take precedence, or at least, that this 
conviction and memory go hand in hand and we cannot have the latter without 
the former34, memory provides us with the conviction that we have identity with 
our past and future selves. „l see evidently that identity supposes an 
uninterrupted continuance of existence. That which has ceased to exist cannot 
be the same with that which afterwards begins to exist."35 For REID memory 
plays the part of a means by which we know that there is something like 
uninterrupted existence, memory provides us with evidence, that a permanent 
self exists. „How do you know - what evidence have you - that there is such a 
permanent self [...]? To this I answer, that the proper evidence I have of all this 
is remembrance."36
It is clear that in REID’s account memory is neither a criterion nor a 
constituent of self-identity, but it is, and very importantly so, an epistemological 
instrument that provides evidence and also carries with it assurance of the 
existence of our selves. It could be argued that there has to be a first memory, 
but it is conceivable that the first memory I have is prior to the first experience I 
am aware of as my, and no one else’s, experience. However, the event I 
remember in my first memory would have to be of this kind of experience 
because otherwise, we could argue, I wouldn’t remember it because I wasn’t 
aware of this experience as being my experience in the first place. According to 
this, the kind of problem BUTLER points out, is clear to see. „But though 
consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our personal identity to
33 REID, T. ibid., p.212.
34 This, however, would not pose a problem in my account of self identity. Only precedence is problematic.
35 REID, T. ibid., p.213-214.
36 ibid., p.215.
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ourselves, yet, to say that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our 
being the same persons, is to say, that a person has not existed a single 
moment, nor done one action, but what we can remember; indeed none but 
what he reflects upon. And one should really think it self-evident, THAT 
CONSCIOUSNESS OF PERSONAL IDENTITY PRESUPPOSES, AND 
THEREFORE CANNOT CONSTITUTE, PERSONAL IDENTITY37, any more
o p
than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes."
We might, on face value, want to agree with BUTLER, but, on second 
thoughts, we find weaknesses in his argument which make it difficult to see the 
self-evidence he claims. He seems to think that, when accepting the memory- 
theory, we face the problem that we can only account for self-identity as far as 
our memory reaches. But what kind of memory has BUTLER in mind here? I 
cannot, of course, remember my own birth, neither can I remember anything I 
experienced before I was two years old. This doesn’t mean I didn’t exist before I 
was that age, it is pretty clear that I existed before then (before I can celebrate 
my second birthday I had to have a first one and I had to be born). Therefore, 
BUTLER argues, memory cannot be even necessary for personal identity. This 
conclusion doesn’t follow, especially not, when we take the person-stages 
account into consideration. That I cannot remember anything happening to the 
baby I was doesn’t mean that I didn’t remember anything when I was a baby. As 
soon as I accept that I have had memories when I was very small the person- 
stage account holds. The memories I had then are, of course, quite different 
from the memories I have now, not only in content but also in kind, because 
babies are usually considered as being not able to reflect upon their memories 
and the remembered experiences in the sense that they cannot conceptualize 
their memories or experiences of any kind because they cannot speak or 
understand speech.
Let us imagine the following case. There is a new born baby. (Note that the 
discussion can be extended into even earlier, that is, pre-natal stages.) The
37 my own accentuation.
38 BUTLER, J. O f Personal Identity, in: PERRY, J. (ed.) Personal Identity, ibid., p. 100.
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baby sleeps in its cot, quite content because it doesn’t feel any pain or need. It 
suddenly feels a growing discomfort which adults would describe as hunger. It 
starts to cry because of the discomfort and keeps on crying because its pain 
and frustration of being in pain increases with time. Finally, someone comes 
along, someone with a familiar smell and a friendly voice and starts to feed the 
baby so its discomfort disappears. These events in their order are repeated, at 
least, six times in 24 hours. The baby remembers that always when it cries 
really desperately someone comes and feeds it or does other nice things and so 
it eventually starts crying with „premeditation“, that is, it cries even then when 
there is nothing wrong just because it wants someone to be there. Every parent 
knows that and every parent knows also that babies do remember these things 
which makes life sometimes difficult because if the mother comes in as soon as 
the child just makes the faintest noise babies start to use this and no one gets 
any sleep. A baby of approximately six weeks of age should have learned when 
someone is coming and when not. Babies couldn’t have learned anything of that 
sort if they wouldn’t have the ability to remember experiences and if they 
wouldn’t exercise this ability.
It is plain to see that GRICE’s chain of person-stages holds here because a) 
there are memories and b) one remembers them at least for some time. It 
doesn’t matter if one forgets them later and doesn’t have access to these 
memories anymore. It is sufficient that these memories were contained in a 
person-stage which contained or could contain also memories which are 
contained or could be contained in the next person-stage. But the problem of 
the first memory still remains and therefore the objection that the memory- 
theory is circular because it presupposes self-identity cannot be refuted by 
reference to GRICE’s account. BUTLER’s arguments concerning the reach of 
memory and self-identity can be shown as not supporting his claim, but the 
claim of circularity itself still poses a problem for the memory-theory.
I think that circularities of this kind only occur when we suppose that either 
memory or self-identity has to be prior to the other, this assumes that one can 
have memory without self-identity in one case and in the other that one can
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have self-identity without memory. The memory-theorist wants to claim that 
memory is a constituent of self-identity and is, as such, sufficient for self- 
identity. But if so, how do I know that these memories are my memories unless 
there is already self-identity? Thus, the accusation that the memory-theory 
presupposes self-identity seems quite reasonable. However, my claim of a 
necessary connection39 between memory and self-identity does not imply an 
assumption of temporal priority and thus can avoid the circularity. The 
necessary connection is supposed to be one of interdependency. I claim that 
one cannot have self-identity without memory and vice versa.40
This raises another question concerning the underlying concept of the self. 
The claim that memory and self-identity are necessarily connected seems to 
imply that to be a self one has to know that one is a self. It is part of the concept 
of self underlying my claim that the self is necessarily self-conscious. Otherwise 
it would be possible to claim that the self is something which needs to be 
discovered, once the individual has discovered its self it is self-conscious. This 
claim implies a substantial understanding of the self.41 This is certainly not 
Hume’s understanding of the matter. For Hume, to have a concept of anything 
whatsoever means to have an idea of that something and to have an idea is to 
perceive an idea. This implies that we have to be conscious of this idea, on 
whatever level of consciousness. Hume would have to say that it doesn’t make 
sense to talk about a self we don’t know about, we don’t perceive. If we do, we
42talk only about a word, not about something we would like to call concept 
Hume implies, on several occasions, that an idea has to be (consciously) 
conceived: „...that it is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas 
of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination."43
39 „Necessary“ is not meant in the causal sense here, since causality requires temporal priority, which I want to 
overcome.
40 It seems to be the case that a similar circularity occurs in respect to at least some of the identity theories 
claiming the body to be the necessary and sufficient constituent of self-identity.
41 Some have argued that the self is something innate. This claim is, at first sight, compatible with my claim. 
However, I will argue later on that since we are not always conscious of ourselves (we are, for instance, not 
self-conscious when we are very small children) we not always are a self, i.e. we have to become a self. Being 
a self is not something we are born with.
42 compare T.I,II,II,32. and T.I,II,V,62.
43 T. App. 629.
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The self is not an external object, it is not part of what we usually call the 
external world which can be doubted, reasonably or otherwise, by overcautious 
sceptics. Since the self is internal to me, it must be accessible to me. In 
Humean terms this means it has to be accessible to my perception and the only 
thing which is, in this respect, is the bundle of perceptions. Hume, and this is 
important to realize, is not saying that the self is identical with any single one 
perception, but neither does he claim that there is no perception of the self. 
REID writes: „My personal identity, therefore, implies the continued existence of 
that indivisible thing which I call myself. Whatever this self may be, it is 
something which thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I 
am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, 
and acts, and suffers. My thoughts, and actions, and feelings, change every 
moment; they have no continued existence; but that self, or /, to which they 
belong, is permanent, and has the same relation to all the succeeding thoughts, 
actions, and feelings which I call mine."44 The picture of the self REID gives 
here understands the self very much as a substance which has powers (to think, 
to feel etc.) which can be exercised. HUME cannot adopt such an account of 
the self since he has to deny the existence of substances on empirical grounds. 
But HUME’s own account is in certain aspects in accordance with some of 
REID’s statements, namely in respect to the nature of perceptions, that is, 
impressions and ideas. HUME regards them, as I have already stated earlier, as 
fleeting existences. No perception is of lasting duration and there is a 
permanent change of the perceptions appearing on the stage of the theater of 
our mind. For that reason the self cannot be any one of such perceptions, but 
has to be, in HUME’s understanding, the bundle of perceptions which, as such, 
must be perceivable45 - but I will come to it later on.
44 REID, T. ibid., p.214-215.
45 Though not necessarily as a simple impression or an impression of the senses. The perception of the self, as 
we will see later on, must be understood as a complex perception of reflection.
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II. Self-Identity
II.I. The Criteria of Identity
Compatibility of Theories
Self-identity lies at the heart of any concept of the self as there must be a 
criterion or criteria which a) make the self the same self over a period of time 
and b) make a self identifiable and re-identifiable by others. Thus, we also need 
to pay attention to the problem of epistemological availability of the criterion or 
the criteria of self-identity.
Concerning the question of the criterion or the criteria of self-identity we are 
faced with mainly three competing theories. The body theory claims that the 
necessary and sufficient criterion of self-identity is the human body, either in its 
entirety (non-reductionist body theory) or only as the physical brain (reductionist 
body-theory). The memory theory, on the other hand, claims that memory (or 
the mental in general) is the necessary and sufficient criterion of the identity of 
the self. There is, last but not least, also a theory which I wish to call the 
combined theory, which argues that self-identity has a bodily as well as a mental 
criterion. Each one of these is a necessary, but on its own not a sufficient 
criterion.
The claim that the body, on its own, is a sufficient criterion for self-identity is 
hardly compatible with Hume’s account of the self especially in Book One of the 
Treatise. It is also incompatible with Hume’s philosophy in general. Although it 
will be argued later on that Hume is, in fact, a Basic Realist, it is also clear that 
the bundle-definition cannot allow for the body to be the sole criterion of identity. 
1 .The self is the bundle of perceptions and perceptions, to be perceptions, have 
to be conscious. They do not only have to be in the mind, they also, so Hume, 
constitute the mind. Thus, the mind has an important role to play where identity 
of the self is concerned and the body theory seems to deny that role. 2. The 
body theorist could argue, in a reductionist manner, that the mind is identical 
with the brain and neurophysiological events which take place in the brain. 
Thereby setting the mind and the physical in a relation of identity. Despite
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Hume’s Basic Realism this is an account which cannot be argued to be Hume’s. 
We will see, later on, that though an ontological claim concerning the existence 
of external body (which includes one’s own) can be made claims about the 
nature of body cannot. The reductionist account implies, however, a claim about 
the nature of body, namely that particular neurophysiological events are 
identical with particular mental events. Such an account cannot reasonably be 
given within the framework of Hume’s philosophy and since such an account 
would be necessary we can say that the body theory, for that reason, is 
incompatible with Hume’s philosophy.
Apart from the obstacles posed by Hume’s theory of perception there are 
other possible objections against the body-theory. I wish to give some indication 
of what they are. Many of these objections have been pointed out by QUINTON 
and SHOEMAKER. Both argue that the body-theory which claims that bodily 
continuity is the sole criterion of personal identity is not in accordance with our 
intuitions concerning personal identity which seem to place it in the sphere of 
memory, character and/or personality, that is, generally speaking, in the sphere 
of the mental rather than in the sphere of the physical i.e. the body. Both draw 
up cases of the following kind: There are two different persons A and B, A has a 
character and a personality of the kind Q whilst S’s personality and character 
are of the kind R. One sunny morning someone wakes up with the body of B. 
We can observe B s body displaying behavior appropriate to Q entirely 
incompatible with R. Someone else also wakes up who’s visual appearance tells 
us that this person must be A since we see the body we previously have known 
as A. Nevertheless, the body looking like A looked yesterday is displaying 
behavior entirely alien to the behavior we would expect from Q, but in total 
accordance with behavior of personalities of the kind R. Our reaction would be 
one of concern and confusion and further inquiry would reveal that the body 
looking like A has all the memories B had yesterday and the body looking like B 
has all the memories A had yesterday. Intuitively we would say that a body 
switch has occurred and that A is still A but has a different body, the one that 
was previously B s. Consequently we would say about B that he is still B but has
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now A s  previous body as his body. What we aren’t likely to say is that a 
memory and a personality switch occurred. We don’t say that A is now B and B 
is now A. „Now what would it be reasonable to say in these circumstances: that 
B and C have changed bodies (the consequence of a mental criterion), that they 
have switched character and memories (the consequence of a bodily criterion), 
or neither? It seems to me quite clear that we should not say that B and C had 
switched characters and memories. And if this is correct, it follows that bodily 
identity is not a logically complete criterion of personal identity; at best it could 
be a necessary condition of personal identity."46
We can find many examples of such cases throughout all cultures and 
times. It is not even necessary that the new body is a human one. The prince is 
still, somehow, the prince, even when he has the body of a frog. If bodily 
continuity would be the sole criterion of personal identity our intuitions were 
entirely mistaken. We would have to say that the frog is not the prince at all, that 
person A is now person B because our identity is defined by our bodies. If such 
a mistake of intuition truly occurs, it is certainly not a mistake we all are going to 
accept and we would subsequently want to correct it. However, the intuition 
seems to be so strong that we are more likely to abandon the strict form of the 
body-theory. Some other beliefs we employ in every day life also do not support 
the body-theory as QUINTON points out: „ln our general relations with other 
human beings their bodies are for the most part intrinsically unimportant. We 
use them as convenient recognition devices enabling us to locate without 
difficulty the persisting character and memory complexes in which we are 
interested, which we love or like."47 Literature and folk wisdom are full of tales 
about ugly or terrible bodies „hosting“ a good and generous soul.
The general consent here seems to be that the bodily appearance has 
nothing to do, or at least not much, with what and who a person really is. 
Intuitively we lay the emphasis on memory and character to identify a person 
and not on their bodies. We can imagine people having identical bodies, pairs of
46 QUINTON, A. The Soul, in: PERRY, J. (ed.), ibid., p.63.
47 ibid., p.64.
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absolutely identical twins, for instance, but it is more difficult to imagine the 
possibility of totally identical minds, because even the bodies of identical twins 
cannot occupy the same space and even if all their experiences were identical 
they still would perceive one and the same object from a different angle which 
gives them a slightly different perception of the object. The position in space, 
however, is clearly a bodily matter, but the kind and the quality of the conscious 
experience isn’t. In ordinary circumstances bodies are a good and easy way of 
identifying others because usually bodies are quite different and we can easily 
recognize these differences; but so are many other things, like names for 
instance. Nevertheless, there are situations in ordinary life where the body is not 
considered as a sufficient means to identify others, like in the case of identical 
twins or doppelgangers. Here we need to make further inquiries concerning a 
person’s memories and character, like for instance, does the person remember 
events and people he or she should remember, and so on. If this person is not 
capable of producing the right kinds of memory, character etc. we naturally 
conclude that the person is quite a different person from the one we know or 
look for. To describe our mistake in the identity of this person we would employ 
sentences like: „l was deceived by the appearance of such and such.“ or „This 
man looked exactly like my grandfather but it wasn’t him.“
We have to realize that these arguments only suggest that bodily continuity 
is very unlikely to be the sole criterion of personal identity. They haven’t shown 
that it is not one of its criteria or constituents, if there is more than one criterion 
or constituent. Furthermore, to say that bodily continuity is not the sole criterion 
of personal identity doesn’t imply that memory in particular or the mental in 
general is the sole criterion of identity either. It seems to me more reasonable to 
think that personal identity has more than one criterion and that bodily continuity 
is one of its criteria. SIDNEY SHOEMAKER thinks that „Bodily identity is 
certainly a criterion of personal identity [...] But I do not think that it can be the 
sole criterion, and I think that there is an important sense in which memory, 
though certainly not the sole criterion, is one of the criteria."48 This view is also
48 SHOEMAKER, S. Personal Identity and Memory, in: PERRY, J. (ed.), ibid., p. 129.
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supported by theories’ in psychology understanding that the particular body of a 
person plays a constituting role in respect to the self of that person (body-self). 
It must be noted, that there is, in connection to the self, a difference between 
someone identifying another person, that is, the finding out the identity of 
someone else and my own identity as it is perceived by me. We certainly can 
use the term self meaningfully in our communication with other people, but 
what it is to be my self can only be perceived by me and no one else.
Division of the Subject
If memory, which is essentially mental, were the one and only criterion of 
personal identity, then how can we make claims about another person’s identity 
at all? And it is obvious that we constantly make such claims. The only identity 
which could be known to me is my own since I don’t have access to the memory 
or to the mental events of other people apart from bodily manifestations. I think 
we couldn’t even use the bodily means of identification as suggested by 
QUINTON because there aren’t any grounds to assume that they were means 
of identification. So, if memory were the sole criterion of personal identity it 
would, theoretically, seem to be possible to account for being able to have an 
identity myself and to know about it but it seems also to be the case that I could 
only identify others, if I can do this at all, by their bodily appearance.
One might argue that one has to distinguish between the ontological, and 
the epistemological question. The question „What is personal identity?" asking 
for its criteria, is quite different from asking „How do I know?". Regarding the 
latter it cannot be denied that in respect to the identification of other persons (or, 
in fact, to any identification) memory is a necessary condition. To identify my 
mother as my mother is quite impossible if I cannot remember how my mother 
looks, what her character (the behavioral expression of her mental events) is 
and so on, I wouldn’t even know that I have a mother at all or what a mother is 
in the first place. Therefore, memory is not only a necessary criterion in respect 
to my own personal identity and therefore to the first person statements I make 
but is also at least a necessary condition, in an epistemological sense, for third 
person identity statements.
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However, all arguments resting on memory presuppose that we know what 
memory is and also presuppose that we hold memory usually to be reliable. 
(The very term contains this reliability already, a false or mistaken memory is 
not memory but something else.) SHOEMAKER offers an argument to show 
that the concept of memory presupposes a criterion of personal identity which 
cannot be memory. He starts his argument by claiming that one doesn’t use any 
criteria of identity on the basis of memory when one makes statements about 
one’s own past. That I was watching the X-Files yesterday is pretty clear to me, I 
remember that I watched them, I also remember having certain feelings and 
thoughts whilst doing so. It is not that I remember someone watching the X-Files 
yesterday and thus need a criterion based on memory or anything else to 
identify whether this someone was me or not. One might perhaps be justified to 
say that the very term memory, or the sentence „l remember Z,“ implies that 1. 
the memorized events and actions really did occur and 2. that an I remembers 
them and can only do so because it was present at the time the event or action 
occurred. This is even so when Z  is something like „The chemical element 
Antimon is of orange colour," or ,,’Nur wer die Sehnsucht kennt, weifB was ich 
leide’ is the first verse in Goethe’s ‘Mignon’". These things are facts and not 
events in the proper sense but I remember them because I was once made 
acquainted with them (and this then was an event), they were made known to 
me and not to someone I have by some criterion to identify as being me. It is 
even possible to infer back from our memory to the idea that we had to be a 
witness or had to be acquainted with it, because we know that it is impossible to 
remember these things if it had been otherwise: I know that my friend has a 
terrible secret, because she referred to it once and I remember that she did. I 
mention to her that I know about it and she tells that she only once in her life 
mentioned it and this was in the kitchen of so and so. Although I don’t 
remember myself ever having been in the kitchen of so and so, I must have 
been there, otherwise I wouldn’t know anything about the secret, given that her 
statement is true.
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SHOEMAKER goes on to claim that if we don’t need a criterion on the basis 
of memory to make statements about our own past, i.e. first-person-statements, 
the criterion of personal identity we employ must apply to third-person 
statements. „lf, as I have argued, one does not use criteria of identity in making 
statements about one’s own past on the basis of memory, the criteria of 
personal identity must be third person criteria. And if memory were the sole 
criterion that we use in making identity statements it would have to be the sole 
criterion that we use in making identity statements about persons other than 
ourselves."49 SHOEMAKER then points out that we need a criterion other than 
memory to make identity claims about other people. We have to establish 
whether the memory-claims of other people are correct or not, thus have to 
establish that they use the term memory properly and know what is meant by it. 
It is obvious that memory itself cannot be the criterion by which we can establish 
all of this. We need something else, which is bodily continuity. „...memory claims 
can be mistaken, and there must, accordingly, be such a thing as checking on 
the truth of a memory claim, i.e., establishing whether a person remembers 
something without taking his word for it that he does. And this, if he claims to 
have done a certain thing in the past, would involve establishing whether he, the 
person who claims this, is the same as someone who did do such an action in 
the past. In establishing this we could not use memory as our criterion of 
personal identity, and it is difficult to see what we could use if not bodily 
identity.1'50
SHOEMAKER’S argument, suggesting two criteria, would still apply to the 
cases expressing our intuitions I talked about earlier in this chapter. If we know 
that the prince was cursed into a frog we have some continuity of a body, 
although it is not the same human body. We would also expect the frog to know 
all the things the prince did know. In the case of the frog prince the two aspects 
of personal identity seem to be reflected together. We expect that the prince 
had the body of a prince and assume that he can use the term memory 
meaningfully and correctly. The frog has also a body, seems to use the term
49 ibid., p. 127.
50 ibid., p. 128.
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memory meaningfully and remembers things only the prince can remember. 
That the frog has had a past as a prince and the prince a past as a frog gets 
highlighted by the last sentences of the tale. There the faithful servant Heinrich 
makes identity claims by saying that his heart is now relieved from the pain he 
suffered when the prince was a frog: „Als Ihr noch im Brunnen saf3t, als Ihr noch 
ein Frosch gewast.“ (When in the pond you liveth, when a frog you were.) In the 
original tale the princess doesn’t know that the frog is identical with the prince 
and doesn’t kiss him but throws the frog against the wall to kill him because she 
is disgusted by the appearance of the frog making claims only a good looking 
man is allowed to make towards her. The faithful Heinrich was not disgusted 
because he knew about the body transformation, most likely by observation, but 
it is plain in the wording Heinrich uses that, though he was aware of some bodily 
continuity, for him the frog was not really the prince either and he is glad that the 
prince is restored to his former self. Let us imagine the frog had told the 
princess that he is a cursed prince. She probably wouldn’t have believed him, 
most likely also not if the frog had provided some evidence based on memory. 
In the latter case she would have been more inclined to believe and she also 
might have wanted to believe, but there would always remain some doubt. The 
important matter is that she wouldn’t have been certain about the identity of the 
frog. She only would have been if she herself would have witnessed the body 
transformation taking place or if she would have trusted a statement of a third 
person which witnessed the transformation. But even in the latter case there is 
room for doubt because the princess couldn’t be absolutely certain about the 
reliability of the witness.
I am inclined to follow SHOEMAKER and to claim that, even if we look at 
our intuitions, neither body or memory is, on its own, a sufficient criterion to 
base personal identity on. This doesn’t endanger the claim I wish to make 
concerning the connection between memory and the self, because for my 
purposes it will be enough to be able to hold up the claim that memory is a 
necessary feature of the self, I don’t have to say that memory is a necessary 
and sufficient criterion for the self. It will be sufficient for me that there has to be
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a necessary connection between memory and the self of whatever kind this 
connection may be. This is why I can go along with SHOEMAKER when he talks 
about us not using a criterion of personal identity of any sort when we make 
statements about our own past. He acknowledges the importance of memory in 
this context and its importance as a necessary feature in respect to our concept 
of what a person is.51 „lt is, I should like to say, part of the concept of a person 
that persons are capable of making memory statements about their own pasts. 
Since it is a conceptual truth that memory statements are generally true, it is a 
conceptual truth that persons are capable of knowing their own pasts in a 
special way, a way that does not involve the use of criteria of personal identity, 
and it is a conceptual truth (or a logical fact) that the memory claims that a 
person makes can be used by others as grounds for statements about the past 
history of that person. This, I think, is the kernel of truth that is embodied in the 
view that personal identity can be defined in terms of memory.52
However, this account of the role of memory for personal identity is not 
without its problems.
1. Memory is understood as a criterion of personal identity when it comes to 
third person identity statements (although it is not the only criterion), but it is not 
a criterion of personal identity, as SHOEMAKER has pointed out, where first 
person identity statements are concerned. I have immediate access to my own 
perceptions, including internal (memory) perceptions, whereas my access to 
someone else’s perceptions, especially in respect to his internal (memory) 
perceptions53, is not immediate. Nor are my own perceptions immediately 
accessible to someone other than myself.
2. Hume defines the self as a bundle of perceptions. Someone else’s 
perceptions (especially internal perceptions) are not directly accessible by me. If
51 We also have to note that the term criterion is ambiguous. SHOEMAKER uses it here in an epistemological 
sense (which is the proper meaning of the term) but it is also used in an ontological sense, in which I  will also 
employ the term later on.
52 SHOEMAKER, S. Personal Identity and Memory, in: PERRY, J. (ed.), ibid., p.133-134.
53 Note that I cannot observe anybody’s perceptions byt my own, even not external perceptions. I can observe 
somebody’s head being hit by a club, but I  cannot directly observe his perception of being hit by a club. I  infer 
the perception by the external signs of perceiving certain perceptions.
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I make first person identity statements I make them on the grounds of my own 
perceptions which I perceive in their totality (complex impression). If I make third 
person identity statements I make them on the grounds of my perceptions of 
someone else, which themselves are part of the bundle that I am. Here we are 
faced with two possibilities:
a) third person identity statements are statements about the genuine 
perceptions of a third person, as part of the bundle that they are, i.e. their self,
b) third person identity statements are statements stemming from my perception 
of the third person’s behavior from which I infer this person to have certain 
perceptions (including memory perceptions).
It seems to be the case that option a) is not available for third person identity 
statements, but only to first person identity statements since I cannot penetrate 
someone else’s bundle (not to speak of qualia). Option b) is available for third 
person identity statements but does also not penetrate someone else’s bundle,
i.e. his self, which can only be inferred.
I think this indicates two epistemologically, and perhaps also ontologically, 
different aspects of an individual’s identity: an essentially (but not exclusively) 
private aspect and a public aspect. The private aspect I wish to refer to as the 
self, the public aspect I refer to as personhood.
11.11. The Concepts of Self and of Personhood
Before I start to investigate the matter I think it is necessary to clarify my 
position to free myself from the accusation of Cartesian dualism which could 
possibly be made when my former statements are misinterpreted. I said earlier, 
that in respect to the self and to personal identity the epistemological question 
„How do we know someone’s (including our own) self and personal identity?", 
and the ontological question „What are they?", can easily be confused and have 
been so throughout the literature. It is also the case that the term criterion is 
used in an epistemological sense as well as in an ontological sense and
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confusion takes place when we shift from „Which criterion or criteria constitute 
the self or personal identity?" (ontological), to „How are these criteria 
employed in identification?". These two questions are undoubtedly connected 
but they don’t have to have necessarily the same answer.
I have treated the problem of privacy as an epistemological problem 
although there is undoubtedly an ontological aspect to it. I don’t wish to claim, 
however, that my thoughts, feelings, perceptions, i.e. my mental events cannot 
be known at all to anyone but me. I can share them, tell about them to other 
people, they can observe my behavior, my face expressions and can and do 
make judgments about my mental states. If I say to my best friend Dagmar „l 
am very sad because my boy friend left me", but my behavior doesn’t display 
any signs of the kind of behavior we expect from someone who is sad, that is I 
jump around, dance and sing, don’t seem to have to make an effort to be lively 
and jolly, my best friend would probably tell another friend, Claudia: „She says 
she is sad but it doesn’t look like it. Can’t be that bad then, she is probably not 
really sad." It is very likely that Claudia replies: „Perhaps she just hides it very 
well." Whereupon Dagmar says: „No, I have seen her doing this before and then 
she was frantically enjoying herself, now it’s more normal, not so much over the 
top, no, she isn’t sad really. But didn’t we know that she is only interested in 
herself? The guy was really nice, she never loved him. That’s probably why he 
left." - Dagmar makes here judgments not only about my behavior, but also 
about my character and my mental states. She doesn’t believe that it is true 
what I told her. I told her that my mental state is „being sad", but she concludes, 
knowing me very well and being closely acquainted with my behavior generally 
and in certain situations, that I cannot be sad. The point is that she doesn’t 
know that I am not sad but believes, however strongly, that I am not sad. Let’s 
also say that her belief is true, I am not sad, but the only person who can know 
that her belief is true is myself. Dagmar cannot be absolutely certain about my 
mental states because she doesn’t have direct access to them, as I have, but 
only indirect access. My mental states are immediately known to me but not to 
Dagmar or anyone else for that matter. She needs means which she also has to
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interpret. If she knows me very well and is a good observer her interpretation will 
be right most of the time, but not always. Even if it were right at all times, she 
would not have absolute certainty about my mental states for a variety of 
reasons.
1. If we take it that she has to know me very well and has gained her 
knowledge about me by experience, there is still no possibility to derive a 
universal law concerning the connection of certain mental states of mine having 
a certain physiological, observable „output“. Such a law cannot be derived from 
experience. Therefore, if it were true of all past events in respect to my mental 
states and their physiological outcome that I cry only if I am sad and I am sad 
only if I cry, it cannot be established that this is still true tomorrow.
2. The ..physiological output" of mental events (behavior and speech) is not 
unambiguous. It is conceivable that a certain mental state can have different 
..physiological outputs", as well as it is conceivable that different mental states 
have the same ..physiological output". People cry when they are sad, or 
desperate, or angry, or furious, or happy, or relieved. Everyone knows that there 
are many different reasons why someone is crying, or laughing, or shouting, or 
yelling etc. I might yell at someone because I am outraged, but I might also yell 
because that person is not hearing very well, I might also yell at someone when 
I am not angry at all but would like to punish someone by yelling or shouting, a 
child for instance.
To interpret the external signs of mental events successfully one needs to 
take context into account, which includes not only the external circumstances 
but also the personality of the people involved, very often their biographies etc. I 
think it is obvious that we never have all information in respect to the entire 
context, even if simply for the fact that we are not the person we interpret. We 
don’t experience this person’s experiences. Therefore there will always be a 
possibility for error, i.e. misinterpretation. We might be justified to say that even 
if we were in possession of all relevant information we could not be absolutely 
certain that we are. To be certain that we possess all relevant data involves
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judgments about what the relevant data are and also that we know them in their 
entirety. Thus, it remains the possibility that our judgments are erroneous.54
Even when we take into account that behavior is not the only observable 
source of information: the person who’s mental states we want to know also 
speaks to us about them - we cannot be absolutely certain about his or her 
mental states either. The person might be lying or might not use proper 
descriptions of the mental state in question. We might, by putting together all 
available information be able to judge that this person is probably lying, and we 
therefore don’t assume that statements made by this person are true, or we 
might believe that the person doesn’t use descriptions properly, but we cannot 
be absolutely sure about it. Even if the belief that the person is lying turns out to 
be a justified belief, we still don’t know the person’s mental state. We only know 
that certain statements made by the person were not true. Factual statements of 
the sort: „When the crime was committed I was at the cinema and watched 
Reservoir Dogs,1 can be verified or falsified by finding evidence that I was 
indeed in the cinema at the time. The verification method rests upon the 
principle that one and the same body cannot be at two different places at the 
same time, which goes back to bodily continuity and not to any mental criteria 
whatsoever. But statements like „l really was sad that I had to kill my 
grandmother," cannot be proven true or false.
In conclusion, I think, it is clear that we do have some access to other 
people’s mental states but not in terms of certainty. My own mental states can 
be known only to me, because I am the only person who experiences them 
directly. The access of other persons to my mental states is restricted by the 
necessity of mediation by behavior and speech (that is by physical means of 
some sort), therefore their access is indirect. Third persons are capable and
54 I am only concerned with human beings here. The theoretical possibility that there are other beings who 
possess all relevant data remains, but it is irrelevant in the present context.
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justified to form judgments and to hold beliefs about my mental states, but these 
beliefs are not knowledge when the latter is defined in terms of certainty.55
Now, that I have clarified my understanding of the privacy of the self we can 
start with the actual topic of this section, namely the distinction between, and 
relation of, self and personhood. When we speak of personal identity I take it 
that we mean the identity of person and ask the question „What makes a person 
the same person at different points in time?“. When I talk of self identity I wish to 
understand it as the identity of self expressed by the question „What makes a 
self the same self at different points in time?". This difference is not vain 
because it is quite conceivable that the terms person and self don’t have the 
same meaning and have different references. It may also be the case that they 
have, in fact, the same reference but refer to different aspects of this reference. 
If it turns out that both terms depict different aspects even of the same 
reference, or ontological unit, the arguments put forward to establish a 
necessary link between personal identity and memory cannot automatically be 
applied to establish a necessary link between the self and memory. This doesn’t 
mean that there is no such link, it just means that what was said about personal 
identity cannot be said in exactly the same way when it comes to the self.
McCALL’s concepts of Person and Self
CATHERINE McCALL writes: „...whilst there exists only one ontological entity, a 
biological, social, and self-conscious being, this entity is thought of and 
conceived in different ways. The terms person, self, and human being, when 
referring to the concepts of ways of conceiving of an individual, have different, 
distinct meanings. But although the meanings are distinct, they are interrelated. 
It will be argued that the terms refer to the individual, and that the difference in 
meaning between the terms does not emerge from the fact that they refer to 
different or separable entities, but rather emerges from the different modes of
55 My knowledge about my own mental states does not have to be conceptualized knowledge. It is not 
necessary that I am able to label a particular mental state I experience to a) know that I am experiencing this 
particular mental state and b) to know what this particular mental state feels like.
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conception under which individuals are understood.*156 McCALL uses the term 
person in the sense that it refers to what she calls a public entity. To talk about 
persons requires third-person-statements. „The individual, as person, is what is 
cognised of the individual by others. The individual, recognised as a person, is a 
public entity. In this sense the person is a third person entity - whatever is 
known, attributed, or thought of the individual constitutes that individual as a 
person. [...] Both what constitutes a person - personhood - and the conditions 
for identifying and reidentifying persons - personal identity - are to be found in 
the public domain. Persons are social beings, created and constituted, and 
found only in society.**57 I think this definition is, at least at the moment, 
acceptable when we look at the account of personal identity given earlier. If 
personal identity, that is what makes a person the same person at different 
times, involves as one of its criteria a bodily one, and if we consider 
epistemological requirements of third person identity statements, then 
McCALL’s understanding of the concept of person can be agreed with here. I 
don’t think that there is prima facie a short-coming of the memory-criterion since 
it has been argued that we need, when making third person statements, that is, 
identifying and reidentifying others, a bodily criterion to make use of the 
memory-criterion at all. We also need memory to make any identity statements 
whatsoever which McCall clearly refers to.
McCALL also offers a definition of the self and I wish to quote her here at 
length because, firstly, her definition contains many features of the self I find 
myself mainly in agreement with, for some of them I have already argued, 
others still need to be established. Secondly, there are also difficulties 
concerning her definition, some of them serious, which need to be explored.
„...the term self refers to those aspects of an individual which constitutes 
self consciousness. This concept concerns the ability of individuals to 
reflect upon their actions, thoughts, intentions, and so on. As a second 
order activity, reflection upon action assumes the existence of a subject 
who performs the action - (if not a subject who performs the reflection) - 
and it is this subject which is conceptualized as the self.
56 McCALL, C. Concepts o f Person. An Analysis o f Concepts of Person, Self and Human Being, Avebury, 
1990, p.7.
57 ibid., p. 12.
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The concept of a self represents the experiential nature of the 
individual: the individual does not merely react to the environment, but 
experiences himself or herself so doing. The self is thus the location of 
experience, the aspect of an individual which can reflect upon experience, 
which „has“ those experiences, but which is not identified with the 
experience.
The use of I as a first person indicator refers to the concept of self. In 
this respect the self is essentially private. Thus, for instance, the status of 
privileged access" in reports of mental states such as, „l am in pain," or „l 
am happy," is a direct result of the experiential nature of such reports. 
Third person reports of the same phenomenon, such as, „He is in pain," 
are descriptive, and whether these reports describe behaviour or 
dispositions they can be challenged, evidence can be presented in favour 
or against the description. But first person reports differ in this respect; 
they do not describe a state, or bit of behaviour, or a disposition; they state 
an experiental fact; first person report statements cannot be contradicted 
by others, need not be supported by evidence.
The term I refers to the experiencing individual, not the person. The 
person is a public construction, and no matter what identity is attributed to 
the individual as person, the experiencing self remains constant."58
McCALL’s definition of person is not unproblematic when we take the 
arguments concerning personal identity and the role of memory as they have 
been put forward earlier into account. We have said that memory is one, but not 
the sole criterion of personal identity. If this is so then memory has to be a 
criterion of being a person too. McCALL argues that the expression the same 
person is frequently used ambiguously, sometimes referring to the person as a 
physical object and sometimes referring to character, personality etc. „The 
phrase can refer to either the identity of a person as a persisting object - as a 
human being - or to the stability of the personality of that individual. The phrase, 
„the same person," is often used ambiguously, in which case the question is 
confused, and it is sometimes used ambivalently, in which case the question is 
avoided."59 Although it is not apparent if one takes her definition of person in 
isolation from her other definitions, it becomes clear that McCALL’s definition of 
person, the distinctions she makes and their consequences in respect to 
personal identity are not compatible with an account understanding memory as 
one of the criteria of personal identity. McCALL can only allow for a bodily
58 ibid., p. 14.
59 ibid., p. 19.
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60criterion and states this when she discusses memory and personal identity. 
„Shoemaker appears to be making a case for memory as a criterion of self 61 
identity; that is, for the particular nature of the individual as s/he experiences 
her/his self as a conscious being. But it is only in the sense that an individual 
directly experiences conscious states, whether these states are memory states 
or physical states, and does not need to observe them, that such a case can be 
made.“62 She goes on to argue that it is impossible to experience someone 
else’s conscious states, memories or otherwise, and therefore don’t need to 
differentiate between one’s own conscious states and the ones of someone 
else. Therefore the question of identity doesn’t arise because differentiation is 
neither needed nor possible. She concludes: „lt would appear that physical 
identity, the identity of the individual as a biological entity, the human being, is, 
in fact, the criterion which is used when making judgements concerning 
personal identity63. Thus, just as an adequate analysis of the concept of person 
includes a description of the properties and characteristics which are typical of 
human beings, so an analysis of the identity of a particular person includes the 
identity of a particular biological organism. The general characteristics of 
persons are revealed in human beings and in their actions, and the particular 
identity of a person is instantiated in a particular body.“64
McCALL understands SHOEMAKER’S case for memory as a criterion for 
personal identity as failing because according to her definitions what he is 
actually doing is making a case for self identity and memory. The problem, so 
McCALL, lies in a confusion of concepts. But is this so? I think it is clear that 
SHOEMAKER gives bodily identity an important role to play when it comes to 
personal identity. I also think it is clear that SHOEMAKER’S reasons for the 
acknowledgement of bodily continuity as one of the criteria of personal identity 
are to be found in the social sphere and refer to it. SHOEMAKER points out that
60 We have seen that SHOEMAKER, in fact, wanted to make a case for personal identity, not self identity and
McCALL, extrapolating her own mistake, believes that he is not making a case for personal, but for self
identity since he includes memory.
61 my own accentuation.
62 McCALL, C. ibid., p. 136.
63 my own accentuation.
64 McCall, C. ibid., p. 138.
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third person identity statements have to be made necessarily. When he talks 
about the proper use of the term memory and refers to third person statements 
then it is obvious that statements and judgments of this kind require a social 
context: there has to be a third person or persons, there also has to be a 
comparison between different persons using the word memory and the meaning 
it has when they use it. If the concept of person is essentially a social one then 
we have also to take into account that the person I am is part of the social 
context just as third persons are part of it. I said earlier that it is impossible to 
make any identity statements about any objects or other human beings without 
memory, this is so because identity is identity in time and I have to identify or 
reidentify X  as X  at different points in time. Memory is, whatever it may be 
ontologically65, mental. Therefore the mental has a part in third person 
statements as well as in first person statements, it therefore has to be part of 
personal identity as well, otherwise, the term identity could not be applied at all, 
because there would be no possibility to determine identity at all. Taking these 
reasons into account it seems to be the case that McCALL’s definition of person 
is too restrictive by leaving the mental criteria out and because of this the 
definiens cannot account for the definiendum.
Before McCALL gives her definitions and goes on to defend them by looking 
at theories of identity, she states that the references of the concepts in question 
are all aspects of one and the same thing, that is, the individual. This indicates 
that these definitions are definitions of interrelated, inseparable aspects of this 
individual or of individuals in general. The references of these concepts are not 
separable, independent entities and it seems to be the case that McCALL, 
making irreconcilable claims, steps into a trap of the Cartesian real distinction 
label by treating them as separable and not intrinsically interrelated, although 
she says they are. There are no situations in life where an adult individual is 
either a person or a self, we are rather everything of this at every moment of 
time in our adult life. We find it difficult to comprehend that one can be a person 
with accountability for one’s actions, with responsibility and consistency in
65 Memory is experienced as mental, even if  the materialist identity-theorists would be right.
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behavior and character, without having a self. It is also inconceivable that an 
individual has a self but no personhood. All this is not only inconceivable but 
impossible by McCALL’s own account. All these concepts refer to aspects of the 
individual and if one of the aspects were missing then we cannot talk of an 
individual at all. It seems to be the case that self and personhood are 
connected practically and ontologically inseparably with one another, that one 
requires the other, especially when we believe that the self is not a lonely 
Cartesian self but essentially social and that the concept of person doesn’t only 
refer to a body but to something which we consider having a self or at least, in a 
wider sense, having the capacity for a self.
The consequences of McCALL’s rigid definitions of the concepts in question 
would be something like this: Firstly, if person is defined in purely bodily terms 
we might call an automaton, looking like a human being and displaying some 
kind of human-like behavior a person and ascribe responsibility, accountability 
etc. to it.66 Since personhood is an aspect of individuals just as being a human 
being is an aspect of the individual, McCALL would then have to say that the
automaton is a human being the object of the different modes of conception
- the object of the concepts of person, self and human being - is the one being, 
the individual."67 This would be wrong by McCALL’s own definition because the 
automaton is biologically and genetically not a human being.
If, on the other hand, McCALL wants to avoid this problem then she has to 
say that one can be a person without having a self and/or without being a 
human being, therefore one wouldn’t be an individual either given her definition. 
She would have to say that each single one of these aspects or pairs of them 
can occur separately and independently from the other/s but don’t constitute an 
individual. (They still can be maintained to be aspects of an individual but only if 
all three of them are together. It is very much like saying that roundness and 
greenness are aspects of Granny Smith - apples. However, they are aspects of 
water melons too. There has to be at least one additional aspect to distinguish
66 These are properties constituting personhood. Compare McCALL, C. ibid., p. 12.
67 ibid., p.9.
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Granny Smith apples from any other entity. Let’s say this aspect is X, and when 
it is the case that roundness + greenness + X, we have a Granny Smith-apple, 
but not a water melon. But then the philosophically interesting question is not 
what roundness and greenness are and how they are part of the features of 
objects, because they are features of many objects. But the interesting question 
would be what X is. If this is so, then McCALL could not treat person, self and 
human being as relatively equally important features of an individual.)
Thirdly, although McCALL wants to investigate only human beings in her 
discussion, her definitions are still too strict. They do not allow for the possibility 
that self and personhood can be ascribed to beings other than human. An 
automaton is certainly not a human being but this doesn’t mean that he could 
not be a person and a self either. Being a human being is surely not a 
necessary condition of self and personhood.
Going back to the suggestion that these aspects can be conceived as 
separate, not intrinsically and necessarily interdependent and interrelated 
aspects, it seems that such a conception would not be in accordance with 
McCALL’s own views concerning the interdependency of these aspects, which 
she acknowledges: „Just as different organs and their related functions can be 
conceived of as being in some sense independent and in some senses 
dependent upon each other, and at the same time being dependent upon their 
integral function within the organism as a whole, so the concepts of person, self 
and human being have distinct functions, whilst remaining interdependent. 
Neither the biological organs, nor the concepts under consideration, can exist 
independently.!...] Similarly, the existence of the concepts of self, person and 
human being depend upon the existence of the individual who is so conceived. 
In order to understand the concepts and their interrelationships, it is necessary 
to understand their relationship to the individual. Neither hearts nor persons are 
to be found existing independently in the natural world, but exist as parts of a 
whole.1,68 McCALL’s account is clearly contradictory.
68 ibid., p.9-10.
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It must also be noted that her definition of person includes features like 
responsibility, accountability and so on. To ascribe these features to individuals 
requires that we make some inferences about their mental states, which cannot 
be observed directly. To know if Oedipus is responsible for the patricide we take 
into account not only physical, directly observable evidence, like seeing Oedipus 
doing it or having some other hard evidence determining that he did it, but also 
mental states. Questions like: „ls Oedipus of a sound mind?“, „ls he capable of 
distinguishing right from wrong?", „Was the killing premeditated?", „What are 
Oedipus’ motives for killing his father?", „Did he know that he was his father?", 
must all be asked and answered, only then can we make a positive statement 
about Oedipus’ responsibility for the crime. When we make statements about 
other individuals we very often presuppose that responsibility for their actions 
can be ascribed to them, but this is so because we usually infer that the other 
individual has mental abilities similar to ours and is generally of a sound mind. 
But there are individuals where we don’t think that they are responsible for their 
actions or there are situations where we consider responsibilities lessened not 
only due to particular external circumstances but also due to whether or not 
certain mental events are believed to have taken place.
We have now determined that McCALL’s understanding of personhood 
cannot be accounted for by her own definition of personhood. Her concept of 
personhood cannot be upheld by a bodily criterion alone. However, we still have 
to shed light upon the relation between personhood and self, both in terms of 
their distinction (as different aspects of the individual) and their interrelationship 
and interdependency. The ground is already prepared for a first consideration 
concerning the latter task, namely, that both personhood and self require a 
mental criterion. This criterion is, at least, an epistemological one. But we will 
see that it must be understood also in an ontological sense.
1. Person is, first of all, a social concept and it seems to be the case that, 
especially where third person identity statements are concerned, the 
epistemological and the ontological aspect are one. Recognizing someone as a 
person is ‘making them into a person’. No one can be a person without the
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recognition of others in social contexts, expressed in third person statements. 
Personhood is quasi given to the individual through bodily and social recognition 
by others.69 McCALL suggests that only one criterion of personal identity is 
needed and that this criterion is one of bodily continuity, i.e. bodily identity. I 
suggested, on the other hand, that if this were the case the interrelationship and 
interdependency of the aspects of an individual, which are here in question, are 
disregarded and dismissed. Such a clear line between the social personhood 
and the private self70 cannot be drawn, neither epistemologically nor 
ontologically. Furthermore, the social nature of personhood and the concept of 
person require something more than only third person perspectives (and 
statements). It is required that the role of the named, recognized and referred to 
‘individual’ is something more than just being named, recognized and referred to 
by others. Which indicates that the self has also a social dimension, which will 
be explained later on.
I also suggested that no identification: for instance identifying me as me at 
different times, or someone identifying something or someone else being the 
same or of a certain kind at different times, by bodily or whatever other criteria; 
can take place without the partaking of some mental activities such as memory, 
whether they occur „in“ the observer or the observed. If we accept at least that 
the concept of person and subsequently personhood is of a social nature and 
requires recognition as well as identification and re-identification, then we also 
must accept that some mental abilities of an intellectual nature (of whoever 
recognizes, identifies and re-identifies - 1 can perceive myself as being a person 
too) are required. Therefore personhood is necessarily linked up with mental or 
intellectual abilities.71
Now that we have established the necessity of mental or intellectual abilities 
in respect to personhood we still have to look into the matter of intellectual or 
mental abilities and the self. It doesn’t matter here, as well as it didn’t matter in
69 This still refers to a third person statement only.
70 Taken for granted, of course, that the self is essentially private. But it must be noted that M cCALL’s 
definition of the self suggests clearly that she thinks it is.
71 Please note that I wish, later on, to maintain that when I have a self I have necessarily to perceive myself as 
being a person too and vice versa.
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respect to personhood or the meaning of the term person , what we take the 
mental to be ontologically. All that is needed is an admittance that mental 
events of an intellectual nature do exist and that human beings usually have or 
are capable of such mental events. If these mental events are emergent 
properties of matter or if they are identical with matter, i.e. identical with 
neurophysiological states, must not concern us here.
2. Referring back to the previous investigation concerning the privacy of the 
self we understand that the self is essentially of the mental kind (however it is 
understood ontologically). Even if the self, like all mental events and states, 
were nothing but physical events or physical states of the brain, i.e. if it were 
ontologically of a physical nature, we still experience a thought as a thought, 
consciousness as consciousness, a feeling of kindness or anger as a feeling of 
kindness or anger very similar to the way we perceive colours as red, blue, 
green, yellow and so on, although they are actually certain wavelengths of light 
which can be expressed in mathematical formulas - wavelengths X  of light is red 
to the human eye, wavelength Y is yellow and so on. We just perceive these 
different wavelengths as red, yellow, green etc. So, if mental states and events 
were actually of a physical nature it still would be true that brain state X is anger, 
brain state Y is kindness and so on. The brain states as such, perhaps 
expressible in formulae, are not available to me, even not if a scientist uses 
some instruments to measure electrical charges in brains and the localities 
where they occur, maps them and makes them available to the public so that 
we all can learn that anger is, in fact, X, and that kindness is Y \n the same way 
as we have learned that water consists of two hydrogen and one oxygen ion. 
The crucial point is that my feelings are directly available to me whereas the 
physical states described by these formulae and the concepts of these formulae 
are not. „One knows what one is thinking and feeling, and, normally, what one 
believes, desires, etc., without having to ground this knowledge on evidence, 
about one’s behavior and bodily circumstances. And in being aware of one’s 
own mental states one certainly is not aware of them as physical states of any
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sort.“72 These phenomena have „come to be known as „qualia“, and are also 
referred to as the ..phenomenal features" of feelings, sensations, and perceptual 
states: the felt features of pains and itches that make them (so one wants to 
say) the kinds of sensations they are, the distinctive feature of a visual 
experience of redness that determines „what it is like" to see red and 
distinguishes this from what it is like to see green, blue, yellow, and so on.“73
The main difficulty of McCALL’s account, which is essentially a Cartesian 
one, is now very clear. When she wants to say that individuals have purely 
physical, in that case socially determined, features (person)74 as well as purely 
mental ones (self) then these features must still be intrinsically linked with one 
another to account for their interdependency and interrelationship. If these 
features are taken separately from one another, as either purely physical or 
purely mental, such a link could not be established; it is, in fact, inconceivable, 
how such a link can exist at all. Now we are able to foresee all the possible 
moves to avoid the problem occurring in the first place, and hard core 
materialism (identity theory) is such a possible move. McCALL’s set of 
definitions is, however, (even if they are only instrumental) entirely 
unsatisfactory. If person is only physical, just as human being is, how can 
interrelationship and interdependency be maintained? It is difficult to see where 
the human being-aspect and the person-aspect link up with the self-aspect of an 
individual. However, McCALL’s problem only occurs because her account is not 
entirely consistent. If the account she gives is altered in the sense that a 
different, more materialist or behaviorist, definition of the self is given, the 
problem could be avoided.
On the other hand, acceptance of the strict materialist viewpoint seems to 
lead to abandonment of the privacy of the self because neither a special nor 
exclusive access to my own mental events can be maintained; the question of
72 SHOEMAKER, S. The Mind-Body Problem, in: WARNER, R./SZUBKA, T. (ed.) The Mind-Body 
Problem, Blackwell 1995, p.57.
73 ibid.
74 Not to speak of the human being-aspect, which is also physical only.
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access seems to become a technological one.75 To illustrate this, let’s take up a 
previous idea, which is that the strict materialists have been right all along: a 
machine, easy to carry and to handle, is invented to „read“ people’s (including 
my own) brain states. There also exists a compendium mapping out and listing 
all brain states which ever have occurred and their corresponding mental 
outcome, that is the experience of whatever objects, including thought, images, 
sense perceptions etc. When we are children we all learn the data gathered in 
the compendium and we all learn to use the brain scan machine. The machine 
is even so common in society and so much an object of every day life that we 
carry it around so naturally as if it were a hat. This enables us to read someone 
else’s brain states and to know what they think or feel with the same ease we 
have at the present time when „reading“ and understanding someone’s dress- 
code. Apart from the practical problems (we would always know when someone 
doesn’t like us or is lying, which would be very bad for our social life), no other 
problems connected with the scan would occur. Does this mean the self, or my 
inner life, is as accessible to others as it is to me? It seems that a third person 
statement concerning the mental state of another person can be made with 
greater certainty now. And if it can be argued that this certainty is an absolute 
one, the epistemological argument I employed must fail. However, I believe that 
the required absolute certainty cannot be maintained.
First of all, the access to someone else’s mental events is still not a direct 
one. It is an indirect access because I have to use a machine to have this high 
degree of certainty, whereas I don’t need a machine to know with certainty my 
own mental events. The sources of epistemological error are mainly of two 
different kinds. Errors are possible in respect to the machine - the machine 
might be malfunctioning - and are also possible in respect to the judgments we 
make concerning the machine’s readings. And here again we have to allow for a 
variety of sources of error. One might misread the data the machine gives, this
75 Some materialists, especially functionalists, have offered accounts which aim to accommodate privileged 
access including the claim of infallibility about one’s own mental states. Nevertheless, these accounts hold 
only for weaker versions of the problem. It also has been suggested, for instance by THOMAS NAGEL, that 
our underlying concept of the physical may be faulty. Which, if true, weakens all non-sceptical ontological, 
especially the materialistic, accounts generally.
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would be a mistake in observation. One might also be mistaken about „correct“ 
data of brain states, and their correspondent mental states. Errors of such kind 
can happen because one didn’t remember correctly the contents of the map 
one had to learn or because one just makes spontaneous mistakes for no 
apparent reason, just in the same way we make spontaneous mistakes in 
counting every now and then. The here outlined possibilities of error can occur, 
even if we take for granted that the map of corresponding brain states and 
mental states is entirely correct and contains all possible combinations.
It becomes obvious that because of the wide variety of possible errors and 
gaps in information it is impossible to claim certainty of knowledge about 
someone else’s mental states. It is also pretty clear that the very condition for 
certainty about the mental states of another individual, which is certainty about 
their brain states (always taken for granted that the identity theory is true), 
cannot be achieved. Claims of infallibility in respect to brain states of individuals 
in general, and mental states of individuals other than oneself, are absurd as 
long as we don’t deal with self evident and a priori, analytical truths.
Secondly, the privileged access to one’s own mental events remains 
untouched in a logical sense, whatever the circumstances may be, even if there 
were, ideally, certainty in the matters suggested. Let’s say I am perfectly 
capable to make true statements with certainty such as, „A is sad now,“. 
Although I have some epistemological access, I don’t have full epistemological 
access in the experiential sense. I have no access to the „what it is like“ of the 
other’s experience76, neither epistemologically nor ontologically. I still don’t 
experience or know about A s  sadness in the same way A does. A lives the 
sadness, is sad, whilst I only make judgments about the fact that A is sad, or 
strictly materialistically, that As  brain is in a physical state which is felt by A as 
sadness. Even if I stimulate my brain into the same brain state as As  at the 
same time when I make this judgment about A being sad, and am consequently 
now sad myself, my sadness would still not be A s  sadness, but mine.
76 compare: NAGEL, T. What is it like to be a Baft, in: Philosophical Review 83, pp.435-50.
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This requires some explanation, both in the context of Hume’s philosophy 
and in the context of theories of personal and self identity in general.
a) The matter should be straightforward when it comes to Hume’s account of 
the self as a bundle of perceptions. Here we would not talk about ..simulation of 
brain states“, but of two individuals perceiving a numerically identical 
perception77 at the same time. Given my example, although my perception and 
A s perception are supposed to be identical it is the case that A s  perception as 
A s  perception is epistemologically not fully available to me. The perception is 
also an element of different bundles and is part of the different complex 
impressions of these bundles. I can only know what it is like for myself to 
perceive this perception, but I do not know what it is like for A
b) I wish to start a more general discussion with the following scenario: When I 
watch the scene in Forrest Gump where Forrest is bullied by other children, runs 
away and looses the restricting mechanisms attached to his legs, I feel very sad 
and start to cry. This scene triggers off my own childhood experiences and this 
is the reason why I react the way I do. Let us imagine that at the same time I 
display this behavior my friend Dagmar has her brain manipulated so that it has 
exactly the same neurophysiological states as my brain. Given the materialist 
identity theory’s account she would now feel sad too. Let’s also say that all the 
reasons which make me cry, are part of the neurophysiological state of my brain 
and Dagmar’s brain is manipulated accordingly. Hence, it would be the case 
that Dagmar cries for exactly the same reasons as I do.
If we take this scenario from a logical point of view we would say that, 
although both experiences are qualitatively identical, they are numerically 
distinct, because they have different locations. One takes place in my brain, 
whilst the other, „identical“ experience takes place in Dagmar’s brain. It still is 
the case that only one’s own (taking place in one’s own brain) mental events are 
epistemologically directly accessible to oneself. Dagmar has direct access to 
her own mental events only, just as I cannot perceive her perceptions (because
77 Whether or not this is possible is here not the issue, I  propose this scenario as a thought-experiment. See for 
a more detailed discussion my introduction to The Principle o f Unity.
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it takes place in her brain) but only my own. The judgment that both brain states 
(and both perceptions) are identical cannot be made by looking at the 
perceptions themselves but only upon an understanding of the mechanism 
which makes them identical. A direct comparison of both brain states (her’s and 
mine) is impossible.
However, our different identities seem to consist, in such situation, not in 
our mental events, because they are qualitatively indistinguishably alike, but in 
our bodily existence. It would be quite obvious, for any observer, to perceive 
that there are two different bodies involved (not to talk about the involvement of 
two brains), which cannot, firstly, occupy the same space at the same time, and 
therefore cannot be identical. Secondly, they are also of different appearance, 
both bodies exhibiting very different and distinct features.
We must look at this problem from two different angles, an outward-looking 
one (the observer’s point of view, expressed in third person identity statements) 
and an inward-looking point of view (the subject’s own point of view, expressed 
in first person identity statements). Both of these possible viewpoints have to be 
accommodated if a theory of identity of individuals shall be successful.
I.III. Theories of Identity
It has been said before that an observer would note that Dagmar and I have two 
different identities because he can observe two different bodies, occupying 
different spaces at the same time. This, first of all, accommodates our claim that 
identity has a bodily criterion. It has been argued before, however, that bodily 
continuity cannot be the sole criterion for personal identity, but that one of its 
criteria has to be memory. It has also been argued that memory is important 
where third person statements are concerned.78 All these arguments apply here.
Taking bodily continuity as the sole criterion of identity in situations as 
described is theoretically and practically unsatisfactory because it rests upon a
78 We must disregard here the fact that memory is a necessary condition for the very act of identification and 
re-identification, because this is an inward-looking argument, which shall be discussed later on.
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one-sided understanding of the individual. Which is certainly not inherent in our 
intuitions about identity. The problem can be illustrated when we consider the 
following example: As before, Dagmar’s mental events are manipulated to be 
exactly the same as my mental events. It now happens to be the case that I 
conceive of the plan and the subsequent decision to murder someone. 
However, the body which performes the murder and is observed doing so is not 
mine, but Dagmar’s. It would, given our intuitions, be difficult to say that I didn’t 
commit the crime, although it was Dagmar’s body which was seen doing it. 
Intuition would hold me responsible because I had planned and decided to 
murder. Firstly, it would by bodily criteria alone be difficult to determine who’s 
mind is the original one, who’s mind it was which originally wanted, and decided, 
to kill the victim. Intuition would tend to understand the mind which is an 
imitation of the original one, as being nothing more than a puppet which did not 
initiate the wish and the decision to kill.79
Secondly, given the connection between body and mind to be existent, then 
it is impossible that only Dagmar’s body could have acted out the killing. All 
mental events of the two bodies are supposed to be identical, this includes 
decisions like „l go now into the house of the victim," as well as the will to carry 
out these decisions, as long as there are mental states, conceptualized or not, 
connected with acting. Therefore our two bodies must have carried out the 
actual killing. There could not be just one perpetrator at the crime-scene but 
two, having acted in an identical manner. Thus, it seems to be the case that 
there are two people who are responsible for the crime. This, however, seems 
not to be in accordance with our intuitions, which would hold the „copy“-person 
not responsible. Or, if we accept the puppet scenario, but not the mind/body 
connection, there would only be one villain. However, we could not identify 
which one of the two was the villain without referring back to the original mind or 
perhaps better, to the original brain (if one is an identity theorist). If it turns out to 
be the case that the original brain doesn’t belong to the acting body which was
79 Though, due to the imitation, Dagmar’s mind will then contain the wish and the decision too and will „feel“ 
subjectively as if  it were the original, initiating mind; it is, objectively, passive in the matter, because it is only 
a „copy“.
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seen at the crime scene but to the other body, we are faced with a contradiction. 
The criterion of bodily continuity tells us that Dagmar committed the crime, 
because it was she who was observed killing the victim. The same criterion tells 
us that it was not Dagmar, but me who really committed the crime because it 
was observed that her brain states were altered to be identical with mine.80
It could now be argued that the contradiction is not a real one because the 
brain is of a bodily nature and the argument favoring bodily continuity as the 
criterion of identity has to be restricted, in cases where humans are concerned, 
to the bodily continuity of the brain. Here it will also be possible, so it is argued, 
to use mental events, in their reduction to neurophysiological brain states 
(identity theory) for identity statements. The mental criterion is reduced to a 
bodily criterion, but it is not eliminated. This reductionist account implies that the 
non-reductionist arguments concerning identification and re-identification of 
other human beings resting on bodily criteria have to be dismissed. Someone’s 
bodily appearance is not a reliable criterion for his identity because we have to 
use the bodily continuity of the brain to make third person identity statements. 
However, a reductionist account can still make use of the continuity of the whole 
body similar to the use memory theorists and the supporters of the combined 
theory can make of it.81 Although the reductionist account seems to be very 
straightforward and simple, I believe that the account, because of its 
epistemological requirements and the necessary ontological claims, is more 
complicated than some of its competitors.
80 So far we have considered a case without taking the body/mind connection into account. If  one does, it 
could be argued that it is impossible that only one of the two bodies could have acted out the decision to kill. 
However, this does not refute my argument against the body as the sole criterion of identity. It is not necessary 
that the two individuals in question have identical mental events (or neurophysiological brain states). One can 
imagine someone manipulating someone else’s brain states in a certain way without having to „copy“ them 
from his own. Identity of mental events was just assumed for the sake of the foregoing discussion.
81 Bodily appearance as an easy, „improvised“, but not sufficient or necessary means of identification.
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The Memorv-Theorv
A memory theorist can still regard bodily continuity as an easy instrument of 
identification and re-identification, although it is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient criterion of identity. A proper identification (or re-identification) can 
only be made by using mental criteria in general, and memory in particular. To 
make third person identity statements possible, the theory has to claim that 
there is some access (epistemologically incomplete access) to someone’s 
mental events, i.e. memory, or that there has to be full access 
(epistemologically complete access) to those mental events. The problem is that 
the necessary and sufficient criterion of identity, memory (or mental events in
general) is not necessarily fully available to any person other than the subject
82having them. Third person identity statements rest therefore upon an 
epistemologically not very reliable basis. We encounter epistemological 
difficulties, which is theoretically not very satisfying because it was these kind of 
difficulties we wanted to overcome in the first place.83
However, even if the accessibility of the relevant data (a third person’s 
mental events) is epistemologically incomplete, some knowledge of someone 
else’s mental states can be acquired in a natural and necessary way (the ability 
to have some knowledge of another person’s mental events is a natural ability 
of human beings and is a necessary part of their world-perception). We are 
therefore justified to say (taking the weakest option of epistemological 
incompleteness) that, although we have some epistemological difficulties to 
access the data we need to make well founded third person identity statements, 
we also have natural and necessary acquisition of them. If epistemological 
completeness could be maintained than we would have complete access to and 
also natural, necessary acquisition of the relevant data. (This is so because 
someone who wants to hold such a theory has to claim that there is some
82 As I said, it depends very much upon the claims one wishes to make, and it is clear that the claim of full 
availability would be the claim which would support the theory most. However, this claim is difficult to 
defend, since humans aren’t known to be telepathic.
831 don’t think it is necessary here to investigate the matter of a possible ontological problem, but I think the 
matter would be problematic in that sense too, since we have no reliable epistemological means to make well 
founded ontological statements when it comes to third person identity statements.
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natural and necessary way, be it intuition or a seventh sense, by which we are 
acquainted with someone else’s mental states. It doesn’t pose a problem within 
this context if it is claimed that the acquisition of the data in question is 
maintained by God’s interference, because the nature of this interference would 
still be a necessary one. It would also be natural in a certain sense. It could be 
argued, for instance, that God made us this way.)
However, the memory theory, as it is understood here, has problems to 
account for a social concept of person, which implies a bodily criterion the 
memory theory cannot account for. Consequently the theory has also problems 
to accommodate a concept of the self containing social aspects. Although the 
theory can allow for at least some acquaintance with other people’s memory 
and mental states to make some third person identity statements possible it 
finds it difficult to accommodate proper third person identity statements which 
require the social aspect. The bodily aspect is a contingent and not a necessary 
aspect. We can here take recourse to SHOEMAKER’S argument that to know 
whether or not someone uses the term memory correctly one needs a criterion 
which cannot be memory itself, but is a bodily criterion.84
If we allow for full and immediate access to other people’s memory to make 
third person identity statements, the difficulties would not disappear. Then we 
would need a criterion to distinguish one’s own immediate and directly 
perceived memories from someone else’s memories, which are also 
immediately and directly perceived. Such a criterion cannot be memory itself. 
Thus, in such a scenario memory cannot be the sole criterion of identity which it 
was claimed by the memory theory to be.
If the presented arguments can be accepted we have to conclude that the 
memory theory is theoretically problematic. It seems also to be unsuitable in 
respect to a social understanding of the concept of person and in consequence
84 This seems to be true for a variety, if not for all intentional expressions. I f  someone says: „I want to eat this 
cake“, but doesn’t eat it, then we would think that the person did either not want to eat the cake and was lying, 
or that the person doesn’t know what wanting something means. The criterion by which we would make our 
judgement would be a bodily one, i.e. the behavior of the individual.
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to a concept of the self as one of several, interdependent and interrelated 
aspects of the individual.
The non-reductionist body theory
The non-reductionist bodv-theorv is a theory which claims that the sole criterion 
of identity is a bodily criterion, but does not reduce the body to the brain. It can 
be seen to be in the following position: it has to dismiss inward-looking 
arguments, which have to claim that memory is, at least, an inward-looking 
epistemological condition of identification and re-identification. It has therefore 
also to dismiss that memory is a condition for any third person identity 
statements.85 The theory understands the body, including the brain, as a reliable 
and sufficient criterion (both ontologically and epistemologically) upon which 
identity statements (first- and third person statements) can be made.86
Such a theory has also to dismiss our intuitions concerning memory as an 
influential factor to determine someone else’s identity. Since bodily continuity is 
the sole criterion of identity the theory has also problems to reply to counter 
cases involving bodily identity of different bodies without either retreating to the 
brain and its states as being the sole criterion (which of course would result in 
the abandoning of the non-reductionist position and be a retreat to a reductionist 
body-theory) or to have to take refuge in reducing the level of the discussion to 
a purely trivial one. In the latter case the distinction of two or more identical 
looking bodies can be maintained when one is referring to the fact that they, 
although they look identical, cannot occupy the same space at the same time 
and are, therefore, not one and the same body.
There is, of course, still the Leibnizian way to say that there don’t exist two 
bodies which are exactly identical in their appearance87, that is, all counter
851 think we can agree that a theory of identity of individuals has to account for inward- and outward-looking 
perspectives.
61 have already argued that bodily continuity as a criterion of the identity of individuals is, epistemologically, 
not as good a criterion as it is claimed to be.
87 Compare Preface, 57; Book II, Chapter i, 110 and Chapter xxvii, 229-231 of LEIBNIZ, G.W. New Essays 
on Human Understanding, edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Abridged Edition, Cambridge 
University Press, 1982.
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examples and thought experiments must be dismissed as describing actual 
impossibilities. But even such a scenario is not without its problems: All bodies 
must not only be theoretically distinguishable, but they also have to be 
practically distinguishable. The distinctive features of objects may only be 
observable by means other than the senses themselves (i.e. microscopes, 
telescopes, machinery of any kind) - and here we have taken for granted that 
we can trust our senses. Therefore the availability of distinguishing features is 
not necessarily direct and subsequently leaves room for mistakes of identity.
The suggested way of recognizing distinguishing features is not a necessary 
but a contingent one, but we are still able to understand it as a natural way (we 
make use of the five senses we possess naturally and it is also natural to 
human beings to think, to draw conclusions and to make judgments about our 
perceptions and their objects). However, the observation of distinguishing 
features of objects or of other human beings may sometimes be difficult without 
the mediation of aids (instruments such as microscopes or looking glasses, or 
markings etc.). It follows that the way of identification or re-identification is 
contingent because the possession of a functioning sensual apparatus and 
reason is a necessary but only contingently sufficient condition.
In respect to the presented concepts of person and self we can say that the 
non-reductionist body theory is not very successful in accommodating their 
mental features88. Since the theory allows only a bodily criterion the mental 
features of personhood and self have to be dismissed as not essential where 
identity is concerned. This applies to inward- and outward looking viewpoints 
and can therefore not satisfy the claims concerning the role of memory which 
have already been established.
The theory is quite capable, however, of accounting for person and 
personhood in the way suggested by McCALL, but it cannot embrace a concept 
of the self as long as the self is claimed to be epistemologically essentially, 
although not exclusively, private. If the privacy, even in the weaker form I 
suggested, is removed from the self, then the self as a special aspect of the
88 Note that the non-reductionist theory is not taken here as some type of the identity theory.
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individual would disappear. With the removal of epistemological privacy we are 
left with a version of McCALL’s concept of person. Since the self would have 
disappeared as a special aspect of the individual the problems of McCALL’s 
account in respect to the connection between self and personhood can be 
avoided. However, it would also be the case that all the arguments brought up in 
the discussion of personal identity in respect to the role of memory can be 
automatically applied. The discussion of SHOEMAKER’S account has shown 
that bodily continuity cannot be the sole criterion of personal identity. Thus, the 
non-reductionist theory of identity, which wishes to maintain bodily continuity as 
the sole criterion of the identity of an individual, cannot be accepted.
We also have to pay attention to the fact that the non-reductionist theory is 
entirely unsuitable in respect to Hume’s theory of perception. It can therefore 
not be used to explore the Humean claims concerning the self and identity in 
general. The criterion of identity the non-reductionist theory suggests is highly 
questionable within the context of Humean thinking because it relies on bodily 
criteria alone and dismisses the mental features completely. Since, for Hume, 
the mind (the succession of perceptions) and its operations are of vital 
importance for the discovery of identity, it follows that a non-reductionist theory 
and a Humean approach are incompatible.
The reductionist bodv-theory
The reductionist bodv-theory is a theory which claims that not the visual or 
otherwise perceptible continuity (and appearance) of the entire human body is 
the sole criterion of identity of individuals, but claims that it is the bodily 
continuity of the brain which is the sought after criterion. The perceptible 
continuity of the entire human body has a role very similar to the one it plays for 
the memory-theorist. It is an easy, but somehow improvised means of 
identification and re-identification. It is in no sense a sufficient epistemological 
criterion of identity (if it is also an ontological criterion, that is whether or not one 
is nothing but one’s brain, is debatable).
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Looking closely at a possible reductionist account, one cannot avoid the 
impression that such a theory is ambiguous and appears, metaphorically 
speaking, either as the reductionist version of the body-theory, or, as a hard 
core materialist’s version of the memory-theory or the combined theory which I 
intend to summarize later. A possible reductionist account of the latter kind 
acknowledges that continuity of the human body, or the body of anything 
possessing a brain for that matter, is not a reliable criterion of individual identity, 
and therefore, is epistemologically neither a sufficient nor a necessary 
criterion.89 However, focussing on the brain is focussing on the physical, 
because the brain consists of matter and has therefore a bodily nature. The 
reductionist theory claims that it can accommodate purely physical, i.e. bodily 
criteria, as well as „mental“ criteria. Possible „mental“ events or states, used as 
criteria, are, of course, understood to be nothing else but physical events. 
Mental events are identical with neurophysiological brain states. For these 
reasons the reductionist theory seems to be very attractive. It seems to be a 
very versatile theory which allows for different options in the way I suggested. It 
is a monistic theory and seems to account for criteria both mental and physical, 
because it reduces what we usually call „the mental" to the physical.
However, it is my opinion that the reductionist account despite its apparent 
advantages entails a variety of serious problems and intrinsic difficulties. If 
these problems and difficulties cannot be resolved, the theory is theoretically not 
very convincing. If the brain has to be understood as playing the same role in 
the reductionist theory as the entirety of the human body plays in the non­
reductionist body theory, then it appears to be the case that the problems faced 
by an account of the latter kind apply to the reductionist theory also, and are 
even deepened, as I hope to show. The non-reductionist problems are not 
resolved but are rather shifted onto a different, even more complicated, level.
89 The body as a whole is only necessary if  one wishes to argue that the brain is part of a whole human body 
and depends upon the existence and proper functioning of all other life-maintaining and stimulating organs 
and bodily parts and their workings. It is easily conceivable that this claim can be altered towards any other 
body, such as the bodies Cardassians and Ferengies have, or towards any other life supporting and stimulating 
equipment. However, under these circumstances the body entire is an ontological, not an epistemological, 
criterion.
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The force of these problems is strengthened because of an epistemological 
„gap“ occurring between the brain states and their identical „mental outcomes 
The reductionist theorist would have to argue that there are mental events, but 
that they are identical with neurophysiological events taking place in the brain. 
These neurophysiological events are usually not observable, that is, unless we 
use a sophisticated machinery. Therefore the observation is never, even if such 
machinery existed, a direct one. But neither is the observation of mental events 
for third persons, since we can only observe language and behavior. However, 
mental events are directly accessible in the first person. This would evidently not 
be the case with neurophysiological events.
It must also be noted that whilst behavior and language, within the limits of 
their reliability to indicate certain mental events, are directly observable by third 
persons, neurophysiological events taking place in the brain are not. This 
means that the chain of epistemological steps necessary or required to gain 
proper knowledge about someone’s mental state is a longer one for the 
reductionist theorist than it is for a non-reductionist account. Thus the amount of 
inferences which have to be made is greater for the former. Consequently, there 
is an increased amount of possible sources of error. The increase of certainty 
claimed to be gained by the application of the reductionist theory becomes 
questionable once one considers the increased possibilities for errors. The 
following should help to illustrate the problem:
non-reductionist theory.
mental events A ------> physical „outcome“ B
(whatever they are identical with) (behavior, language)
of a continuous existing body b
B is contained in b and b is the sole criterion of identity.
B and b are directly available to third persons
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reductionist theory. 
mental event A 
+
neurophysiological brain state A 
of a continous existing brain a
physical „outcome“ B 
(behavior, language) of 
a body b
A is contained in a and a is the sole criterion of identity.
A and a are not directly available to third persons.
B is contained in b.
Only B and b are directly available to third persons.
B and b are not the criterion of identity other than in a subordinate way.
When we apply my earlier simulation-example to the reductionist theory we 
become aware that a reductionist account cannot deal satisfactorily with the 
problems the example is trying to point out:
a) criterion of identity: neurophysiological brain states
If the neurophysiological states alone are supposed to be the sole criterion of 
the identity of an individual, then Dagmar and I are identical because we have 
identical brain states at the same time. Here a logical contradiction occurs, since 
my neurophysiological brain states take place in a different locus in space than 
Dagmar’s, we are one and the same individual because of neurophysiological 
identity but we are not the same individual because our brain states are 
numerically not identical.
b) criterion of identity: the brain-body
On the other hand, if the brain as a physical entity with continued existence (that 
is, the brain only in respect to the fact that it is a particular lump of matter with a 
particular form) is supposed to be the criterion of identity, then Dagmar and I 
would not be identical simply for the reason that there are two lumps of 
organized matter which can only be found to occupy different places at the 
same time. If this is the case then it becomes hard to see why we should bother
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with neurophysiological events and the materialist identity theory in the first 
place.
c) criterion of identity: the neurophysiological states and the brain-body
As a third possibility, the brain-body and its neurophysiological states in 
combination are understood as the criterion of identity. This requires that none 
of the factors takes precedence. If either one of them does take precedence, 
one of the above arguments applies. Thus, the brain-body and the 
neurophysiological events, each taken on its own, is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient criterion of identity.90 This is, in its form, similar to the account of the 
combined theory, which will be dicussed next. The combined theory, however, 
proposes criteria of identity of an individual which allow it to get on without 
having to reduce the mental to the physical. The latter is the main problem of 
the reductionist theory. Mental events have ..phenomenal features", also known 
as qualia. These cannot be reduced to neurophysiological events of some sort, 
since they are qualitative experiential contents which ..determine ‘what it is 
like’"91 to have a certain experience/perception. A reductionist theory cannot 
account for these features of the mental.92
Even if the reductionist account would be accepted, it fails to accommodate 
the outlined concepts of self and person for exactly the same reasons as the 
non-reductionist account. The theory still keeps all the major problems of a 
purely bodily account although they are shifted onto a level of reduction of the 
mental to the physical.93 The non-reductionist account simply dismisses, 
eliminates, the mental as a possible criterion of identity.
The claims the theory puts forward are also irreconcilable with Hume’s 
theory of perception and his version of Basic Realism. The reductionist theory
90 Without this division of the combination in two necessary, but singly insufficient criteria the matter would 
become problematic. I f  the neurophysiological events and the brain-body are taken, in combination, as only 
one criterion we would end up with a criterion which is potentially self-contradictory. Different brains (brain- 
bodies) can, ex hypothesis, be in the same brain state (same neurophyiological events).
91 SHOEMAKER, S. The Mind-Body Problem, in: WARNER, R., SZUBKA, T. (ed.), ibid., p.57.
92 See for a discussion of the nature of reductionism: KIM , J. The Myth o f Nonreductive Materialism, in: 
WARNER, R., SZUBKA, T. (ed.), ibid., p.242-257.
93 Eliminativism is a possible consequence even of supposedly non-reductive materialism.
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makes ontological claims about the nature of the brain and the nature of 
perceptions which can, on Humean grounds, not reasonably be made.
The combined theory
The kind of theory which I wish to call the combined theory proposes two criteria 
of individual identity: continued bodily existence and memory. This theory and 
possible supporting arguments have been discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter in reference to SIDNEY SHOEMAKER. Each one of the criteria, taken 
on its own, is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for determining identity. 
It is clear that the arguments put forward, and the account of the combined 
theory given so far, take the issue from an epistemological angle. (I don’t think 
this is very worrying when one discusses the matter from a third person’s point 
of view, because we cannot experience someone else’s bundle of perceptions 
as Hume points out. It is my belief that the matter is somehow different, even if 
only in the sense that it requires some investigation, when we look at the issue 
from a first person angle.)
The combined theory avoids the problems any one-sided account is facing. 
These problems have been pointed out throughout the literature. The 
arguments containing them were intended to be objections against, or supports 
of one of the two one-sided theories of identity of an individual. The mental 
criterion is certainly weaker in respect to third person identity statements than it 
is in first person identity statements. There it even ceases to be an 
epistemological criterion because of the self-evidence attached to it. ..Persons, 
unlike other things, make statements about their own pasts, and can be said to 
know these statements to be true. This fact would be of little importance, as far 
as the problem of personal identity is concerned, if these statements were 
always grounded in the ways in which people’s statements about the past 
histories of things other than themselves are grounded. But while our 
statements about our own pasts are sometimes based on diaries, photographs, 
fingerprints, and the like, normally they are not. Normally they are based on our
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own memories, and the way in which one’s memory provides one with 
knowledge concerning one’s own past is quite unlike the way in which it 
provides one with knowledge concerning the past history of another person or 
thing.*'94 Making statements about one’s own past are first person identity 
statements, whilst statements about individuals or things other than oneself are 
second or third person identity statements95. If statements about individuals or 
objects other than oneself are not identity statements themselves, then they at 
least are based upon identity statements.96
As it has been argued before, especially in reference to SHOEMAKER’S 
account, memory must - to be an epistemological criterion of identity - be a 
criterion in respect to third person identity statements. It has been suggested by 
SHOEMAKER that memory is not an epistemological criterion when one is 
making statements about one’s own past. (I don’t have to ask the question, „Are 
these memories I have mine, or are they someone else’s?" , it is evident that 
they are mine and I don’t need a criterion by which I decide whether or not they 
are my memories and are an image of one of my past experiences.) So, if 
memory is supposed to be a criterion of identity, in an epistemological sense, it 
must be a criterion in respect to third person identity statements about 
individuals other than oneself.
I have argued before that if someone looks like my grandfather and let’s 
say, even displays the same behavior as my grandfather, uses the same style of 
verbal and non-verbal expression (same speech pattern and vocabulary, same 
body language), but doesn’t have any of the memories my grandfather has, but 
has entirely different ones, I most certainly conclude that this person is not my 
grandfather, but perhaps a doppelganger. We just have to think of examples of 
espionage to realize how important memory is in respect to identification and re­
identification of individuals other than oneself. If the agent Tommy Beresford is
94 SHOEMAKER, S. Personal Identity and Memory, in: PERRY, J. (ed.) ibid., p. 119.
951 refer to all identity statements other than first person identity statements as third person identity 
statements.
96 Sentences like ‘The stone is red’, imply several identity statements: this stone, and not another one, is red; I 
must also, making the statement, be able to identify the colour red just as I have to be able to identify the given 
object firstly as an object and secondly as a stone and not as a leaf etc.
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set up to be general Canaris’ new Aid du Camp von Hornung, not only his 
appearance is altered so that he looks like the captured von Hornung. He also 
has to learn all of von Hornuncfs relevant past experiences (memories) and has 
to display von Hornuncfs character traits. General Canaris would become very 
suspicious indeed about his aid’s identity, if von Hornung not only would not 
look like he is supposed to look, but would also behave differently from the way 
von Hornung is known to behave, and would not have memories Canaris knows 
von Hornung must have.
It could now be argued that memory cannot be seen as a proper criterion of 
identity, not even if it is not understood as the sole criterion. Memory is only 
used as a means to determine the whereabouts of the body. Therefore bodily 
continuity is taken as the proper criterion of identity, not memory. It is very much 
like the following: the real von Hornung went to school in Schulpforta and can or 
could recall, therefore, many memories of the school and its pupils. The fake 
von Hornung (Beresford) didn’t go to Schulpforta (because he was in an English 
school and not in a German one) and can and could not recall all the memories 
which are immediately available to the real von Hornung. Canaris now gives a 
dinner party which is also attended by major Bauer, who also went to 
Schulpforta. Since talking about one’s old school mates and teachers is one of 
Bauer’s favored topics he entertains his comrades in arms accordingly. Von 
Hornung/Beresford can partly join in because he learned some of the old school 
stories from the real von Hornung, but his act is not very convincing because his 
knowledge of Schulpforta and its inhabitants is not consistent with Bauer’s. The 
suspicion that von Hornung/Beresford is a fake arises, not because his 
memories (or better, the pretended memories) are inconsistent with what is 
known about the object of these memories, but because the inconsistency 
proves that this von Hornung was not in Schulpforta. We are faced with the 
situation that either Canaris’ aid is von Hornung and von Hornung was, in fact, 
not in that school or, von Hornung was in that school but Canaris’ aid then is 
not, and cannot be, von Hornung.
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The underlying idea of the argument against memory is that one and the 
same continuously existing body was known to occupy a certain space at a 
certain time. If it works out that the body in question was not occupying the 
space it is known that it has, then the conclusion has to be drawn that we are 
faced with two different bodies and not with one and the same body. Memories 
and their expressions as far as third person identity statements are concerned 
are analogous to the mark we make on an object, like an egg, to distinguish it 
from another egg. Memory is just an instrument to trace the whereabouts of the 
body. The decisive and proper criterion of identity is the body and its place in 
space and time. It is perhaps justified to say, that the argument suggests that 
bodily identity is the sole criterion, epistemologically, of the identity of an 
individual and that memory is a necessary criterion, epistemologically (but by no 
means a the only one), by which one determines the bodily identity of human 
beings other than oneself.
chain of identification:
memory (and other, mainly bodily, criteria) —> bodily identity —> individual 
identity
First of all, such an argument implies that there is something special about 
human beings, that there is something which distinguishes them from other 
things, such as stones, carrots and even dogs. Memory, and therefore a mental 
faculty, has still a part to play, here in a seemingly subordinate way. It is not 
dismissed as having no bearing whatsoever on the problem of identity where 
human beings are concerned. Thus, the importance of memory in respect to 
identity of an individual other than oneself is acknowledged. It would indeed be 
strange, from an outward looking point of view, to claim that memory is a 
criterion for a third person identity statement about the identity of an apple tree. 
We don’t think that an apple tree has something we would or could call memory. 
The argument also suggests that memory is an essential, distinguishing feature 
of human beings in general and of an individual in particular.
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Here the absurdity of the argument against memory as a criterion of identity 
of an individual other than oneself (from an outward looking point of view) 
becomes clear. The presented argument contains a mental element 
somewhere. And it is also here, where the different aspects of an individual 
have to be looked at. It does not make sense to include a mental criterion (it 
doesn’t matter whether it is a sufficient criterion or not) in the set of criteria we 
need to determine the identity of a body if body is understood in a Cartesian 
way or if one happens to be a hard core materialist. One must note that these 
criteria, including the memory-criterion, are here referred to as epistemological 
criteria needed to be able to make a proper identification of another individual. 
They are here not supposed to be criteria in an ontological sense. It could 
therefore be argued against my claim that being a hard core materialist or being 
a Cartesian doesn’t have any real theoretical impact since these theories make 
ontological statements.
i. First of all, I would like to point out that ontology and epistemology are 
connected, although they don’t have to be one. We probably all agree that in 
cases where I have no means to know whether p or -p is the case I cannot 
conclude that p is. (It might, in fact, be true that p is, but I have no possibility to 
know that it is and my ontological statements are nothing more than an 
educated guess.) The only thing I can say is that I don’t know. If it is the case 
that a mental criterion is needed to determine identity (epistemologically) then it 
cannot be concluded that the mental is not an ontological criterion, nor can it be 
said that it is. Though it is my belief that an account resting on the materialist 
identity-theory becomes more and more difficult to accept because, within such 
an account, it would be epistemologically necessary to be able to exchange 
statements about a mental event (for instance a particular memory) with 
statements about a neurophysiological event salva veritate. I don’t think this is 
possible. Firstly, if the previous arguments concerning the possibility of 
epistemological gaps (indirect availability, sources of error, etc.) in respect to the 
identity-theory are accepted, it seems to be true that neurophysiological events 
carry, epistemologically, not the same weight as memory, especially not in first
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person identity statements. Secondly, the exchange salva veritate does not 
seem to be possible because of qualia.
ii. A Cartesian account thinks of the mental and the physical as 
independently existing, separate substances. The chain of identification can be 
accepted where first person statements are concerned or where the first person 
point of view is taken into account (for instance, I know that bodies exist 
because I have a clear and distinct idea about it). However, I wish to restrict 
myself only to the third person angle at the moment. This means that someone 
else’s memories cannot be a criterion for this someone’s identity if the individual 
is defined, merely, in bodily terms97. The mental is entirely distinct from the body 
and cannot, where the third person angle is taken, contribute, either 
epistemologically or ontologically, towards identity statements, not even towards 
statements of existence.
If these arguments are valid then it follows that the suggested chain of 
epistemological criteria of identity of individuals, taken from a third person angle, 
cannot be brought as an argument against the combined theory supporting 
either the identity-theory or a Cartesian account. It appears to be the case that 
the combined theory is a very strong theory. It can avoid the kind of identity- 
problems pointed out in examples and counter-examples throughout the 
literature. Accepting the combined theory, it can be said that if two bodies, or 
two brains, have identical mental events at the same time, then we still don’t 
have two identical individuals, and this not only in a purely trivial sense. Firstly, 
we are here concerned with the identity of individuals, i.e. with experiencing 
beings which have the capacity to reflect upon their experiences and to learn (at 
least to some degree). It is trivial that even two identical bodies cannot „contain“ 
two identical experiencing minds, since the bodies have to occupy un-identical 
spaces at the same time. They will also have different experiences a) resulting 
from their different spatial coordinates - and this goes beyond the trivial 
distinction and b) resulting from different qualitative experiential contents
971 cannot doubt that I think, hence I cannot doubt my own existence. I can, however, doubt the existence of 
my own body as well as of other bodies. The latter includes other people.
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(qualia). The latter cannot be set into an identity relation because comparison is 
simply not possible.
The combined theory is very clear when it comes to examples and counter­
examples of the usual kind, which we find throughout the literature intended to 
support one or the other one-sided theory. Since the combined theory claims 
that each of the criteria in question (either memory or bodily continuity) alone is 
a necessary but not a sufficient criterion of identity, it can avoid the problems 
and absurdities occurring with a one-sided approach. It is also capable of 
accommodating our intuitions in respect to the identity of individuals. If Mary 
wakes up in the morning and finds herself having the body of Ann, it cannot be 
said, according to the combined theory, that she is now Ann, since bodily 
continuity is not a sufficient criterion of identity. It would also be false, if we want 
to keep faith with the combined theory, that she still is the Mary she was 
yesterday, since memory alone is not a sufficient criterion of identity either. It 
may be true that we value intuitively the mental criterion more than the physical 
one, as my earlier example of the frog prince points out. Nevertheless, our 
intuition can accommodate the just given account. Even intuitively we would not 
be entirely at ease to declare the Mary of today to be identical with the Mary we 
knew yesterday. Our intuition sees an individual as a unity of body and mind. 
The absolute „same“ Mary would consist of Mary’s body (and not someone 
else’s) and Mary’s mental life, including her memory, as far as we are able to 
make third person statements about it. The individual having Mary’s memory but 
Anne’s body is neither Mary nor Anne, it is Marianne. In the other case, where 
Mary’s body remains the same but „contains“ Anne’s memory, we would also 
have to say that the individual we are faced with is not Mary, but neither is it 
Anne. She is a new individual, Annemarie.98
The frog prince example expresses also intuitions of the suggested kind and 
can also accommodate the combined theory. Heinrich, the servant, knew about 
his master’s body change. He still saw his master in the frog, although he
98 The same would be true for clones having a mind transfer. Their bodies would, at least, be numerically 
distinct. Their mental live differs due to a) their different location in space and b) due to the different 
phenomenological features of their experiences.
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expressed that he didn’t think that they were absolutely identical. It seems to be 
the case that Heinrich’s pain and suffering caused by the curse laid upon his 
master is motivated by the fact that his beloved master is changed, is not truly 
himself anymore, has to live in a pond and to eat flies, because his body had 
changed.
So it becomes clear that the combined theory can accomodate the 
personhood aspect of an individual, which as a social aspect cannot be 
understood to rest upon bodily continuity alone. The combined theory is also 
capable of accommodating Humean thought as well as the concept of self as it 
has been outlined, investigated and understood so far. Hume does not deny the 
existence of bodies, as his famous words in Section II of Book I, Of scepticism 
in regard to the senses, so clearly express: „We may well ask, What causes 
induce us to believe in the existence of body? but ‘tis vain to ask, Whether there 
be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our 
reasonings."99 The sceptical question which is reasonable and useful to ask is 
the first one, asking for the grounds upon which we form the idea of the 
existence of bodies, but we have to take for granted that they exist if any 
question we are going to raise shall be meaningful. I will show in the chapter 
concerning the principle of unity of perceptions that Hume is, in fact, a Basic 
Realist. Hume’s scepticism is entirely an epistemological one and he doesn’t 
make the mistake, at least not in regard to the existence of body and externality, 
to slide away onto ontological grounds.
When there are bodies, then there are people other than oneself. Third 
person identity statements are entirely possible and needed, especially when it 
comes to the passions. Hume recognizes the social aspect of identity of 
individuals (person) as well as the more private, inward looking aspect of an 
individual (self) already in Book One of the Treatise. When Hume talks about 
identity in Book One, it becomes obvious that the question of identity is twofold. 
It contains two distinct, although in my understanding not separate, aspects. 
„What then gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these
99 T.I,IV,II,187.
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successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and 
uninterrupted existence thro’ the whole course of our lives? In order to answer 
this question, we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards 
our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern 
we take in ourselves100. The first is our present subject."101 The combined 
theory works well with a Humean account because it does not require a theory 
which has to necessarily make claims about the ontological nature of body (or 
mind) beyond the Basic Realist claim that something we refer to as body exists 
and influences our perceptions.
The second aspect of identity Hume mentions is the subject especially of 
Book Two and refers to person and personhood. When Hume gives his account 
of the passions, like pride and humility, love and hate, and when he gives his 
account of sympathy, he refers to this aspect without leaving out the other 
aspect of an individual, the self, as it is understood in a social context. The self 
as a social self, as it is here indicated, cannot und must not be reduced to the 
person aspect of an individual. In my account of these aspects, they are 
interrelated and interdependent. The self has social features: one can talk about 
one’s perceptions, the self is needed for sympathy, we need others for the 
emergence of our self, etc. Nevertheless, to perceive oneself as a person 
implies, firstly, that one also perceives oneself as a self. Secondly, one’s 
perception of oneself as a person has qualitative contents (qualia) which are 
only directly accessible to oneself and, as such, cannot be fully communicated. 
This is why the self cannot be reduced to personhood and vice versa. If 
personhood is defined by mental criteria also, since it is a social concept, it is 
defined by the mental criteria which are socially available. But not all mental 
events are socially available. So self and personhood are interdependent and 
interrelated because the latter requires the former, and the former requires 
social context and social recognition to emerge. The role of memory in a 
Humean account is very similar in respect to third person identity statements
100 my own accentuation.
101 T.I,IV ,V I,253.
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and first person identity statements. Without memory it is impossible to arrive at 
a notion of necessary connection. Since we require causation to gain an idea of 
the continued existence of anything (mind or body), it follows that memory is a 
necessary condition of any identity statements whatsoever and must therefore 
be also a necessary condition for third person identity statements.
In conclusion we can say that the combined theory is, so far, most suitable 
for our purposes and can accommodate both, the philosophy of David Hume as 
well as the concepts of person and self as they have been here presented.
The subject’s view point and Hume’s account of memory
It has already been indicated that when it comes to an inward-looking viewpoint, 
identity statements of any kind are not possible without the partaking of 
memory. This claim belongs to the group of inward looking identity statements 
because it is the memory of the subject itself which makes those statements 
possible. Statements of identity imply a comparison. To make statements such 
as: „Some object I have seen at time 2 is the same object I have seen at time 
1“, I have to compare the object I perceived earlier with the object I saw at a 
later time. Since I cannot compare the earlier perceived object itself with the 
later one, because the perception of the earlier object is in the past, I compare 
my memory of the object at time 1 with the object I have an experience of now, 
that is at time 2. Without memory the past is not available to me.102 It doesn’t 
matter, for the time being, what mental events and memory ontologically are, 
even if the identity theorists were right and memory as well as particular 
memories were nothing but neurophysiological brain states, memory, i.e. these 
particular neurophysiological events and the capacity for them to occur, are still 
needed to make identity statements at all.
This sounds very trivial, but we will see that it isn’t, especially not when we 
relate it to the account of memory Hume gives in Book One of the Treatise. We
102 It is not only the events of the past which would not be available without memory, but it is the very concept 
of the past itself which would not be available.
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need to remember Hume’s theory of perception to understand why it is difficult 
for him to account for identity statements. Memory is needed to establish the 
ideas of necessary connection and of externality - and these are conditions 
necessary for any notion of self. „As memory alone acquaints us with the 
continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, ‘tis is to be consider’d, 
upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no 
memory, we never shou’d have any notion of causation, nor consequently of 
that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person."103
As I pointed out in the first chapter, all perceptions (impressions and ideas) 
are fleeting existences. It is therefore hard to see how memory, i.e. the recall of 
past perceptions shall be possible. It is obvious that I cannot experience the 
past perception itself to compare it to the present one, but with Hume I also 
cannot recall a past perception because it doesn’t endure over time. Hume fails 
to see the difficulty when he writes: „Thus it appears, that the belief or assent, 
which always attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of 
those perceptions they present; and that this alone distinguishes them from the 
imagination. To believe is in this case to feel an immediate impression of the 
senses, or a repetition of that impression104 in the memory."105 Hume says 
here, firstly, that memory is possible and is always accompanied by beliefs 
because of the strong vivacity of its perceptions and secondly, that memory- 
perceptions are perceptions felt as repeated perceptions in memory. The 
„repeated“ perception, however, is not the same perception I have a memory of, 
but is a new, distinct perception with a different content. (I don’t have the idea 
that my arm is broken, but I have the idea that my arm was broken a year ago.) 
We have to ask the questions: 1. What is it that facilitates memory despite the 
fact that perceptions are fleeting existences? And 2. How do I know that it is a 
memory in the first place?
Hume seems to think that the second question can be answered by 
referring to the belief which attends such an idea. I believe that the idea I have
103 T .I,IV ,V II,261/262.
104 my own accentuation.
105 T .I,III,V ,86.
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is an idea in memory because the idea is very vivid, and being vivid means to 
give immediately rise to the belief. I have already argued that such an account, 
at least as it is presented in the sceptical parts of Book One, is not very 
satisfactory since Hume allows for mistakes. I can mistake an idea of memory 
which happens to be less vivid for an idea of imagination. I can also mistake a 
vivid idea of imagination for an idea of memory. But I think we can add 
something more. With the possibility of mistakes the following problem arises: 
Hume is obviously giving an account of what imagination and memory are, but 
since the beliefs attending the perceptions are unreliable because of his 
allowance for mistakes and because it seems to be the case that these beliefs 
cannot be verified, how can Hume arrive at such an account and can make a 
proper distinction between perceptions in memory and others?
I have discussed the matter at length earlier on. When we take into 
consideration what Hume is saying in Book Two and Three in the Treatise, we 
will find that a possible way of verification opens up within a social context: I 
may have a vivid idea that I burnt my hand when a child and consequently 
believe that I burnt my hand. However, let’s say this memory and this belief is 
not confirmed by anybody or anything else. My mother denies it, so does 
everybody who knew me at the time of the supposed accident. Additionally, all 
records suggest that I never burnt my hand. In short, no evidence can be found 
that the event I believe to remember ever did occur.
Hume argues: „Thus it appears upon the whole, that every kind of opinion or 
judgment, which amounts not to knowledge, is deriv’d entirely from the force 
and vivacity of the perception, and that these qualities constitute in the mind, 
what we call the BELIEF of the existence of any object. This force and this 
vivacity are most conspicious in the memory; and therefore our confidence in 
the veracity of that faculty is the greatest imaginable, and equals in many 
respects the assurance of a demonstration.“106 This is a very interesting 
statement. It draws a) our attention to the problem we discussed earlier, the 
problem of the distinction between ontology and epistemology as it occured
106 T.1,111,XIII, 153.
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when we were trying to distinguish memory from imagination; b) it raises the 
issue of verification of beliefs of memory.
a) According to Hume, ideas in memory are very vivid and give rise to 
beliefs. These beliefs, so it seems to be the case, do not amount to knowledge. 
It has been argued before, especially when we were discussing SHOEMAKER’S 
account, that memory provides us in a special way with knowledge about our 
own pasts. It has also been said that the reasons lie in the very meaning of the 
term memory. So called „false memories", or memory-mistakes, are not 
memories at all but are something else. For something to be a proper memory 
of mine it is necessary that this something really recalls events (of whatever 
kind) or occurrences of my own past. „Event memory must be distinguished 
from factual memory, particularly from factual memory that an event occurred. 
Most of us remember that Columbus discovered America in 1492. We wouldn’t 
miss that question on an exam. But no one now remembers Columbus 
discovering America. Most of us remember that we were born; few of us 
remember our birth. We can remember that events occurred which we never 
witnessed, and no plausible account of personal identity could be built on 
factual memory. But we can only have memories of events that we witnessed or 
in which we consciously took part."107 It is my opinion that even factual memory 
of the kind PERRY describes has to have some link with event memory. I don’t 
have to witness the events the facts are facts of but I had to be a witness to an 
event where I was made acquainted with these facts. Or, in plain word, I must 
have learned the fact somewhere. PERRY is quite right to point out that factual 
memory has no bearing upon individual identity in a direct way, but it certainly is 
important in an indirect one.
However, it will be sufficient for the present purpose to consider the 
relatively undisputed event memory when we talk about the term memory and 
its proper meaning. Hume’s account of memory doesn’t provide us with the 
special source of knowledge about our own past, at least not on a certain level, 
whereas it attempts to do exactly this on another one. If we look at the
107 PERRY, J. Personal Identity, Memory, and the Problem o f Circularity, in: PERRY, J. (ed.) ibid., p. 144.
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epistemological level, we can say that memory cannot be used 
unproblematically in its proper meaning, since I can mistake a perception of 
imagination for a memory perception and vice versa (this statement itself is an 
ontological one) because of their degree of force and vivacity. But if memory 
can be properly established, both as possible despite the fleeting existence of 
perceptions and as reliably distinguishable from imagination, the problems 
occurring on an epistemological level would be resolved. On an ontological level 
Hume can agree with the understanding of memory as the special source of 
knowledge, but so far there hasn’t been, epistemologically, a way to provide for 
a distinction between proper memory, that is, actual perceptions of memory, 
and perceptions of imagination.
We also have to take into account what Hume is saying about the character 
of the beliefs accompanying very vivid perceptions. Hume claims that our 
confidence in their veracity is a very big one and equals the confidence we have 
in the veracity of, for instance, demonstrations. If we apply the content of this 
statement to the example I gave earlier, we get the following picture: I believe 
that I burnt my hand when a child. The perceptions involved are very vivid and 
give rise to such a belief; but on an ontological level this ‘memory’ is actually 
nothing but a perception of imagination having an unusual force and vivacity. As 
I said, all my relatives disagree and no evidence of any kind can be found to 
confirm that I really burnt my hand. Rather the opposite is the case, there is 
quite a considerable amount of evidence to suggest that I never did burn my 
hand. The problem is that my trust in the veracity of my perception equals the 
trust I have in demonstration and in all the evidence presented to me. It seems 
therefore to be difficult to imagine how I am able to correct my belief, since I 
don’t have more trust in the evidence or in all demonstrations than in my own 
belief. A situation like the one decribed seems to leave me, at best, undecided, 
or leaves me dismissing all evidence and demonstrations. Such a problem, if it 
were not resolvable, would cause serious difficulties, not only in respect to the 
way humans behave and reason usually, but also in respect to Hume’s account 
of memory and imagination. It would seem to be the case that the problem
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removes any foundations, even the ones of observation, on which the 
allowances for memory mistakes are made. It would also not acknowledge 
memory’s special role in respect to the knowledge about one’s own past.
It is the way we experience and the concept of necessary connection itself 
which provides a solution to the problem. Hume writes in Of unphilosophical 
Probability. „The belief, which attends our memory, is of the same nature with 
that, which is deriv’d from our judgments: Nor is there any difference betwixt that 
judgment, which is deriv’d from a constant and uniform connexion of causes 
and effects, and that which depends upon an uninterrupted and uncertain. Tis 
indeed evident, that in all determinations, where the mind decides from contrary 
experiments, ‘tis first divided within itself, and has an inclination to either side in 
proportion to the number of experiments we have seen and remember. This 
contest is at last determin’d to the advantage of that side, where we observe a 
superior number of these experiments; but still with a diminution of force in the 
evidence correspondent to the number of the opposite experiments. Each 
possibility, of which the probability is compos’d, operates separately upon the 
imagination; and ‘tis the larger collection of possibilities, which at last prevails, 
and that with a force proportionable to it’s superiority."108 This is a mechanism 
which provides us with a tool to correct memory-mistakes in a social context, 
which does include statements of witnesses other than oneself as well as 
evidence as it is given in representations of human knowledge, like books, 
diaries, pictures etc.
The possibility to spot and to correct mistakes is based on observation of a 
number of experiments and the forming of habit in the imagination. Hume’s 
atomism becomes very apparent when he argues that it is the „larger collection 
of possibilities" which prevails with a larger force proportionate to its larger 
number. The account Hume gives here is not negating the trust in the veracity of 
our perceptions we feel (note that a belief is a perception too). If the quantities 
of the different experiments on both sides hold their balance, then the mind is 
divided „and has an inclination to either side in proportion to the number of
108 T.I,III,XIII,154.
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experiments". For instance, when I have observed very often that my memory of 
my childhood is correct, the result is a great trust in my own memories. When 
disagreements occur I am not easily convinced that I am wrong. In fact, if it is a 
matter of my memory against someone else’s, I cannot be persuaded at all that 
they might be right and I might be wrong. The only evidence I regard as being 
stronger than my own memory is documented evidence of facts. This is 
because I have experienced a larger number of experiments where it was 
shown that factual evidence is more reliable than my memory, than there were 
experiments where my memory was more reliable than factual evidence.109 It 
must also be observed that the acceptance of evidence of facts against one’s 
event memory is also rooted in the absorption of social habits. On the other 
hand, a large number of experiments gave me the inclination to think that my 
factual memory (as opposed to event memory) is anything else but very reliable. 
In cases where my opinion stands against someone else’s opinion I am inclined 
to believe the other opinion to be right and to mistrust my own, at least I will 
check the controversial facts.
In conclusion we can say that Hume’s account allows for some verification, 
though not in the usual sense of verification. We do not check our beliefs of 
their correctness but are able to change them due to stronger impressions 
opposing the impression of the initial belief.
However, all these mechanisms do not have any proper foundation unless 
memory can be successfully established. The unaccountability of memory is 
rooted in Hume’s theory of perception which is of strong eminence throughout 
the Treatise. We cannot simply make some additional assumptions and declare 
perceptions not to be fleeting existences. This would overthrow anything Hume 
wants to say about identity (internal and external) and we would arrive at an 
understanding of the workings of the mind alien to Hume’s philosophy. If, on the 
other hand, memory remains unaccountable, the consequences will be 
devastating. Without memory the ideas of necessary connection, identity and
109 It must also be noted that in the latter case the final evidence showing that my memory was more reliable 
than the known facts, is factual evidence itself.
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externality cannot be accounted for. Furthermore, imagination itself could not be 
established because although imagination must be distinguished from memory, 
it still requires memory. The material imagination works on, is not only 
instanteneous sense perception material, it is also material provided by 
memory. Additionally, imagination makes transitions from habits, but no habit 
can be formed without memory.
The subject’s view point and the distinction between self and personhood
There are indications that person and self are two distinct aspects of an 
individual from an inward looking point of view. These indications seem to have, 
firstly, epistemological roots anchored essentially in the privacy of the self as an 
epistemological concept. To start with the investigation of the problem I wish to 
refer to the concept of person which is presented by STRAWSON. STRAWSON 
writes: „...persons are essentially beings which possess abilities and 
dispositions of certain kinds; are self conscious, capable of ascribing to 
themselves certain properties; and which are capable of entering into, and find 
themselves entering into, certain kinds of relationships, involving mutual 
communication, with each other, taking each other thereby, to be creatures of 
the same kind as themselves."110 There has been much discussion of the 
justification of STRAWSON’s theory, which I do not wish to refer to unless it is 
necessary to do so for my own purposes. However, I think we are entitled to say 
that STRAWSON’s account of person is essentially a social one and rests on 
considerations about communication and communicability. It therefore rests on 
language (including non-verbal language) and its use, both on a level of thought 
(which should also include non-conceptualized thought) „but also in the original 
speaker-hearer senses."111
STRAWSON’s interpretation understands self-consciousness as an 
essential feature of person or personhood, but it is certainly not the only feature
n° s tra w S O N , P.F. Reply to Mackie and Hide Ishiguro, in: Van STRAATEN, Z. (ed.) Philosophical 
Subjects, Oxford University Press 1980, p.269.
111 STRAWSON, P.F. Individuals, London: Methuan, 1959, p.87.
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nor can it be set identical with person. It is perhaps possible to say that 
according to STRAWSON’s interpretation, person is self-consciousness + 
experience (including social experiences of all kinds) + communication. We 
have to note that communication is only possible in so far as there exist social 
experiences and social relationships. Epistemologically, we can say that 
communicability is perhaps most crucial where the difference between person 
and self is concerned. Communication of experiences and mental events is 
limited by their communicability. Limitation results, firstly, from the communicans 
itself - i.e. the limits of verbal as well as non-verbal language.112 Secondly, a 
more serious limitation rests with the limitation of the communicandum, or 
better, to the qualitative contents of our experiences (qualia), be they sensual 
experiences, thought or mental events of whatever kind, which seemingly 
cannot be communicated adequately. Epistemologically, we can argue that the 
communicable belongs to the realm of personhood, but most importantly, that 
the incommunicable belongs to the realm of the self.
I want to say that the person aspect goes only as far as communication 
goes. What is not communicable does not belong to the person aspect of the 
individual, which is understood by STRAWSON and others to be socially 
defined and has therefore to be accessible to other individuals. The 
incommunicable belongs to the aspect we call the self. There are qualitative 
contents of all experiences which are incommunicable by any means, which are, 
essentially and necessarily, private (qualia). I can, of course, infer that the 
individual I am communicating with has had similar experiences than those I am 
having now and that he can therefore comprehend what is going on inside me, 
that he can empathize with me and has an idea of what my experiences feel like 
to me. I can only make these inferences because I have recognized the other to 
be of the same kind as I am and communication, where possible, is a very 
important way to recognize this. McCALL seems to miss exactly this when she 
writes critizising STRAWSON: „...as Strawson does not put forward any other 
identifying conditions of persons, other than the attribution of P-Predicates, any
112 However, it could be argued that the inadequacy of the communicans is purely accidental in nature.
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entity to which such predicates can be (meaningfully) applied falls under the 
concept of „person“. [...] The nature of the concept of person depends, it seems, 
upon how we use our language. If we can meaningfully ascribe P-Predicates, 
within the structure of the language as it is, the entity to which such predicates 
can be ascribed is understood to be a person. Yet in our language as it is, P- 
Predicates can be meaningfully ascribed to dogs and to computers, etc., without 
those entities being thought of as persons (by most people.) For instance, it can 
be said meaningfully that the dog is unhappy, is missing his master and wants 
to go out for a walk, and Artificial Intelligence programmers can make claims 
that they have designed programs which understand natural language. Such 
uses of language may be thought to be inaccurate but they are not 
meaningless. Yet our ordinary concept of person is surely distinct from that of 
animals or artifacts. Strawson’s account fails to make such a distinction."113
The point McCALL is missing is that we may, in fact, ascribe so called P- 
Predicates to dogs, goldfish and computers but only because, when we do this, 
we treat the animal or the computer as if they were persons. We do not really 
think that the dog is happy in the same way we think human beings are happy 
or that the dog wants to go for a walk as we would want to go for a walk. We do 
not think either that the dog really understands our language nor do we think 
that the computer does understand it as long as we don’t want to understand 
understanding to mean nothing else than ..receiving a signal". We certainly do 
not think that dogs or computers are self-conscious. Self-consciousness is a 
feature of personhood and a condition for the proper assignment of P- 
Predicates.
My dog and I are doubtlessly able to communicate, but not on the level of 
communication as it usually occurs between human beings. To make a dog 
understand my commands I have to use methods of communication the dog 
can understand, human language as meaningful language is not one of them, 
or, to put it into plain words, I have to „speak“ doggie language that the dog can 
understand me. When my puppy is grown into an adventurous, strong adult
113 McCALL, C. ibid., p.52-53.
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male dog and makes serious attempts to lead the pack (that is, the family he 
lives in, since he perceives this to be his pack) it does not make sense to reason 
with the dog and to tell him that since I pay the bills and do the work I am the 
master of the house. Instead I have to fight with him and to force him into the 
obedience position to show him that I am the leader of the pack and will not be 
challenged. The difference is that the dog cannot communicate with me on the 
level of human communication, but I can communicate with the dog on his level. 
When I communicate with my dog on his level of communication I certainly don’t 
think that the dog is a person.
The communication between a human and an animal (taken for granted that 
the animal does not possess self consciousness on whatever level - if it does 
the matter is indeed a different one) and between a human and an artifact is of 
an entirely different kind, than the communication taking place between 
humans. This is so for two main reasons. Humans have, usually, self- 
consciousness. They have a self and are conscious of it (whatever that self 
happens to be) and infer that the other human is self-conscious too. They also 
recognize others as persons. Animals and artifacts are usually not self- 
conscious and don’t refer to others or to themselves as persons. I refer to 
someone else as a person because I have perceived, by communication, this 
someone to be of the same kind as I am, i.e. being self-conscious. I perceive 
the other to be part of a social environment I am also a part of, which is the kind 
of social relationship that takes place between beings of the same kind.
If self-consciousness is a necessary feature of personhood in an outward 
looking way, i.e. I understand someone else to be a person if and only if the 
other is a self-conscious being, then this must also be true for an inward looking 
point of view, although the matter is then epistemologically different.114 I myself 
don’t have to infer that I am a self conscious being, I simply know that I am 
(again, it doesn’t matter what that self exactly happens to be). Thereby referring 
to my self. Furthermore, to understand and to recognize myself as a person it
114 The ontological claims do not differ because in both cases we make the ontological claim that the 
respective individual is a self-conscious being. The difference here is an epistemological one, i.e. differing by 
the means by which we know that I am or the other is self-conscious.
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is not only required that others perceive and recognize me as a person. I have 
to ascribe the term person to myself and can only do this in so far as I am a 
self-conscious being. To make any first person identity statements I have to be 
able to use the term I meaningfully, something I can only do provided I am a 
being which is self-conscious. The term person is also only ascribed to self- 
conscious beings.
I also have to perceive myself as having social relationships and as being a 
being living in a social environment (again, it does not matter what this 
environment exactly is). I have to know that I am perceived and recognized by 
others as a person to perceive myself as a person. Person or personhood are 
social concepts and only apply in a social context. This is why personhood 
cannot be reduced to self-consciousness, although self-consciousness and the 
self are not, neither ontologically nor epistemologically, independent of social 
relationships. The self is closely connected to and linked up with the person, 
that is, with the social aspect of the individual, because of their interdependency 
and interrelationship. Self and personhood require each other: i) being self- 
conscious is a necessary feature of personhood, and ii) the self (that which is 
conscious of itself) requires social interaction to emerge.
I wish to claim that the self and consequently self-consciousness are 
ontologically not in tempore prior to personhood but are necessary115 for 
personhood. I want to say that without a self and self-consciousness there 
cannot be a person or personhood. The same is true vice versa: without the 
recognition of others in a social context there cannot be a self-conscious self 
either. The difference between self and personhood is subtle. I am a person as 
far as I am myself the object of my perception and the object of perception of 
others. The term person refers to an individual as an object of recognition in a 
social context whilst the term self refers to an individual as far as it is fully 
subject. If I look at myself as an object, I look at myself as a person. In so far as 
I reflect upon myself in a communicable manner (in, for instance, 
conceptualized thought), I look at the public side, or the public aspect of myself,
115 Not in the crude causal sense which suggests temporal antecedence.
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which we refer to as person. This aspect is possibiliter communicable although I 
don’t have actually to communicate it.
However, there is also something I am aware of - not only then when I am 
reflecting upon myself - which is incommunicable because it cannot be 
conceptualized adequately. There is a quality of content to the experience of 
being oneself, as well as to any other experience, which cannot be adequately 
expressed and therefore cannot be fully communicated. This quality is private 
and must remain private. We have to note that this privacy is limited: I can infer 
that others experience something similar to my experiences by recognizing them 
to be of the same kind as I am. To be aware of the incommunicability requires 
communication and therefore a social context in which communication takes 
place. I cannot know that there is something I cannot communicate as long as I 
cannot communicate at all.
It should be clear that the ontological claim is somehow embedded within 
the epistemological aspects: I have direct epistemological access to the qualia 
of my own experience, but not to the qualia of the experience of individuals 
other than myself. The claim about the existence of qualia is an ontological 
claim. However, this is still not sufficient to justify my ontological claim 
concerning the interdependency of self and personhood. What is established so 
far is an epistemological claim. Namely, that the self is in tempore not prior to 
personhood epistemologically: that I don’t acquire knowledge first about being a 
self and then, resting on that knowledge, acquire knowledge about myself being 
a person. It is rather the case that the recognition of one of these aspects of my 
existence as an individual is intertwined with the recognition of the other. Both 
aspects require each other epistemologically.
To establish an ontological claim becomes perhaps easier when we take 
another claim into account, namely the claim that the self is necessarily self- 
conscious, that what we usually call self-consciousness is an essential feature 
of the self. This claim is in accordance with Hume’s account: If there exists a 
perception in my mind, then this perception, as such, has ontological existence. 
The self is just such a perception. It is, firstly, an idea - but here ontological
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claims cannot be made beyond the idea itself. However, as will be argued later 
on, there is also an impression of the self. This impression is a complex 
impression of reflection of the bundle of perceptions. Although the impression is 
not a simple impression, it carries with it a natural ontological claim, expressed 
in a belief (in Hume’s understanding of belief). Since there are only perceptions, 
i.e. ideas and impressions, we can say that a felt perception has existence, at 
least as a perception. I believe this is good enough for an ontological account of 
the self, which is an internal perception. There can be no doubt that the internal 
impression of self needs to be assisted by external perceptions, such as the 
awareness of one’s own body, perceptions necessary to distinguish between 
oneself and others etc. But there is also no doubt that an ontological claim can 
be accounted for. The necessary bodily criterion rests with what the necessary 
elements and the principle of unity of the bundle exactly are, but not with the 
possible perception of the bundle itself.
However, there are still some problems with such an account which need to 
be resolved. It can be argued that if the self is necessarily self-conscious it 
follows that in times when we are not self-conscious we are not a self. Neither 
are we, then, a person, because personhood and self are interdependent. This 
seems to be absurd. To tackle the problem we can look at two scenarios we are 
already familiar with: early infancy and sleep.
a) early infancy
If we don’t find any difficulties in understanding the self as something non-static, 
but as something which has to develop, then we shouldn’t have any difficulties 
to understand how and that a self comes into existence progressively. When we 
come into existence we are not self-conscious and consequently are not a 
person either. However, we are a human being. To be a human being is a 
sufficient condition for the expectation that we will develop a self and 
personhood. This expectation is held by the other members of society, our 
parents, for instance, who have acquired the expectation through custom.
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(Nobody reasonable has a similar expectation about amoebas, dogs or carrots, 
for instance.) So it may well be the case that P-Predicates are not ascribable to 
young infants. If they are ascribed to them, they are ascribed as if the infants 
were already self-conscious. P-Predicates, if ascribed, will be ascribed because 
of the expectation, not because self-consciousness can be observed in its 
instantiations. It is not necessary that we are recognized as a person to interact 
socially or to be encouraged and taught to do so. It is sufficient to be recognized 
as a human being for the relevant expectations to be held. The criteria of being 
a human being are of a more bodily nature than the criteria for self and 
personhood. We can say that, if self-consciousness is thought to be a feature of 
personhood, then both have to be simultaneously acquired. However, because 
both self and personhood feature each other, they are irreducible to one 
another and cannot be said to be identical.
b) sleep116
To investigate this problem we have to look at the different angles under which 
the problem can be perceived. We have to clarify to which person stages the 
problem applies and which person stages we therefore have to consider. The 
following example shall help to illustrate the puzzle: Yesterday evening, before 
going to sleep, I read a crime story (person stage 1). Then I slept until 8 o’clock 
in the morning (person stage 2). Then I woke up and started my day with 
making myself a cup of coffee (person stage 3). The question arises by which of 
these person stages the identity of the individual shall be established. Which 
person stages have to be considered and have to be taken into account to 
establish the identity of the individual in question? The question can also take 
the form: ‘What are the criteria by which the individual of person stage 3 is the 
same individual as the individual of person stage 1?’
If the question involves only person stages 1 and 3, then all the arguments 
presented earlier to establish memory as the criterion of personal identity apply
116 I  refer to dreamless sleep here.
96
to account for the self identity and the personal identity of the individual in 
question. Person stages 1 and 3 are stages of self consciousness. The mental 
criterion of self identity and personal identity is available for first person identity 
statements, although here not strictly as a criterion, and for third person identity 
statements (limited availability). The bodily criterion is also available.
However, the matter seems to be different when one wants to take person 
stage 2 seriously and includes it in one’s consideration. Thus, what are the 
criteria (ontologically and epistemologically) by which we identify the individual 
of person stage 1 and 3 with the individual of person stage 2? It is clear that the 
problem is not only a problem of self identity, but also of personal identity. It is 
also a problem which concerns first person identity statements as well as third 
person identity statements. The problem arises because the combined theory 
favors not only a bodily, but also a mental criterion of personal identity and both 
criteria, taken separately on their own, are necessary but not sufficient criteria.
I have argued before that there have to be some perceptions even in a state 
of deep, dreamless sleep. If there were none it would be impossible to be 
woken up by alarm clocks, noises or other people. It might be the case that 
someone has to shake me and to shout at me for at least five minutes to wake 
me up. However, he eventually manages to do so. It can also be observed that 
the sleeper is perceiving some outside interference with his sleep because the 
sleeper tends, very often, to react to this interference by, for instance, grunting, 
turning away from the source of interference etc. Therefore, the scenario of 
complete absence of any perceptions in periods of sound sleep, as it is 
presented by Hume and also by LOCKE, does not seem to be quite true.
However, it cannot be denied that we are not conscious in times of 
dreamless sleep. Therefore, the memory criterion cannot be used to establish 
personal and self identity. The condition for personhood - consciousness - is not 
fulfilled. If this is true, then what are the consequences and are they serious in 
the sense that they invalidate or endanger the account of self identity and 
personal identity given by the combined theory?
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I think that we are justified to say that in periods of unconsciousness of 
whatever kind (sleep, coma, fainting etc.) the problem of identity, so far as first 
person identity statements are concerned, does not arise. Nobody unconscious 
is capable of making first person identity statements.117 The only identity 
statements which can be made at times of unconsciousness are third person 
identity statements made by persons other than the unconscious person. In that 
sense we can say that when we are unconscious the I does actualiter not exist, 
although we can say that the observer, according to the experienced previous 
experiments, expects the unconscious person to enter a person stage 3 
eventually. With entry into person stage 3 memory can fulfill its function as one 
of the criteria of identity in the way it has been argued previously. If this can be 
accepted we gain an additional indication of the claim that the self has 
necessarily to be conscious not only of perceptions of external objects but also 
of the perception of itself. If the self would only be conscious of perceptions of 
external objects but not of itself, it could not distinguish the perception of the 
external objects from the perception of itself.
If we look at third person identity statements, that is statements made by
others about the identity of the unconscious person, we will find that it is
possible to make them in a somehow „improvised“ manner. They are not always
sufficiently founded but usually, even within a Humean context, good enough for
every day purposes. We will also find that when we move into areas outside the
usual every day experience, the insufficient founding of such third person
identity statements becomes more apparent. Third person identity statements of
the kind we have here to consider are entirely based upon bodily criteria and
upon custom. We make identity statements about the unconscious person on
118purely bodily evidence. When we make these statements about a sleeping 
person we cannot perceive, at that moment in time, anything of their mental 
events. Although they may speak or cry out when dreaming, we do not know the
117 Self-consciousness requires not only consciousness, it also requires that one perceives impressions and 
ideas. The self is a complex impression of reflection.
118 This is no proof that the body theory is right, especially not when we take into consideration the fact that 
we make such an identity statement about someone who is not conscious at the time, just as we make identity 
statements about, for instance, inanimate objects.
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mental context which accompanies such utterances, and very often they are not 
comprehensible in a communicative way. Referring back to the earlier mind 
transfer examples we might find ourselves, making these identity statements, in 
the following position: It may well be that I observe my son Niklas sleeping and 
make an identity statement that I see that Niklas is asleep. But what I am 
actually observing is his body. It may also well be that whilst my son is sleeping 
a mind transfer has taken place: Nicola’s mind has been transferred „into“ 
Niklas’ body and Niklas’ mind „into“ Nicola’s body. I have no possibility to know 
about this mind transfer because as long as both of them are sleeping I can only 
observe their bodies as such. I cannot observe any kind of behavior or language 
which is supposed to express someone’s mental events to a certain extent. 
After Niklas has entered a person stage 3 and is displaying behavior and 
language I know not to be his usual kind of behavior and language, I would 
become aware of the discrepancy and would strongly suspect that I do not have 
the same child as I had yesterday. The child at person stage 1 is not identical 
with the child at person stage 3.
This is a scenario similar to the ones I drew up earlier to support and to 
establish the claim that personal identity has a mental and a bodily criterion. 
Hence all the arguments suggesting that bodily criteria are not sufficient to 
determine the identity of a person (even more so in respect to the self) should 
apply. If these arguments are accepted we are justified in concluding that in 
periods of unconsciousness the bodily criterion is not sufficient in respect to 
third person identity statements. We are theoretically not justified, although we 
do so all the time, to identify the person at person stages 1 and 3 with the 
person at person stage 2. We make these identifications because we assume, 
and this is usually a very reasonable assumption, that a mind transfer didn’t 
take place just as we assume that the sleeper we see is not dead. If we would 
live in a society where mind transfers happen quite frequently to everybody, we 
would be more careful about such assumptions, in fact, we would probably not 
make such assumptions at all because we would have to consider the likelihood 
that the sleeper has just gone through such a procedure.
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If these arguments can be accepted we can conclude that the absence of 
consciousness at times does not pose a serious problem for the identity of 
individuals (in the sense of personal and self identity) when we decide that we 
can live with the idea that identity statements at these times cannot be made as 
sufficiently well founded statements, neither ontologically nor epistemologically. 
It seems, however, that many philosophers find this difficult to accept and try to 
avoid the problem by either favoring the idea of a substance or by favoring one 
or the other type of the body theory. I don’t think absence of identity (especially 
epistemologically) at times of unconsciousness is a problem since the combined 
theory in general, and an account which takes person stages into consideration 
in particular, provides us with good criteria to make well founded identity 
statements about conscious beings, whilst they are conscious.
In respect to any type of body theory I have argued that each of these types 
is theoretically unsatisfying for several reasons. It therefore doesn’t seem to be 
appropriate to adopt such a theory only because it can avoid problems with 
identity at times of unconsciousness. If we also take into account that we search 
for an identity theory which is compatible with Hume’s theory we have to judge 
the body theory, by any means, unsuitable. Theories putting forward the idea 
that individuals are substances are also not compatible with the Humean theory. 
Hume strongly rejects the idea of substance, especially DESCARTES’ account 
of substance. “The whole system, therefore, is entirely incomprehensible...1,119 
Remarking on the idea of the substance of the soul he writes: „To pronounce, 
then, the final decision upon the whole; the question concerning the substance 
of the soul is absolutely unintelligible."120 Even if we consider Hume’s version of 
Basic Realism we have to conclude that the idea of substance cannot be 
maintained. The idea of substance entails an ontological claim concerning the 
nature of the existens. And though a claim of existence can reasonably be 
made, a claim maintaining a particular nature of the existens cannot.
119 T .I,IV ,111,222.
120 T .I,IV ,V ,250.
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There is, of course, a question which can reasonably be asked, namely: 
Given that the subject is neither self nor person in the complete sense of the 
word at times of unconsciousness, how is it possible to explain the transmission 
back to consciousness? This question is not unimportant since we must believe 
in such a transmission to have the expectation that it will eventually take place. 
We can certainly argue that we have the expectation due to the observed 
number of experiments. That’s why we believe the transmission is possible. 
However, this seems to be a rather unsatisfying argument. There are more 
interesting ways to argue and we will find a better explanation of the process 
when we take the difficult notion of capacity into account.
II.IV. Hume’s Account of Capacities
It has often been argued that Hume’s theory cannot allow for any capacities at 
all since he seems to deny their existence explicitly. Hume writes: „There are no 
ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, than those of 
power, force, energy or necessary connexion.“121 He then goes on to argue: 
„When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of 
causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or 
necessary connexion, [...] From the first appearance of an object, we never can 
conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any 
cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without 
experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by the 
mere dint of thought and reasoning. [...] It is impossible, therefore, that the idea 
of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies, in single instances of 
their operation; because no bodies ever discover any power, which can be the 
original of this idea.“122 Since powers or capacities themselves cannot be 
observed or be perceived, whilst perception (having an impression) is necessary 
to give rise to a resembling idea, we cannot by experience of the perception of 
..external objects" arrive at the idea of power or capacity. That is, so far we have
121 ECHU, V II,I,6 1 -62.
122 ibid., p.63-64.
101
no reasonable grounds to justify the thought that things do have powers or 
capacities.
Since we obviously have the idea of power or capacity Hume considers the 
possibility of the idea of power or capacity being gained from internal 
experiences. „lt may be said, that we are every moment conscious of internal 
power; while we feel, that, by the simple command of our will, we can move the 
organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our mind. An act of volition 
produces motion to our limbs, or raises a new idea in our imagination. This 
influence of the will we know by consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of 
power or energy; and are certain, that we ourselves and all other intelligent 
beings are possessed of power."123 Setting this up as a pretense, Hume goes 
on to show that we cannot gain the idea of power or capacity by reflection 
either. Even when we look at the operations of the mind and reflect upon them 
we can only perceive singular events. We cannot perceive a necessary link 
between our single perceptions. If I will to open my eyes and then do open my 
eyes, the only things observable are that firstly, I wanted to open my eyes, and 
secondly, that I did so. I cannot observe, so Hume, that I opened my eyes 
because I wanted it, or, in other words, that my will to open my eyes caused 
this particular action. If we apply this to our case concerning capacities and take 
also Hume’s reasoning in respect to the unjustified conclusions drawn from 
inductive reasoning into account, we must say that although we perceive 
ourselves to be capable of performing an action like opening one’s eyes, we 
cannot conclude that we have a capacity to do so. Be it just for the simple 
reason that the action, which is possible now, cannot be predicted with absolute 
certainty to be possible tomorrow. Hence, Hume draws a first conclusion in 
respect to motion and volition: „We may, therefore, conclude from the whole, I 
hope, without temerity, though with assurance; that our idea of power is not 
copied from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves, when
123 ibid., p.64.
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we give rise to animal motion, or apply our limbs to their proper use and 
office."124
He then applies the same arguments to the connection between volition and 
operation of the mind and points out that what can be said about the 
impossibility to observe a power in respect to volition and motion must also be 
said about any performance the faculties of the soul can give. From this it 
follows that the ideas of necessary connection, power or capacity can neither be 
derived from the perception of ..external objects" nor from reflection. „So that, 
upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of 
connexion which is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and 
separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between 
them. They seem conjoined, but never connected.“125
Although Hume puts these arguments forward to show that the idea of 
necessary connection, or causality, cannot be derived simply from experience 
and reason alone, it is quite clear that these arguments apply also to the idea of 
capacity. It is impossible to observe capacity itself, all we can observe are the 
exercises of such a capacity and inductively we have no sufficient grounds to 
conclude justifiably that such a capacity exists, especially not at times of 
unconsciousness. However, one can still maintain that there was something like 
a capacity, though in a backward looking and a contemporary way which refers 
to past and present actions and events. I know that I opened my eyes in the 
morning and I could not have done so if I hadn’t had the possibility to do so. The 
same applies to all actions one is presently performing. I think we are entirely 
justified to call this possibility capacity, but it remains a question how much we 
gain theoretically by such a meaning of the concept, since the most interesting 
part, the future orientated one, seems to be completely eradicated.
Is it therefore necessary to abandon our usual and common sense 
understanding of the term capacity? I do not think it is. Hume does not deny that 
capacities of the mind exist, he himself refers to the faculties of the soul,
124 ibid., p.67.
125 ECHU,VII,II,74.
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although we would find it difficult, given Hume’s philosophy in Book One of the 
Treatise as a starting point, to observe any faculties themselves. Hume’s 
question doesn’t seem to be an ontological one, it is quite clearly an 
epistemological question.126 Hume argues that we get our idea of necessary 
connection with the help of imagination, which forms the idea by making 
transitions from habit. „lt appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion 
among events arises from a number of similar instances which occurs of the 
constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by 
any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But 
there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, 
which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of 
similar instances, the mind is carried by habit upon the appearance of one 
event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This 
connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition, of the 
imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or 
impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion."127 
This can also be said for capacities. What else are capacities if not powers? To 
have the power to perform such and such an action is to be capable of such a 
performance whether that performance is actually carried out or not.
If we apply these findings to the problem of unconsciousness as in, for 
instance, sleep, we can say that whilst we are sleeping we still have the capacity 
of memory (as well as the capacity to move the limbs of our body voluntarily if 
we could do so before we were going to sleep, that is in person stage 1). 
However, the process by which we move from the capacity to remember 
something to the exercised capacity cannot be seen as independent of 
consciousness in terms of its absence or presence. Hence it depends upon the 
clarity and the type of perceptions we experience. Given dreamless sleep, we 
can say that any perceptions we have then (the ringing of an alarm clock etc.) 
are very faint perceptions, we are not consciously aware of them. We become,
126 This applies also to causality and externality, for instance, although the internal workings and features of 
the mind have a special, ontologically much stronger status.
127 EC HU,VII,11,75.
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however, consciously aware of them once full consciousness is recovered, i.e. 
the mind is perceiving clear perceptions again.
Our expectation that a transmission will take place is justified in terms of 
probability. It is also clear that Hume can account for capacities given that they 
are understood in terms of probability. „...that power has always a reference to 
its exercise, either actual or probable, and that we consider a person as 
endow’d with any ability when we find from past experience, that ‘tis probable, 
or at least possible he may exert it. [...] that power consists in the possibility or 
probability of any action, as discover’d by experience and the practice of the 
world."128 Using the term capacity in this sense, reference to capacities is 
ontologically and epistemologically justified. It may well be that an account 
claiming the absence of self and personhood at times of unconsciousness is 
counter intuitive. But it is the only counter intuitive account we have to give here.
I believe that the arguments I have presented, together with Hume’s 
account, if accepted, present a strong case for a rethinking of the connection 
between self, personhood and self-consciousness. It is possible to maintain that 
the self has to be necessarily conscious of itself without falling into 
contradictions and absurdities and without failing to give a satisfactory account 
of the three aspects of the individual and their interrelations in an 
epistemological as well as in an ontological sense. Although personhood and 
self are not identical, the arguments presented to establish that personal identity 
requires bodily as well as mental criteria are partially still applicable in respect to 
the identity of the self. This is so because of the close connection and 
interdependency between self and personhood. The difference seems to be one 
of contextdependent emphasis. Whilst the mental aspect steps forward in 
respect to the self, bodily criteria have still a role to play. The self, by its strong 
connection to the person aspect, needs social environment to develop and to 
progress. It is not sufficient to be capable of a distinction between me and non 
human objects of whatever kind. My perceiving myself as an individual (and the 
self is a necessary feature of the individual, not to say of individuality) requires
128 T.II,I,X,313.
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that I am also capable of perceiving myself as being different from other 
humans - being a self different from their selves, as well as being a person 
different from them. On the other hand, in respect to the person aspect of the 
individual, which focuses on the individual’s social side, we can say that the 
emphasis is more on the bodily criteria. It also has, and must have, recourse to 
the mental aspect of the individual, as I have tried to show earlier.
I think we have seen that Hume’s account of identity in Book One of the 
Treatise is an account of self-identity rather than an account of personal identity. 
It is, given that we have taken it, so far, separately from the account of Book 
Two, quite successful. It is compatible with the combined theory, which means 
that Hume’s account of self identity does not contradict the arguments brought 
forward to support the view that bodily as well as mental criteria have a bearing 
upon personal identity. This is especially important because the close 
connection between personhood and self implies that self identity and personal 
identity have also to be closely connected. We can also see that Hume is not 
abandoning identity either epistemologically or ontologically. The main problem 
lies with his theory of perception, not because the theory is generally 
problematic, but because perceptions are understood as fleeting existences, 
which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to allow for memory in a theoretically 
sound way. The theoretical impossibility of memory has grave consequences 
since memory has to write the script of the play staged in the theatre of the 
mind. However, to investigate the potential of Hume’s theory it is necessary to 
take a successful account of memory for granted. All my arguments involving 
memory and imagination imply a successful account of memory. Hence they 
have to be taken as resting upon a condition unsatisfiable by Hume’s theory of 
perception.
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2. Hume’s Concept of the Self in Book Two of the 
Treatise
III. The Passions 
lll.l. Pride and Humility
In this chapter I wish to argue that the concept of self underlying Hume’s 
philosophy in Book Two of the Treatise focuses on the social side of the 
individual. It is a social concept of the self and is therefore much nearer to the 
aspect of the individual we refer to as person than it is to the self aspect as 
defined in the previous investigation. Attention will also be drawn to the 
connection between self and personhood, especially in respect to the role of 
sociality.
„What then gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these 
successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and 
uninterrupted existence thro’ the whole course of our lives? In order to answer 
this question, we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our 
thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in
12Qourselves." Hume dedicated the first Book of the Treatise to the investigation 
of the former, whereas Book Two is concerned with the examination of the 
latter. My investigation of the concept of self in Book Two of the Treatise begins 
with Hume’s account of the passions, especially with the passions of pride, 
humility, love and hatred. Hume’s treatment and understanding of these 
passions in particular is constantly referring to a self, being either the object or 
the subject of particular passions.
Impressions are either impressions of sensation or impressions of reflexion. 
Passions and emotions are secondary, reflective impressions. ..Original 
impressions or impressions of sensations are such as without any antecedent 
perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from the animal 
spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs. Secondary, or
129 T.I,IV,VI,253.
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reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original ones, 
either immediately or by the interposition of its idea. Of the first kind are all the 
impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second 
are the passions, and other emotions resembling them."130 Passions are not 
pleasures or pains, which are primary impressions, but pleasures and pains can 
quite often be sources of passions.
Hume divides the passions into violent and calm passions. Calm passions 
are passions like the sense of beauty and deformity in action and in 
composition131, whereas love, hatred, grief, joy, pride and humility are violent 
passions. Hume is far from claiming that his distinction is very exact. Passions 
considered to be calm passions can at times be felt very strongly whilst the so 
called violent passions can also be very faint and almost imperceptible. The 
distinction is a general distinction rooted in the common perception of the 
passions and allows for different degrees of strength of the impressions felt at 
particular instances. There is also no indication that the distinction is connected 
to the degree of vivacity of the respective passion. Hume distinguishes clearly 
between violent and strong passions as well as between calm and weak
132passions.
When looking at the causes of passions Hume distinguishes direct and 
indirect passions. „By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately 
from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such as proceed from the 
same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities."133 Pride and humility 
are indirect passions. Hume begins his investigation in a very straightforward 
way and states: „that pride and humility, tho’ directly contrary, have yet the 
same OBJECT. This object is self, or that succession of related ideas and 
impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness."134 We 
can already see the importance of the self in respect to the passions and 
especially in respect to pride and humility, but also, almost as a mirror image of
130 T .II,1,1,275.
131 compare ibid., p.276.
132 compare T .II,III,IV ,419.
133 T.II,1,1,276.
134 T .II,I,II,277.
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Hume’s account of pride and humility, in respect to love and hatred. The self as 
the object of pride and humility is what these passions are directed at. They are 
passions about the self but they are not caused by the self. „For as these 
passions are directly contrary, and have the same object in common; were their 
object also their cause; it cou’d never produce any degree of the one passion, 
but at the same time it must excite an equal degree of the other; which 
opposition and contrariety must destroy both."135 Hume argues that if the self 
were the cause of these contrary passions it must always cause both of the 
passions to the same degree at the same time; though the degree itself can 
differ at different times. Furthermore, it is actually impossible, so Hume, to have 
both passions at the same time since one can either feel proud or humble, but 
not both together. ,,’Tis impossible a man can at the same time be both proud 
and humble; and where he has different reasons for these passions, as 
frequently happens, the passions either take place alternately; or if they 
encounter, the one annihilates the other, as far as strength goes, and the 
remainder only of that, which is superior, continues to operate upon the mind. 
But in the present case neither of the passions cou’d ever become superior; 
because supposing it to be the view only of ourself, which excited them, that 
being perfectly indifferent to either, must produce both in the very same 
proportion; or in other words, can produce neither. To excite any passion, and at 
the same time raise an equal share of its antagonist, is immediately to undo 
what was done, and must leave the mind at last perfectly calm and 
indifferent."136 Hume uses a physicalist concept for his argument, namely that 
two equal and opposite forces cancel each other out. Hence no effect upon the 
object on which the forces work, is achieved. Both forces have to be necessarily 
equal in strength if the cause of the two forces, which occur at the same time, is 
the same. It follows that the self cannot be the cause of these passions. But it 
can be their object.
Hume goes on to argue that the set of possible causes of pride and humility 
contains a vast variety of subjects: almost any conceivable quality of the mind or
135 ibid., p.278.
136 ibid.
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the body, just like any other quality we judge it valuable to be related to. „Every 
valuable quality of the mind, whether of the imagination, judgment, memory or 
disposition; wit, good-sense, learning, courage, justice, integrity; all these are 
the causes of pride; and their opposites of humility. Nor are these passions 
confin’d to the mind, but extend their view to the body likewise. A man may be 
proud of his beauty, strength, agility, good mein, address in dancing, riding, 
fencing, and of his dexterity, in any manual business or manufacture. But this is 
not all. The passions looking farther, comprehend whatever objects are in the 
least ally’d or related to us. Our country, family, children, relations, riches, 
houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths; any of these may become a cause 
either of pride or of humility."137 The possible causes of pride and humility have 
to have some relation to ourselves to be able to excite the passion in question. 
To explain and to show the necessity of this connection Hume makes a further 
distinction in respect to the cause of the passion. He distinguishes between a 
quality the cause possesses and the subject of which the quality is a feature. To 
feel any passion like pride and humility, that is for the cause to produce a 
passion, we have to value the quality the subject possesses. There also has to 
be some relation between the subject and ourselves.
Hume argues that there is a causal relationship between the qualities of the 
subjects of pride and humility, pains and pleasures, the passions themselves 
and the self. The passion is derived from a „double relation of ideas and 
impressions".138 The quality of the subject is more than just a feature of the 
subject we are indifferent to. It is a quality in a particular sense, namely that it 
produces agreeable (pleasures) or disagreeable (pains) feelings in us. If these 
qualities produce a feeling of pleasure and the subject possessing these 
qualities is related to us, then pride is produced - which leads to pleasure (the 
same, just in a negative sense, is said about humility). So we can say that the 
passions in question are produced by sensations which have themselves been 
produced by the subject of the passions, and the passion produces a sensation 
in its own right. The self has an important role in this double relation. First, the
l3/ ibid., p.279.
138 T .II,I,V ,286.
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cause of the passion must be related to the self which is the object of the 
passion. If it is not, passions like pride and humility are not prompted; just as 
„the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation 
of the passion14.139
Secondly, the self, or perhaps better, the idea of the self underlying these 
arguments is two faced. A relation between cause and object of the passion is a 
necessary condition for the passion to be produced. It is very plausible that this 
should be so: Almost all humans admire beauty (it does not matter here what 
our idea of beauty exactly is) but for beauty to give rise to the feeling of pride 
within me the beauty must be the beauty of something which is related to me. I 
cannot feel proud that something I am not related to is beautiful. It might be that 
the Loire is a very beautiful river, and I might acknowledge this quite happily 
when I go there as a tourist, but I do not feel proud about its beauty since this 
particular river has nothing to do with me. However, I feel proud that the river 
Saale is one of the most beautiful rivers in Germany because the Saale flows 
through my home town. It becomes obvious, that both parts, quality and subject, 
are necessary components of the cause. Both have to occur in conjunction and 
the subject has to be related to the object of the passion to make up a cause of 
pride or humility in an individual.
The double role of the self appears to be not unproblematic. Hume points 
out that: „...we must suppose, that nature has given to the organs of the human 
mind, a certain disposition fitted to produce a peculiar impression or emotion, 
which we call pride: To this emotion she has assign’d a certain idea, viz. that of 
self, which it never fails to produce.11140 Thus it looks as if the self is both cause 
and one of the conditions of the passion. If we accept that a passion like pride 
or humility does not occur unless the subject of the passion is related to the 
object, one can justifiably say that the self as part of the relation is part of the 
cause of the passion. However, it is also produced by the passion. So, how can 
it be both, a part of the cause and the effect, at the same time?
139 ibid.
140 ibid., p.287.
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To begin with, two important distinctions have to be made. One has to 
distinguish between the idea of the self and the impression of the self. To 
understand the double role of the self we need to understand that the play the 
passions are staging is not static. It is a process, a succession of events 
following each other and being related to one another. Particular relations are 
rooted in our nature and our ideas of them are formed by the workings of the 
imagination. „AII resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner 
one arises than the rest immediately follow. Grief and disappointment give rise 
to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole 
circle be compleated. In like manner our temper, when elevated with joy, 
naturally throws itself into love, generosity, pity, courage, pride, and the other 
resembling affections. ‘Tis difficult for the mind, when actuated by any passion, 
to confine itself to that passion alone, without any change or variation. Human 
nature is too inconstant to admit of any such regularity. Changeableness is 
essential to it. [...] Tis evident, then, there is an attraction or association among 
impressions, as well as among ideas; tho’ with this remarkable difference, that 
ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity, and causation; and 
impressions only by resemblance."141 I will try to explain how I think this relevant 
and important in respect to the understanding of the self in its double role.
The passions of pride and humility produce the idea of the self naturally as 
their object. No reasoning is required to work out if these circumstances, these 
achievements, these possessions I feel humble or proud about are mine. That 
the passion is aroused implies that I recognize them as mine, that I recognize a 
relationship between the object of the passion and myself. However, because 
my awareness at the time when the passion is first produced is focused on the 
relation, the idea of the self is hardly a clear idea. It is an impression, which may 
be more vivid than the idea but it is not conceptualized since it is an impression. 
A clear idea of the self is then produced by the passion. In this sense the idea of 
the self is naturally and necessarily produced by the passion. Hume emphasizes 
that the self is the ..immediate object" of the passions and states, opening his
141 T.II,I,IV,283.
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discussion of sympathy: „the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always 
intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a 
conception of our own person, that ‘tis not possible to imagine, that any thing 
can in this particular go beyond it. Whatever object, therefore, is related to
142ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception..."
Hume has offered good reasons why the self cannot be the cause of pride 
and humility. On its own, the self is never a sufficient cause for a passion but 
needs context. However, the context alone would be meaningless without a self 
or perhaps better, without an individual being a self and being aware of the 
context. The self is subject and cause (as part of the relation) because it is 
embedded and develops in a context. It is a self only in relation to other, 
animated and unanimated things. The perception of these form and develop the 
self, excite passions, produce responses. Just as the context requires a self to 
be created and to be meaningful, the self requires context for its existence also. 
In that sense the self is the effect of the passions. „lf reason is and ought to be 
the slave of the passions, it is not going to be able to get an adequate idea of 
the self, one of whose „organs“ it is, if it tries to abstract from the passions, 
those more vital and more dominant organs of mind and person. Hume never 
retracts his Book One denial of a „simple“, persisting self, the sort of thing of 
which we might have a simple impression. The self is complex, changing, 
dependent on others for its coming to be, for its emotional life, for its self- 
consciousness, for its self-evaluations.“143 The contradiction between the self 
being cause and effect simultaneously only occurs if the dependency between 
the self and its context is understood as a one-way road. Hume’s philosophy 
would be entirely misunderstood if we think that the connection is nothing but 
this. It is one of the main and most interesting features of Hume’s philosophy, 
just as it is its perhaps greatest achievement, that he takes nothing for granted: 
not our concepts, not our values and not the role of reason. As reason has to 
reflect upon itself and is consequently confronted with its limits, so the self is not 
set as a first principle we cannot question because every human activity stems
142 T .II,I,X I,317.
143 BAIER, A. ibid., p. 130.
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from it, be it an activity of the mind or the body. It has to be understood as a self 
created enriched and enhanced by its feedback provided by the passions, 
epistemologically as well as ontologically. I find myself here in complete 
agreement with ANNETTE BAIER who writes: „The chosen opening of Book 
Two shows us something about its relation to the books that precede and follow 
it, and about its author’s philosophical priorities. Reflexivity, indirectness, conflict 
- these are the opening themes, and they are all themes that are of importance 
for understanding Hume’s version of morality, as well as being themes that are 
carried over from Book One. The pride of place given to pride is not so much a 
case of egotism as it is of preoccupation with reflection and reflexivity."144
To present only Hume’s account of the passions of pride and humility would 
be to give a one-sided picture of the passions as well as of the self and the 
process by which it emerges. I find it necessary and enlightening to have a look 
at pride and humility’s „mirror image", the passions of love and hatred. Since 
love and hatred are more associated with persons rather than with other things 
(although, of course, we can love or hate a lot of things, not only people) they 
are prima facie more interesting when one is looking for the social aspect of the 
individual and puts the self, ontologically and epistemologically, in a social 
context.
Ill.ll. Love and Hatred
Hume perceives the passions of pride and humility to be very similar to the 
passions of love and hatred. So, it is not surprising that Hume uses the material 
he has presented to explain pride and humility to serve towards an account of 
love and hatred. He writes: „As the immediate object of pride and humility is self 
or that identical person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are 
intimately conscious; so the object of love and hatred is some other person, of 
whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious."145 Hume’s 
latter statement must not be taken literally since we can be conscious of 
someone else’s actions and to some extent of their thoughts and sensations.
144 ibid., p. 134.
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However, as I have argued before, and this is the way in which, I think, Hume 
wants to be understood, we are not intimately and immediately conscious of 
actions, thoughts and sensations other than one’s own.
Discussing love and hatred Hume employs arguments similar to those he 
has used to show that the object of pride/humility cannot be the cause of these 
passions. The object of the passion is not a sufficient cause to produce the 
passion, but is undoubtedly one of its conditions.146 The arguments rest, again, 
upon the view that love and hatred are contrary passions and that if they were to 
be produced by their object alone, they would have to be produced 
simultaneously and with the same force, thereby the two opponents would 
cancel each other out altogether. Hume argues further that the cause of love 
and hatred is a compound, made up of, again, the subject and certain qualities it 
possesses. He thinks both components to be equally necessary to be able to 
arouse feelings like love and hatred. „A prince, that is possess’d of a stately 
palace, commands the esteem of the people upon that account; and that first, 
by the beauty of the palace, and secondly, by the relation of property, which 
connects it with him. The removal of either of these destroys the passion; which 
evidently proves that the cause is a compounded one."147
Hume wants to say that there are certain qualities which cause love or 
hatred. It could be argued, however, that passions, especially love and hatred, 
don’t seem always to be caused by these qualities. Common experience tells us 
that we very often don’t know why we love or hate someone. It must be replied 
that the fact that we don’t know which qualities in particular cause these feelings 
only implies that we do not know the particular cause of the particular passion 
experienced. It certainly does not imply that there is no cause to the passion. It 
also doesn’t follow that qualities of subjects cannot be such a cause.
If we look at the mechanism by which particular passions are produced we 
will find that Hume believes that particular passions are naturally linked to one 
another. The nature of these links becomes especially apparent when we look
compare ibid., p.330.
147 ibid.
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at the mechanism connecting love and pride as well as hatred and humility. 
Hume perceives, generally, an interdependency between these passions. 
Exploring this interdependency will also illuminate the self in its role as the 
subject of love and hatred.
To begin with it is important to notice that both sets of passions are closely 
connected to another human being.148 Hume says quite explicitly, referring to 
both sets of passions: „We may also suppose with some shew of probability, 
that the cause of both these passions is always related to a thinking being, and 
that the cause of the form er149 produce a separate pleasure, and of the latter 
150 a separate uneas/ness."151 This is the first connection observable between 
the two sets: both are related to individuals. Pride and humility have the self, 
which obviously belongs to an individual, as their object whilst love and hatred 
have an individual other than oneself as their object. Hume then goes on to
develop a picture of these connections and consequently of their
interdependencies as follows:
Pride <-— Impression —-> Love
object object
Humility <—- Impression —-> Hatred
Pride and Humility have the same object just as love and hatred have their
common object. Hence both sets are defined by their respective objects. There 
is also a similarity of impression between love and pride - both are agreeable, 
their impressions are pleasant whilst the impressions of humility and hatred are 
unpleasant. These similarities signify the connection between pride and love, 
and humility and hatred. Reflecting upon these connections Hume claims that: 
„nothing can produce any of these passions without bearing it a double relation,
1481 have mentioned before that passions of this kind can also be felt in respect to inanimate objects - one can 
hate Schonberg’s music, spinach or nuclear power stations and love Bach, the sea and aeroplanes. However, 
Hume would not regard the emotions expressed in such a way as love or hatred in the proper sense. The 
subject of pride and humility and the object of love or hatred can only have their respective role in so far as 
they are related to, or are themselves, a human being.
149 love and pride, T.L.
150 hatred and humility, T.L.
151 T.II,II,I,331.
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viz. of ideas to the object of the passion, and of sensation to the passions 
itself.“152 He argues that the respective passions, connected by their 
impressions, never fail to attend each other. Love gives rise to pride, pride to 
love. The same can be said about their opposites. He then offers several 
experiments which shall both highlight and prove his claim. I don’t wish to 
discuss these experiments. It is more interesting, especially regarding the role of 
the self, to look into the mechanism of these double relationships.
1. From love to pride. If I love another person then this person is the object 
of my passion whilst I am the subject of that passion. I recognize that this 
person possesses certain agreeable qualities. These qualities cause the 
passion of love I feel for this person. This sentiment is pleasurable in two 
senses: it is caused by agreeable qualities I take pleasure in perceiving, and the 
passion of love itself also causes pleasure. Once my attention is drawn to the 
other person as the object of my passion, all my perceptions of the person with 
all the qualities I find pleasurable and agreeable, are clear and vivid. Since a 
close relation to the person and a vivid perception of his admirable qualities are 
so established, the transition to pride can easily be made. In pride this person is 
the subject of the passion whilst my self is the object. The qualities which have 
caused my love towards this person naturally cause pride because both 
passions are agreeable, pleasant impressions. It is important to note that love 
precedes here pride and establishes thereby a close relationship between the 
relata (I love A\ or, perhaps better, taking the direction of the causation into 
account: A is loved by me). It also focuses my attention on the other and not on 
myself. Pride then brings the situation back home to myself. It causes the idea 
of my self. So we can say that love refers to pride and pride refers easily to the 
self, which has been the starting point of love, since it is the subject of that 
passion.
2. From pride to love. „The transition from pride or humility to love or hatred 
is not so natural as from love or hatred to pride or humility."153 This has its main
m  T .II,11,11,333.
153 ibid., p.339.
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reasons in the directedness of the passions, i.e. their objects and their vivacity. 
Whilst the object of love and hatred is another person, the object of pride and 
humility is the self. We are acquainted with another individual’s qualities, 
feelings, thoughts and actions to a certain extent, but we perceive our own 
thoughts, feelings and actions more vividly than those of another. ,,’Tis evident, 
that as we are at all times intimately conscious of ourselves, our sentiments and 
passions, their ideas must strike upon us with greater vivacity than the ideas of 
the sentiments and passions of any other person. But every thing, that strikes 
upon us with vivacity, and appears in a full and strong light, forces itself, in a 
manner, into our consideration, and becomes present to the mind on the 
smallest hint and most trivial relation. For the same reason, when it is once 
present, it engages the attention, and keeps it from wandering to other objects, 
however strong may be their relation to our first object. The imagination passes 
easily from obscure to lively ideas, but with difficulty from lively to obscure. In 
the one case the relation is aided by another principle: In the other case, ‘tis 
oppos’d by it.“154 Once attention is focussed on the self it is more difficult to 
make the transition to other objects, although the transition is not impossible 
because it is also the nature of the mind that it cannot stay fixed upon one 
perception for too long and will eventually wander off to some other objects. 
However, the easiness of transition from love to pride follows naturally, as has 
been argued, whilst the transition from pride to love (or from humility to hatred 
respectively) is not as easy as the first. The perception of one’s self is always 
more vivid than the perception of some other person. Hence the transition from 
the self to some other person becomes more difficult because it is accompanied 
by a loss of vivacity. Hume regards these occurring difficulties of the transition 
from pride to love and from humility to hatred and the easiness of transition in 
the opposite direction as a further proof of the connection between these sets of 
passions. It shows that there is a mechanism linking these passions which is 
rooted in causation and is influenced by vivacity.
154 ibid.
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Vivacity is certainly one of the key issues, not only in respect of conditioning 
the transition between the passions, but also in respect to the self and its double 
character as cause and effect. I have argued that the self and consequently the 
perception of the self is cause in a certain sense as well as it is effect. It 
becomes now even clearer that pride and humility produce the idea of the self in 
a greater vivacity than it had prior to the occurrence of the passion. The self is 
the object of these passions. Pride and humility are directed at the self, 
therefore attention is drawn upon it. The self as cause does not make as vivid 
an impression upon us as the self as effect. This clarifies the character of the 
self as a cause. It also helps us to understand how we can experience passions 
like love and hatred, that is passions with a person other than one self as their 
object, in the first place. It shows how attention can be drawn towards another 
person. When the wheel of the passions begins to move, the perception of the 
self is not as vivid as it is when a circuit is completed and we experience pride 
or humility.
It becomes clear that Hume’s concept of the self in Book Two is socially 
dependent. The idea of my self is „brought home to me“ by social interaction, by 
my passions connecting me with other persons. The place which pride, humility, 
love and hatred occupy, together with the easiness or difficulty of the transition 
between these sets, is exemplary for the social nature of the self in Book Two of 
the Treatise. If somebody happens to be an egomaniac not able to love or hate 
another individual nor, and perhaps more importantly, ever being loved or hated 
by someone else, then one would expect that this person can nevertheless 
experience the passions of pride and humility because the object of these 
passions is nothing but the self. It is my opinion that such a person is hardly 
able to feel even the passions of pride and humility because it is difficult to 
imagine that this person could be a self in the proper sense of the term. This is 
because, firstly, the self is predominantly a subject, it is the full subject where 
the passions of love and hatred are concerned. It is also, in some sense, 
subject when it comes to pride and humility.155 Something which is not a subject
155 As the bundle of perceptions, including the perception of the passions of pride and humility.
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and cannot fulfill the role of a subject is by definition not a self. A subject is also 
a subject in relation to its object, which can differ, and can include, like in pride 
and humility, the self itself. The question arises how the self would be able to 
recognize itself as an object. Something which is not a subject cannot have an 
object, and particularly not be an object to itself (i.e. to its own reflection upon 
itself), because it does not fulfill the conditions of a subject/object relation in the 
first place.
Secondly, pride and humility stem to some extent also from comparison. 
Hume writes that: „objects appear greater or less by a comparison with 
others.“156 To be proud of the beauty of my daughter involves not only an 
understanding of beauty but also that I am able to perceive her appearance in 
comparison with the appearance of other members of womankind. If everybody 
were beautiful in equal degrees, beauty would not be a quality one can be proud 
of, it might not even be recognized as a particular quality at all. If the object of 
my attention is nobody but myself, how am I able to make these required 
comparisons? Or, to see it from a different angle, we can say that to feel pride 
or humility demands that I have a relation to the subject of my pride or humility. I 
have to be able to distinguish this relation from other relations involving 
someone else and his subjects of pride or humility. Equally, comparisons have 
to be made between subjects and their qualities. Comparisons, however, 
require distinction.157
The subject of the passions of pride and humility is not myself, and whether 
the subject is related to me or to someone else is something I have to grasp. 
Hume says quite clearly: „Ourself, independent of the perception of every other 
object, is in reality nothing."158 The „other object" includes the other individual. 
The subjects of my pride or my humility are related to me just as the subjects of 
another’s pride and another’s humility are related to them. Something which is 
not related to anybody cannot be subject to pride and humility. Or, as ANNETTE
156 T .II,II, V I I I ,375.
157 To avoid misunderstandings, we have to remember that the recognition of this relation needs no reasoning.
I  have argued in respect to first person identity statements that criteria to determine whether my thoughts and
feelings are really mine and not somebody else’s are not required.
158 T .II,II,I I,340.
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BAIER puts it: „But once we get to Part II of Book Two, with its thesis that the 
object of love is of exactly the same type as the object of pride159, and that, if 
our passions are not to be absurd (T.332), we must see other persons in 
relation to what is theirs, and ourselves in relation to what is ours, in precisely 
the same way [...] I must be to what is mine whatever I take you to be to what is 
yours, and what you take me to be to what is mine."160
If we look at the way the transition from one passion to the other is made we 
can see how love and hatred, which imply that another individual is recognized 
as an individual, prepare the ground for pride and humility and subsequently for 
a clearer and more vivid idea of ourselves. Recognition of the other as an 
individual by the passions opens the door to a better and fuller perception and 
understanding of the self, and since in the case of the self ontology and 
epistemology have to stand together, it can be said that the passions of love 
and hatred have an important role to play in the forming, the bringing about, of 
the self.
Another problem we still have to explore concerns so called unconditional 
love“. Hume recognizes emotions of this particular kind and discusses them 
together with the role of acquaintance. He writes: „...there is always requir’d a 
double relation of impressions and ideas betwixt the cause and effect, in order 
to produce either love or hatred. But tho’ this be universally true, ‘tis remarkable 
that the passion of love be excited by only one relation of a different kind, viz. 
betwixt ourselves and the object; or more properly speaking, that this relation is 
always attended with both the others. Whoever is united to us by any connexion 
is always sure of a share of our love, proportion’d to the connexion, without 
enquiring into his other qualities."161 Our love for another person who is not 
related to us is aroused because we perceive certain qualities that the person 
possesses, which cause the pleasurable emotion of love within us. In the case 
of close relations, the possession of such agreeable qualities, whatever they 
happen to be, is not required; the relation to us alone is sufficient to produce the
159 both are persons, T.L.
160 BAIER, A. ibid., p. 135-136.
161 T .II,II,IV ,351-352.
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passion. Hume clearly thinks that the relation itself is a sufficient cause of the 
passion. We might want to add, that the passions of pride and humility cannot 
be far off either because of the strong pull such close relations have upon us. 
However, pride and humility naturally require a relationship between me and the 
subject of these passions as well as they require the presence of certain 
qualities in the subject; neither of these two conditions alone is claimed to be 
sufficient to cause the respective passion. Therefore I am not necessarily proud 
of my son only because he is my son; but I necessarily love him, if not for any 
other reason than because he is my son. Thus it is possible to love a relation of 
oneself and at the same time to feel humble about them.162
Since love can be produced by the relation alone Hume argues that the 
stronger the relation the greater the passion: „Thus the relation of blood 
produces the strongest tie the mind is capable of in the love of parents to their 
children, and a lesser degree of the same affection, as the relation lessens.“163 
Parental relationship is not the only relationship humans experience. Other 
kinds of relationships have also a pull upon us and can excite love, differing in 
degrees as the relationships differ. This is the context in which acquaintance 
has its full bearing, not only because it is more common for us to observe 
qualities within an acquaintance than it is to observe them in a stranger; but 
because, even if we don’t observe such qualities within acquaintances, the fact 
that they are people we know can excite passions of love or fondness towards 
them and makes their company preferable over the company of people who are 
known to possess very valuable qualities, but are strangers to us.
The picture Hume gives, if it is applied to both passions, love and hatred, 
helps us to gain an explanation of the phenomena mentioned earlier, such as 
that it is possible to hate an entirely amiable human being and to love another 
who doesn’t possess any agreeable qualities whatsoever. The latter is quite 
easily explained, because the relation alone can be a sufficient cause to excite 
love. If we happen to love an „unworthy“ person we didn’t have a previous
162 It is quite common to express one’s feelings about a relative in sentences like: ‘I love my mum but I don’t 
like her’ or ‘I know my child is an awful person but I can’t help loving him’.
163 T .II,II,IV ,352.
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relationship with, we can refer back to the qualities which are otherwise the 
causes of the passion and stress the point that the particular qualities which 
cause the passion within us don’t have to be known to us. If the manners or the 
behavior of such a person are just abominable, the qualities which have a pull 
on our emotions might be some other ones.
To explore hatred it is certainly helpful to refer to relations once again, 
because there seem to be at least two different kinds of scenario. 1. Love 
changes into hatred or, in weaker terms, we start to hate a person we have 
some relation to, of whatever kind this relation may be. 2. We instantly hate 
someone we didn’t have a previous relationship to.
To 1. We know that in Humean terms the relation alone can be sufficient to 
excite love. Love is a positive, pleasurable feeling. We can therefore say that 
relationships cause us pleasure: the closer the relationship the stronger the pull 
towards the emotion and the stronger is also the pleasure caused. It can now be 
argued that if we start to hate someone we had previously a positive, 
pleasurable relationship with, then this is a reaction to the changing nature of 
the relationship. The reasons for such a change are manifold and I wish only to 
discuss the most obvious ones to illuminate the matter. Hume writes: ,,’Tis 
obvious, that people associate together according to their particular tempers 
and dispositions, and that men of gay tempers naturally love the gay; as the 
serious bear an affection to the serious. This not only happens, where they 
remark this resemblance betwixt themselves and others, but also by the natural 
course of the disposition, and by a certain sympathy, which always arises 
betwixt similar characters. [...] that our natural temper gives us propensity to the 
same impression, which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any 
slight occasion [...] a love or affection arises from the resemblance, we may 
learn that a sympathy with others is agreeable only by giving an emotion to the 
spirits, since an easy sympathy and correspondent emotions are alone common 
to relation, acquaintance, and resemblance.“164 Since relationships involve 
resemblance of the persons having the relationship, changes of a certain kind in
164 ibid., p.354.
123
one or both of the persons might affect the resemblance in a detrimental way. 
Thus the relation itself is threatened. When the relation worsens or is destroyed 
pleasure cannot be derived from it. So, hatred can be understood as a reaction 
to the withdrawal of pleasure or can be caused by pain accompanying a process 
of separation. There is further indication that such an interpretation is justified: 
Hume classes the „ties of blood" as the strongest ties, creating the strongest 
relationships the human mind is capable of experiencing. The blood relationship 
is a relationship which will prevail in whatever way the individuals will change. In 
that sense a relationship by blood will always be unaffected and stable as such.
The changes of an individual are not always changes decreasing the 
degree of resemblance to other individuals. There can also be changes in the 
sense that one of the two relating individuals might want to terminate the 
relationship. The consequences in terms of displeasure can be the same: the 
relationship itself is threatened. It seems to be the case, taking the double 
relationship of the impressions and ideas into account, that the individual is not 
only interested in the other as the object of love and hatred, but is also 
interested in the relationship itself. If either of the two changes in a detrimental 
way, hatred can be the result.
To 2. Taking for granted that there is such a thing as instant hatred,165 the 
obvious way to tackle the problem is to refer to the qualities, in this case to 
disagreeable qualities, which are perceived instantly and produce the feeling of 
hatred in the perceiver. There are also more indirect ways to produce hatred: 
Let’s say I meet someone I didn’t know previously, this person possesses many 
agreeable qualities I would like to have myself but which I have not. We need to 
consider the causal chain of the occurring passions and the connections 
between different passions to explain hatred: a) My first reaction can be a 
pleasurable feeling, designating the person is question as an object of love. 
However, the transition from love to pride is easily made and therefore my 
attention is drawn to myself as the object of pride. Once this has happened I
165 There certainly exists something we would call instant dislike. However, such an emotion would not be 
identical with hatred, since every passion is a simple impression.
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cannot perceive any of the agreeable qualities of the other person within me. 
This makes me feel humble or ashamed. This is a disagreeable feeling and the 
transition from humility to hatred can be made. Another way to produce hatred 
in situations like this is via envy, a disagreeable feeling, which is also connected 
to humility.
We also have to notice that in such cases a resemblance between the two 
persons is not given, which makes it more difficult for love to be excited in the 
first place. This seems also to prepare the ground for hostile feelings, because a 
resemblance cannot be perceived and a pleasurable relationship seems 
unobtainable. Taking the latter into consideration we find that here too is a 
twofold cause of hatred. The qualities of the other person in comparison (it is 
also conceivable that the comparison is made by people other than myself) and 
the perceived impossibility of a relationship in positive terms.
Hume’s account of the possible causes of hatred emphasizes the 
importance of relationships in respect to the passions and consequently in 
respect to the self. Whatever the passion happens to be, it requires a relation 
between the individual feeling the passion and others. The passion connects us 
not only to individuals other than oneself but also to a variety of external 
surroundings (as objects like possessions or environments) and circumstances. 
We must understand that the relationship has not necessarily to be prior to the 
passion, but can also be produced by the passion itself. The passions are one 
instrument (imagination is another) by which we reach out into the world and to 
others. We create this world as we create others and ourselves as persons and 
individuals. Hume’s concept of the self in the opening chapters of Book Two 
unites the aspects of the individual, self and personhood, as I have defined 
them before. Hume pays much attention to the social nature of the individual 
(person aspect) and links this aspect to the more private aspect I referred to as 
the self and which is entirely compatible with his bundle definition of Book One. 
A clear perception of the self is produced by the social passions by connecting 
the impression of the self to the outside world. This connection is very much 
needed if the idea of the self is to emerge. „l own the mind to be insufficient, of
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itself, to its own entertainment, and that it naturally seeks after foreign objects, 
which may produce a lively sensation, and agitate the spirits. On the 
appearance of such an object it awakes, as it were, from a dream: The blood 
flows with a new tide: The heart is elevated: And the whole man acquires a 
vigour, which he cannot command in his solitary and calm moments. Hence 
company is naturally so rejoicing, as presenting the liveliest of all objects, viz. a 
rational and thinking Being like ourselves, who communicates to us all the 
actions of his mind; makes us privy to his inmost sentiments and affections; and 
lets us see, in the very instant of their production, all the emotions, which are 
caus’d by any object."166 In interpreting this passage we must make reference to 
the definition of the self Hume gives in Book One of the Treatise. He never 
rejects this definition. It is the fundamentum of his explanation of the social 
nature of human beings.
The self is naturally seeking perceptions of „foreign objects" because these 
perceptions are lively and vivid. They stimulate the perceiving self. As is the 
case with pride and humility, attention is drawn to the self, which is the bundle of 
perceptions. The impression of the self becomes livelier and stronger and is 
able to give rise to a clear idea of the self. The strongest, and certainly the most 
interesting perceptions are perceptions of other human beings. They are not 
objects like chairs, horses and carrots, they are like us, they resemble us, they 
communicate with us as we communicate with them. We are naturally drawn 
towards other human beings by resemblance as well as by other relations. Our 
first experiences in life are experiences of others to whom we are causally 
related, we are the children of parents and brothers or sisters of our siblings. 
We also resemble them: we look like them and we experience similar 
expectations, we speak, walk, laugh like they do. Other people cause passions 
within us, bring us pleasure, sometimes pain, and thereby make us feel our own 
existence. „Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and 
obey one man: Let the sun rise and set at his command: The sea and rivers roll 
as he pleases, and the earth furnish spontaneously whatever may be useful or
166 T.II, II, IV,352-353.
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agreeable to him: He will still be miserable, till you give him some one person at 
least, with whom he may share his happiness, and whose esteem and 
friendship he may enjoy.“167
We resemble each other also in the sense that we all are capable of 
passions, of feelings and thoughts. If I see my brother in pain I have an idea of 
what pain feels like because I have felt pain myself. Perception of others makes 
me what I am. These perceptions are part of the bundle which I am. I become 
aware of myself by having perceptions of a relation I am part of. I also perceive 
myself through the perceptions of others: they respond to me, interact with me. 
which, in turn, causes new and lively perceptions within me. In that sense the 
self is progressive and needs interaction with other human beings to emerge, 
not only because that interaction provides me with the perceptions I am made 
up of, but also because I need others to turn upon myself, to get a lively idea of 
myself (pride and humility) and so I need the company of others to be myself.
It becomes clear that in the light of this account self and personhood are 
closely connected, that they require and condition each other. Without relation 
and consequently interaction with other individuals the self cannot emerge nor 
can we gain a lively idea of it. Social recognition, expressed in many ways and 
always implying third person identity statements, is a condition of the coming 
about of the self. On the other hand, social interaction between me and others 
requires my participation, requires that I perceive the other as resembling me. It 
requires that I perceive the other as an individual and not as a carrot, dog or 
chair. In this sense the self, created in social context, is also creating social 
context.
It could now be argued that we are faced with a vicious circle since there 
cannot be a self without social context creating it as there cannot be a social 
context without a self creating it. Therefore there can be neither. I wish to argue 
that this is not so, that the circle is not a vicious one but that we face here a 
dialectical relationship.
167 T.II,II,V,363.
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It is obvious that social context is not created from scratch. When we are 
born, social context is already there. What is needed for the emergence of the 
self is that we are able to recognize other individuals. This is surely a learning 
process. By recognizing that which is ..already there" we learn to recognize 
ourselves. Since we cannot choose to have or not to have perceptions, 
perceiving the context (made up of other people, animals, inanimate objects) is 
inevitable. Once we have gained an idea of ourselves, brought about by our 
own internal and external perceptions, we will be able to understand our own 
social context better. We can make an inference that other individuals are 
subjects, whereas, at first, we took them by their differing object-characters. By 
recognizing others as subjects we create social context.168
Another argument supporting my position stems from the combined theory 
of identity. I believe that this argument can establish the progressive nature of 
the self and accommodates the Humean understanding of the self as it is 
presented in Book One and Two of the Treatise. We have to remember that 
identity of the self (as well as personal identity) require both, bodily and mental 
criteria. In respect to the self we can say that the emphasis lies more upon the 
mental criteria because of the essential, but not exclusive privacy of the self. We 
are here already in accordance with Hume who seems to agree with such a 
view on two accounts: He claims in Book Two that we are most intimately 
conscious of ourselves, which means that we are intimately conscious of our 
perceptions. This also accommodates the bundle definition of Book One. We 
are also conscious of someone else’s perceptions, but not in the same way as 
we are conscious of our own. The perceptions of an individual other than 
oneself are not intimately known to us nor are they as vivid to us as our own. 
The self is defined as the bundle of perceptions. Without perceptions there can 
be no self. Passions are perceptions, and they are, in respect to social context, 
very important perceptions. A passion is only a passion, and only occurs, in 
relation to something other than oneself, whether the self is the object (love and 
hatred) or subject (pride and humility) of the passion. Therefore, if there were
168 There should be no problem with such an account, especially when we take Hume to be a Basic Realist. 
Hume’s Basic Realism will be established later on.
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nothing other than myself I relate to, there would be no passion. Without the 
passions, however, we cannot gain the idea of the self.
This alone would be sufficient, or so it seems, to establish the necessity of 
social context and interaction for the coming about and the progress of the self 
(as well as of personhood since self and personhood are interdependent). We 
need to understand the self within the framework of Hume’s account of human 
nature. Human beings to be human beings must have passions. They love, 
hate, feel ashamed, humble, proud, angry and so on. A being without passions, 
in the understanding of 18th century philosophy, cannot be a human being. The 
Enlightenment places man in between angels and beasts. If we accept that 
human beings necessarily have passions then we are compelled to find general 
absence of passion, which is a necessary consequence following from the 
absence of any social context, reason enough to say that we do not look at a 
human being, but on something else. This would render the quest for the self 
uninteresting, since it is embedded in the framework of human existence.
On the other hand, it is possible to argue, that an actually passionless being 
might theoretically still be capable of passions, though it is never experiencing 
them because there is no „outside“ stimulus to produce them. Although this 
being does not experience a social context and does not interact socially, it 
could still be a human being, since it has the required capacities but never 
exercises them. Such an argument accepts and supports the claim that social 
interaction is needed in respect to the passions, but it refutes the former 
argument that this alone would be sufficient to prove social context and 
interaction necessary for the emergence and the progress of the self. If we look, 
however, at perceptions other than the passions we will find a similar picture, 
i.e. we find that the perception of context, especially social context and 
interaction, is necessary for the self. Without context I find myself in solitude, 
isolation and despair - the position of Hume’s thinker in Part IV of Book One of 
the Treatise. Any attempt to reason the world into being has ended in absurdity 
and obscurity, because reason alone cannot provide for it. The habits, by which 
imagination makes a transition to form the ideas of identity, externality and
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causation are habits created by interaction with the world and other human 
beings. If my world consisted only of myself then these ideas could not be 
accounted for.
If we were to deny Hume a Basic Realist account and were to argue that the 
mind generates the world, including social context, the consequences would be 
as follows: For the self to emerge perceptions of any environment (including 
social environment) are still necessary. Since mind and self are set identical by 
Hume it follows that we cannot say positively what it is that generates the 
perceptions. We can only say that perceptions cannot be generated by the mind 
or the self, because the mind/self is the total of the perceptions. Therefore it 
seems to be the case that a non Basic Realist interpretation of Hume’s 
philosophy renders itself impossible. ANNETTE BAIER argues that: „Book 
Two’s turn (or continuation of the turn) from solitary reason to sociable passions 
answers Book One’s despairing questions [...] Book Two does not take back 
Book One’s conclusion that a person is a system of causally linked „different 
existences", which ..mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each 
other" (T.261), but the system of perceptions is now seen to be inseparable 
from the system which is the living human body. [...] In Book Two the self is the 
..correlative" of all the things that belong to it, mental, physical, cultural, as the
1 RQself of Book One was the correlative of its heap of perceptions." The thinker 
of Book Two is a full blooded individual, not restricted to reason alone. However, 
we must not mistake Book Two’s „body“ to be a denial of the account of body 
and externality given in Book One. Both concepts of body are entirely 
reconcilable. Books One and Two are consistent with each other, though Hume 
is approaching different levels of investigation in the two books. In Book One 
Hume is trying to look beyond experience and the workings of the mind, 
especially imagination. He cannot find anything which can justifiably be said 
about the beyond, and therefore concludes that the mind independent existence 
of bodies has to be taken „for granted in all our reasonings".170 Once this is 
established he goes on, in Book Two of the Treatise, to make his moves on the
169 BAIER, A. ibid., p. 142.
170 T.I,IV,II,187.
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level of the perceptions themselves. If we perceive A, A is there as it is for us, 
whether A exists mind independently or not.171 The objects of perception are 
treated as if they were real existing objects, and indeed, in some way they are. 
This is something we have to take as a first principle, reason cannot provide 
proof for it, though our sentiment is naturally inclined towards their real 
existence.
Hume’s account of the body especially in Book Two indicates accordance 
with the combined theory. The body serves as one of the criteria of identity, not 
only by its very existence (in the sense I have suggested) but also in its 
connection to other bodies. It is an instrument of identification and re­
identification by bodily appearance and is so an instrument of contact and 
communication with others. Our sensual apparatus is a bodily apparatus and is 
directed at other human beings, makes perception of them possible and 
enables us to communicate.172 It is by contact and communication that the 
thoughts and feelings of others become known to us, which in turn provides us 
with the mental criterion of identity and enables us to make third person identity 
statements about others as it enables them to make such statements about us.
Mental criteria are necessary criteria, therefore third person identity 
statements require social context. No third person identity statements can be 
made if there are no third persons. If there are third persons then there is social 
context. But is, in respect to first person identity statements, a solitary self 
possible? Looking at Book One of the Treatise one might be tempted to say that 
it is. However, I think that this judgment is mistaken. The self which reasons and 
reflects in Book One is a self which has emerged already. It questions the 
grounds of its existence, just to find that reason cannot pave the grounds it rests 
upon. To address the problem as I have presented it we have to set our 
attention onto the genesis of the self. We cannot take the existence of the self 
for granted, even if it is understood to be nothing but a bundle of perceptions. 
To undertake the quest for the genesis of the self and its conditions, and to
171 We can see here quite easily why KANT thought so much of HUM E and claimed that he was woken from 
his slumber by Hume’s philosophy.
172 At this level it does not matter whether the apparatus or the objects of perception are fictitious or not.
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establish that the self is progressive and nothing given, we have to go right back 
to the very beginning of the Treatise. All our knowledge stems from perceptions, 
be they impressions or ideas. There is nothing but experience which could 
provide the material for the operations of the mind. There are only perceptions 
and operations of the mind. The operations of the mind are rooted in the nature 
of the mind. The mind has a natural disposition to carry out these operations; 
perceiving itself is one of them. Since there are no innate ideas (all ideas we 
have are derived from experience plus the operations of the mind), there can be 
no innate or inborn idea of the self. The operations of the mind need material to 
work upon, i.e. the perceptions. As long as there are no perceptions, the mind 
cannot operate. Furthermore, Hume claims that the mind is a theatre, furnished 
with perceptions. Therefore it must be observed that as long as there is no such 
furniture, there is no theatre, i.e. the mind itself is nothing without its 
perceptions. The plain conclusion is: that the idea of the self, just like any other 
idea, must be acquired. The acquisition, however, is natural.
We need also to remember an earlier argument concerning the relation 
between the idea of the self and the self. I have argued that, on Humean terms, 
ontology and epistemology stand together in respect to the self, since the self is 
an internal perception. It does not follow that the idea of the self requires a prior, 
resembling, simple impression of self. However, in consequence we are faced 
with two possibilities which need to be looked into: 1. The idea of the self is a 
complex idea stemming from a complex, possibly resembling impression of self. 
In this case the self is, ontologically speaking, a complex impression. 2. The 
idea of self is a complex idea and does not stem from a complex impression, 
but is a compound of simple ideas. Here the self will not have a resembling 
impression. It will suffice, for the time being, that either way the idea of the self 
cannot be arrived at if there are no perceptions it can be inferred or derived 
from.173 Since the idea of the self requires perceptions in the first place and 
given the particular character of our usual understanding of the self, it is very
173 My discussion of the passions and my account of sympathy, which will be given later on, contain, however, 
arguments supporting the view that there is a complex impression of the self. The idea of the self is produced 
by the connection between the impression of the self and the passions, aided by the principle of sympathy.
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likely that the perceptions we have of other people are of special importance. To 
recognize myself as a self it seems to be necessary that I have perceptions of 
individuals other than myself in the first place. We also need to consider the role 
and the importance Hume gives to the principle of resemblance. A human 
being, totally on its own from the very beginning of its existence, has no 
perceptions of other human beings. Hence it cannot form the notions of human 
being, self or personhood, because there is nothing resembling it. Hume points 
out that notions of resemblance and difference cannot be derived from single 
instances alone.
To form an idea of a self requires passions like pride and humility, love and 
hatred. Thus it requires that one perceives other individuals as individuals. 
Furthermore, an inference has to be made concerning the other to be self- 
conscious, i.e. to be a self. So the perception of other selves, as far as we can 
perceive them, is required. We gain an idea that others have a self because 
they resemble us and we can experience the resemblance by interaction and 
communication. We even become aware of the privacy of the self by 
communication with others. The limits of communication are only discovered by 
realizing, through communication, that there is something another cannot 
adequately communicate to me just as I find that I cannot adequately 
communicate everything to someone else. We find ourselves regularly in the 
position to have misinterpreted someone’s language or behavior or to be 
misinterpreted and misunderstood ourselves. We all have heard and said 
sentences like: „l didn’t mean to...“, or „You don’t understand me“. These 
sentences aren’t meaningless or unintelligible, either to the speaker or the 
hearer. We can feel the other person’s frustration just as we can feel our own 
frustration when we are aware of the impossibility of communicating the quality 
contents of experience adequately, though wanting to do so. We also perceive 
that communication is possible: I perceive human beings behaving towards 
each other, I perceive how they respond to me. Thus I discover that I am one of 
them, that we are of the same kind. I also perceive my own distinctiveness:
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They don’t do all the time what I want, they don’t always share my opinions or 
feelings etc.
The last argument I wish to present is very similar to the one I presented in 
respect to the passions. It is an argument resting on the definitions of 
personhood, self and being a human being as referring to different aspects of 
the individual. Since the aspect of personhood requires social environment and 
interaction by definition, the self also requires these conditions. Self and 
personhood are interdependent and interrelated by definition. We have found 
plenty of indication that these definitions are very plausible and fit the combined 
theory of identity. Assuming that Hume is a Basic Realist we have also found 
that the combined theory of identity is compatible with Hume’s philosophy, 
Hume’s philosophy accommodates these definitions. This is the strength of the 
argument.
The weakness is that the definitions take interdependency and 
interrelationship for granted. I have tried to show that personhood and self are 
indeed dependent on each other. However, none of the arguments I was able to 
present proves this connection conclusively, although the arguments given so 
far very strongly suggest the plausibility of the definitions. It is my opinion that a 
conclusive proof is logically, in classical terms, impossible, since one has always 
to refer to one of the relata to give a foundation of the other. I tend to interpret 
this very fact as a further indication in favour of the plausibility of my claims. If 
such interdependency and interrelationship are truly the case, then any attempt 
to explain one of the relata without reference to the other must naturally fail.
If we employ reason alone to give a foundation of the self, we are left with 
the bundle of perceptions of Book One. As I hope to have established in the 
previous chapter, such an account is not necessarily unsuccessful, especially 
not when it is interpreted within the combined theory of identity. However, the 
combined theory contains the assumption of existence of others (mind 
independent or not) because of its account of the role of the body as a criterion 
not only of third person identity statements, but also of first person identity 
statements. We also have to consider, in connection to Hume’s philosophy as a
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whole, that if reason alone shall provide for a notion of ourselves and our 
identity we deceive ourselves if we think the relevant questions could be 
answered meaningfully. Reason alone cannot provide for the idea of identity. 
This idea can only be gained from the perceptions themselves worked on by 
imagination and memory. The role of reason is not unimportant,174 but clearly 
subordinate. Part of the perceptions must be the passions. They are 
theoretically necessary in respect to the connection between the perceiver, the 
perceived and the perception itself, since the perception can be pleasurable and 
painful. They are also necessary for the obvious reason that human beings do 
have passions. And since there are passions there must also be other 
individuals.
So far I tried to show that Hume’s concept of the self in the opening chapter 
of Book Two of the Treatise not only requires social context and interaction but 
also refers constantly back to them in a dialectical manner. The self to emerge 
needs social context just as the social context is nothing without the self, which 
is part of its own context. To get a clearer picture 1) of the strong connection 
between the self and other individuals and 2) of the relation between self and 
personhood, we must investigate one of the key concepts of Hume’s 
philosophy: sympathy.
174 Reason is, for instance, necessary when it comes to expectations and probability.
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IV. Sympathy
IV.I. The Mechanism of Sympathy
„ln general we may remark, that the minds of men are mirrors to one another, 
not only because they reflect each others emotions, but also because those 
rays of passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated, and may 
decay away by insensible degrees."175 Hume uses images like the mirror or the 
echo to describe sympathy. Sympathy is one of the most important features of 
the human mind, or, perhaps better, of the human soul. It allows us to 
communicate our passions and thoughts to one another, which in itself has also 
an effect upon the passions. Hume introduces the concept of sympathy quite 
early in Book Two of the Treatise as part of the investigation of pride and 
humility. Since his introductory remarks are very notable for several reasons, it 
may be permitted to quote Hume at length here:
„Our reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast 
weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty 
and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and 
sentiments of others. In order to account for this phaenomenon ‘twill be 
necessary to take some compass, and first explain the nature of sympathy.
No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in 
its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, 
and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, 
however different from, or even contrary to our own. This is not only 
conspicuous in children, who implicitly embrace every opinion propos’d to 
them; but also in men of the greatest judgment and understanding, who 
find it very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to 
that of their friends and daily companions. To this principle we ought to 
ascribe the great uniformity we may observe in the humours and turn of 
thinking of those of the same nation; and ‘tis much more probable, that this 
resemblance arises from sympathy, than from any influence of the soil and 
climate, which, tho’ they continue invariably the same, are not able to 
preserve the character of a nation the same for a century together."176
175 T.II,II,V,365.
176 T . IU X I ,316-317.
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Let us abstract from Hume’s remark about the uniformities of character found in 
members of the same nation and concentrate on the core of Hume’s opening 
statement. It springs to mind that: Firstly, sympathy doesn’t seem to be a 
passion, but a principle of communication. Secondly, it does not only serve as a 
principle to communicate passions and sentiments, but also thoughts and 
opinions. Hume himself calls sympathy a principle. The afore mentioned images 
he uses to describe sympathy also suggest that it cannot be understood as a 
passion, but must be understood as a principle by which the passions, 
sentiments and opinions of one person can be known to another in a special 
way. A special way, because they don’t seem to be known to me in the same 
way as I know that a chair has four legs and that water is colorless, but in a way 
that influences our own passions, sentiments and opinions. - This becomes 
clear when we consider the mechanism of sympathy. Hume is explicit that the 
passions, sentiments and opinions of another person can not themselves be 
observed. Only their effects expressed in behavior and language, be it voluntary 
or involuntary, are observable. We perceive the behavior of others by our 
senses (impressions) and consequently gain an idea from which we infer the 
impression the other person is experiencing. This in itself causes an impression 
within us. „When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by 
its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, 
which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, 
and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very 
passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection."177 
Hume believes the passions to be simple impressions. Hence each passion 
must be distinguishable from another, that is each passion has a ‘different feel’ 
to it.
Looking at our every day experience we may want to say that we also know 
a feeling of sympathy. If, as Hume argues, sympathy is a principle and not a 
passion, then there cannot be a feeling we refer to as sympathy. In that sense 
Hume’s account of sympathy seems to be counter intuitive. However, we will
177 ibid., p.317.
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find that the feeling we usually refer to as sympathy is, in Humean terms, 
mislabeled if we call it so. His name for this feeling is benevolence. Hume 
writes: „Now ‘tis certain, there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, 
tho’ they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more 
known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. These 
desires are of two kinds; either certain instincts originally implanted in our 
natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to 
children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider’d merely
178as such.“ Benevolence is a calm passion. The impressions of this passion 
have only a low vivacity - it follows that benevolence, like any other calm 
passion, can easily be mistaken for something else.179 We can discover many 
congruencies between Hume’s account of benevolence and our every day 
concept of sympathy, especially when we also consider one of Hume’s earlier 
statements: „We may, therefore, infer, that benevolence and anger are passions 
different from love and hatred, and only conjoin’d with them, by the original 
constitution of the mind.“180
Sometimes we use sympathy to refer to something which is perhaps more 
adequately described as compassion or we use it to express a certain kind of 
agreement. However, these common uses of the word sympathy are not 
compatible with Hume’s understanding of sympathy. They don’t have the same 
reference. Pal ARDAL points this out when he writes: „But Hume is not primarily 
concerned with the expression of sympathy nor with the use of the terms 
‘sympathy’ and ‘sympathize’. He is concerned with sympathizing as a kind of
transference of emotions, feelings and opinions, rather than with the
181 18? deliberate expression of sympathy. He goes on to argue: „lt was made
perfectly clear by him183 that pity and compassion were different from his
178 T .II,III,III,417.
179 It also seems to be the case, when looking at Hume’s statement, that he is not entirely clear about the 
distinction between passions and desires. However, since the distinction is not the topic of the present 
discussion I don’t think it necessary to go into it. My purpose is an investigation of the self. It is not my aim to 
give a full account of Hume’s moral philosophy and philosophical psychology.
rso T.II,II,V II,368.
181 or undeliberate, T.L.
182 ARDAL, P.S. Passion and Value in Hume’s Treatise, Edinburgh University Press, 1966, p.48.
183 Hume, T.L.
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principle of communication: they were passions, and although sympathy may 
[...] help to explain why pity or compassion occur, they cannot, any more than 
the other passions, be equated with a principle of communication of any
184kind." We can only observe a person’s feelings, emotions and opinions by 
their effects. The effects themselves, such as speech, body language and 
behavior, are not sympathy in the technical sense of the word, nor is 
observation. Nevertheless, sympathy as a principle, although it cannot be 
identified with them, requires observation and the expressions of someone’s 
state of mind. Sympathy for Hume is the principle by which these expressions - 
available to us by observation - have an effect upon the observer and cause 
sympathetic (in the common sense of the word) impressions within the 
observer.
Sympathy is more than a principle of communication of feelings and 
emotions. It also takes an active part in the communication of opinions and 
beliefs. The principle is supposed to explain the influence of other people’s 
opinions and beliefs upon our own judgments. Although we may be easily 
inclined to agree with the former, agreement will not as easily be obtained when 
it comes to the communication, even the adoption, of opinions about matters of 
fact. However, the matter appears in a different light when we remember that 
opinions or beliefs generally stem from vivacity. If a perception is vivid enough 
to give rise to a belief, then it is conceivable that this perception can be 
communicated by sympathy, and can give rise to the same belief in the one it is 
communicated to. Communication of an opinion by sympathy must be 
understood in a way which takes social context into strong consideration. 
Society or social context like companionship, for instance, can have an 
encouraging as well as a detrimental influence upon the adoption or rejection of 
certain opinions communicated by sympathy. „We know that certain opinions 
may be widely accepted in a community in such a way as to make it extremely 
difficult to convince a member of that community of their falsity."185 Here it may
184 ARDAL, P. ibid., p.51.
185 ibid., p.47.
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be helpful to discuss several scenarios186: Dana Scullys187 society believes in 
science and the laws of nature. It also believes to have found the main laws of 
nature. It does not believe in ghosts and alien abduction, since there is no 
known law of nature which could explain them. Furthermore, the laws of 
probability and logic render these phenomena virtually impossible. It is hard to 
imagine that Scully can be convinced of the opposite beliefs. Reports of so 
called eye witnesses must be mistrusted since there might have been a flaw in, 
or a distortion of their perception. When Scully finds herself having strange 
experiences she places distrust in her own perceptions. It is impossible for 
Agent Mulder to convince Scully, although she herself is investigating strange 
phenomena, that alien abductions and ghosts exist, because the majority of the 
society they both live in rejects these beliefs. Mulder himself is seen by others 
as an eccentric, to say the least. It is very difficult for Mulder to express his 
beliefs without experiencing disapproval or ridicule from other members of 
society. Given this scenario it is pretty obvious why Scully doesn’t believe in 
ghosts and aliens. These beliefs are contrary to the set of beliefs society holds - 
the vast majority of the members of society share the same beliefs as Scully. It 
is more puzzling, given Hume’s account, why Mulder holds his beliefs despite 
the beliefs widely held in society.
The puzzle can be solved by referring to vivacity. The opinions of others are 
transferable to us by sympathy. A successful transfer requires, firstly, that the 
beliefs another holds have a high vivacity. Secondly, these beliefs have to 
cause an impression in us more vivid than the vivacity of our own opposing 
belief. Since Muldefs belief in aliens and ghosts is very strong and the 
impression which belongs to the belief is very vivid, the causes which would 
enable him to abandon his beliefs and to adopt new ones are not strong 
enough.
186 Pal ARDAL’s example that horsemeat is considered poisonous in some societies doesn’t seem to be very 
convincing. It rests upon the assumption that, although one knows that horsemeat can safely be eaten, one 
would eventually adopt the prejudice against horsemeat of this society.
187 The X-Files. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1995.
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If society holds a belief A and a person entering this society holds a contrary 
belief B then it is possible that the person abandons B and adopts A by 
transference of opinions by sympathy.
A(S) + B(P) may lead to A(P)
A(P) is caused by A(S)
It is equally conceivable that a person is not altering his beliefs in that manner, 
and it seems to be true that:
A(S) + B(P) may NOT lead to A(P)
A(P) is NOT caused by A(S)
Therefore we seem to be faced with a contradiction.
However, the contradiction only occurs when A(S) can be regarded as a 
necessary and sufficient cause. It is neither of the two. A(S) is not a necessary 
cause because a variety of other causes leading to the alteration or the change 
of one’s beliefs is easily conceivable, such as personal experience or reasoning. 
GALILEO held the belief that the earth rotates around the sun not because 
somebody else believed it, especially not his society and the authorities of his 
society - the contrary was the case. He believed it because of reasoning. I 
believed for a long time that it only hails in winter and early spring. When I 
experienced a hail in the middle of the summer, I changed my belief because of 
this new experience. This is also entirely compatible with Hume’s framework 
concerning the acquisition of knowledge and the role of experience, of habit and 
of constant conjunction.
A(S) alone is not a sufficient cause. Additional conditions, partly external to 
A(S), have to be fulfilled. Not only must A(S) itself be able to make a vivid and 
forceful impression upon the person which shall adopt the belief. The person’s 
particular beliefs opposing A(S) have to be less vivid than the impression gained 
from A(S) by sympathy.
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If V[A(S)]<V[B(P)]\hen B(P),
if V[A(S)]> V[B(P)] then A(P).
V = vivacity 
A = belief A
B = belief B\ A and B are contrary beliefs 
S = society 
P = person
This model also accommodates Hume’s account of the high degree of adoption 
of opinions by children. Children do not hold as many opinions and as many 
beliefs as adults. This is so because they haven’t experienced yet the amount 
and the variety of experiences adults have. Far fewer matters of fact are known 
to children. Children had fewer opportunities to observe events in constant 
conjunction. Epistemological habits are not fully formed, or not formed at all yet. 
The latter, of course, is rooted in the fewer actual experiences which in itself has 
its reasons in the fact that children are younger than adults. In this sense 
children can be understood to be highly impressionable by the opinions and 
beliefs of others. It is rarely the case that children hold a contrary belief to the 
one held by the surrounding people. We also know that, if they do hold such a 
contrary belief, they will not be persuaded by anyone to change the initial belief, 
unless their own experience supports a new belief. It is quite difficult, if not 
impossible, to convince a child that there are no monsters in the wardrobe 
unless it has been sleepless and fearful through many nights - and nothing has 
happened. This can be explained by taking reference to vivacity, and in this 
case, also to imagination. The idea of a monster in the wardrobe, although the 
idea is a product of the imagination, is so lively that it is mistaken for an 
impression. Its vivacity gives rise to the belief that there really is a monster in 
the wardrobe.
Hume’s account of sympathy in regard to the passions is highly influenced 
by NEWTON’s physics. I think that, considering the mechanisms of sympathy
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and taking for granted that my description of its workings are adequate, this can 
also be said about sympathy in regard to opinions and beliefs. I think we are 
justified in exchanging the word passion in ARDAL’s statement for opinion and 
contrary opinions. „The influence of Newtonian mechanics upon Hume’s thought 
about the passions is evident here. The passions are opposed to each other in 
the same way as opposing gravitational forces.'1,188 But although we might agree 
that children have an impressionable mind and may also accept that beliefs and 
opinions in general can be transferred by sympathy, we tend to be more 
sceptical when it comes to competent adults of sound and firm judgment. This 
matter seems to involve more than the vivacity of the opposing beliefs and 
opinions. The adoption of beliefs and opinions which are found in the ones 
closest to us or which are held generally by the kind of group we are part of, 
seems not to be caused by the higher degree of vivacity in the respective 
impression. It seems to have other causes such as the desire to conform, or the 
connected desire to live in harmony to others. Taking the problem from a 
different angle, we may want to argue that A(S), together with sympathy, is also 
not a sufficient cause of A(P) in an additional sense: „We must also bear in 
mind that sympathy may be at work, even though it does not lead to an identity 
of sentiment or opinion, for it may have the effect only of making it difficult for 
men ‘to follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of their 
friends and daily companions’ (THN II, 40/316). Sympathy, in fact, admits of 
degrees and may succeed in creating in our minds only a certain tension. The 
most conspicuous example of this and perhaps the most important, would be a 
conflict of motives engendered in this manner."189 This seems to strengthen my 
first point. It is not straightforward to think that to follow one’s own reason and 
inclination is rendered difficult only because of sympathy and eventual opposing 
beliefs of others. It is, at least, accompanied by, and may even require, the 
additional desire to conform or to live in unspoiled harmony with others. I think it 
is even possible to enforce the latter statement without loosing plausibility by 
saying that the desire for harmony and conforming is the actual cause, that
188 ARDAL, P. ibid., p.24.
189 ibid., p.48.
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sympathy serves as an aid towards achieving fulfillment of these desires. Hume 
himself certainly sees the reason why even the competent judge is not entirely 
independent from the opinions held by his friends and companions in the 
workings of sympathy. Why this should be so is not entirely clear. Hume’s view 
in this respect is not entirely plausible and it is far from being conclusive. There 
are competing reasons which sound just as convincing as Hume’s account.
A variety of further criticisms concerning Hume’s account of sympathy and 
ARDAL’s interpretation can reasonably be made. Firstly, ARDAL says that 
sympathy comes in degrees. He thinks this explains the impact, differing in 
degree, which other people’s opinions have upon us. It seems to me that, by 
saying this, ARDAL makes the mistake of looking at sympathy as if it were a 
passion. However, it clearly is not as he himself emphasizes often enough. 
Sympathy is a principle and it is difficult to imagine how a principle can have 
degrees and occur in degrees. Surely enough, principles work under initial 
conditions, and these conditions can either promote the workings of a principle 
or be detrimental to it. In the first case transitions can be made easily, in the 
latter case they are more difficult. However, the working of the principle depends 
then on the suitability of the initial conditions. It seems to be more in accordance 
with the technical meaning of sympathy Hume employs to say that sometimes 
the initial conditions are favorable towards sympathy, such as close relations or 
a higher degree of vivacity in the impression A(S) makes upon us. Sometimes 
the initial conditions are not favorable, in which case we are far less more likely 
to „be impressed" by somebody else’s opinion in terms of its adoption by us.
My second criticism focuses on the „mechanics“ of Hume’s account. It is 
directed at the role of vivacity. I have argued that Hume’s account of the 
mechanics of sympathy, especially in respect to the communication of beliefs, is 
as follows: There are contrary beliefs A and B. Belief A is held by person X. 
Belief B held by Y. If sympathy is at work between X  and Y and extends towards 
their opinions and beliefs, then X  adopts B if the impression B makes upon X  is 
more vivid than the impression connected with A. Y only adopts A if the 
impression A produces within Y has a greater vivacity than the impression
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connected with B. If we now ask the question: ‘which belief prevails?’, it is 
answered: the one which is connected with the more vivid impression. Asking 
then: ‘how do we know which one is connected to the more vivid impression?’, 
the answer must be: ‘by its prevailing’. This poses doubtlessly a problem 
because the argument is circular.
ARDAL’s explanation of the alteration and adoption of beliefs favors a more 
gradual change of beliefs. However, I think the criticism still applies. ..According 
to a Humean doctrine, a belief is a lively or vivid thought. Why should the 
conception in this case not tend to be enlivened into a belief, if the thought is 
closely enough related to the person? This relation is established by his 
repeatedly thinking of the poisonous qualities of horsemeat. He thinks of these 
every time he reflects upon the beliefs of others in regard to the edibility of 
horsemeat. The thought of their belief that horsemeat is poisonous is repeatedly 
raised in his mind by their talk and by their actions. His thought that the people 
belong to his own community further strengthens his belief. This recurrence of 
the thought in his mind may in time lead him to share the belief of others that 
horsemeat is, indeed, poisonous. This would be in perfect harmony with Hume’s 
contention that frequent repetition tends to engender belief."190 ARDAL explores 
how the transition of beliefs is possible, but again, even a gradual enlivening of 
the impression has to be understood in terms of vivacity. If the person living in 
the community had the initial belief that horsemeat is perfectly eatable, the 
problem of circularity occurs.191
ARDAL seems to take beliefs and opinions here as isolated, which partly 
stems from Hume’s own account and his definition of beliefs: „So that as belief 
does nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive any object, it can only 
bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity. An opinion, therefore, or 
belief may be most accurately defin’d, A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR 
ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION."192 To understand Hume’s
190 ARDAL, P. ibid., p.48.
191 As I  have argued with regard to children and their impressionability: if one doesn’t hold any beliefs about 
horsemeat, the matter is much more straightforward and the problem doesn’t seem to occur.
192 T.I,III,VII,96.
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definition of belief or opinion properly we have to pay attention to the footnote 
he adds, considering the traditional distinction between conception, judgment 
and reasoning: „What we may in general affirm concerning these three acts of 
the understanding is, that taking them in a proper light, they all resolve 
themselves into the first, and are nothing but particular ways of conceiving our 
objects. Whether we consider a single object, or several; whether we dwell on 
these objects, or run from them to others; and in whatever form or order we 
survey them, the act of the mind exceeds not a simple conception; and the only 
remarkable difference, which occurs on this occasion, is, when we join belief to 
the conception, and are perswaded of the truth of what we conceive. [...] I am at 
liberty to propose my hypothesis concerning it; which is, that ‘tis only a strong 
and steady conception of any idea, and such as approaches in some measure 
to an immediate impression."193 Thus, it cannot be argued that the problem the 
role of vivacity poses can be avoided by suggesting that I have mixed up beliefs 
with conception. If there is a difference then it does not matter here. The 
conceptions of ideas have to be strong in terms of vivacity too.
The circularity seems to be an epistemological one. The criteria Hume 
offers are criteria by which we know which belief prevails and by which we 
know which belief has the greater vivacity. Whether one accepts Hume’s 
account depends very much upon whether we are willing to accept the role of 
vivacity outlined by him. It seems also to be the case that the decision, in its 
own turn, depends upon acceptance of the empirical foundation of his 
philosophy, that is his theory of perception. The difference of ideas and 
impressions is one of vivacity by definition. One can almost say that the higher 
vivacity of impressions, as opposed to the lower vivacity of ideas, is set as a first 
principle. This can be seen as one of the reasons why the circularity occurs and 
must occur. The circularity is, taken as a matter of definition and principle, not a 
vicious one.
If we agree with the latter we must conclude that the distinction between 
impressions and ideas by vivacity does not cause a serious problem.
193 ibid., footnote, p.97.
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Consequently the mechanical account of transference of opinions and beliefs by 
sympathy is not particularly problematic, at least not because of the circularity 
occurring in respect to vivacity. The real problem lies far deeper and is more 
hidden. It resembles very much the type of problem I have pointed out and 
discussed in the first chapter, the problem which became apparent in respect to 
the distinction between memory and imagination by vivacity. The seriousness of 
the problem is rooted in the unreliability of vivacity as a criterion when it comes 
to human psychology (ideas can be sometimes very vivid and impressions can 
be very faint). It is also rooted in Hume’s inconsistency in respect to the relation 
between his ontological and his epistemological grounds. It is of no great 
comfort to understand that Hume has to be inconsistent in order to give a 
psychological account to explain well known phenomena, such as 
hallucinations. He wants to explain the fact that we all know that certain 
impressions are very faint and are less vivid than other impressions or ideas we 
have at the same time. If this weren’t the case I could hardly sit here and think 
about Hume’s philosophy. My attention would be entirely absorbed by breathing 
and sitting on a chair. These are impressions whereas my thoughts about Hume 
are ideas.
Although Hume’s account of sympathy is not problematic in respect to 
vivacity, it is problematic in respect to the distinction between impressions and 
ideas. To understand the problem we have to have a further look into the 
mechanics of sympathy. Hume gives us the modus operandi of this principle of 
communication when he introduces sympathy,194 He continues to argue later on 
in the Treatise: „The idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and 
conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object, to which 
we are related. This lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression; these 
two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same, and differing only in 
their degrees of force and vivacity. But this change must be produc’d with the 
greater ease, that our natural temper gives us a propensity to the same 
impression, which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any slight
194 compare T.II,I,XI,317.
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occasion.'1195 We observe another person’s behavior and can listen to what they 
say - every sign the other displays gives us the idea that this person is sad, for 
instance. The idea so gained of the other person’s sadness becomes lively. It 
becomes converted into a real impression by the relation to ourselves and by 
the impression we have of ourselves. As the result of the process the observer 
feels sad too. „This enlivening of the idea is achieved through the operation of a 
related impression."196 This related impression is the impression of the self.
Hume makes clear distinctions between ideas and impressions in his 
account of sympathy. The idea we gain about the state of mind and the 
passions or beliefs of another person has its source in an impression (or 
impressions). We have, at first, impressions of the external signs, which then 
give rise to a resembling idea. We then, by inference, form an idea of the other 
person’s internal state. This idea is then enlivened so that it becomes a proper 
impression. The entire process can be understood in the following way:
Impression ldea--l--> Idea —2—> Impression 
1 = impression giving rise to a resembling idea
1 = Inference
2 = idea enlivened to impression by related impression
Hume argues that the idea of another person’s state of mind can be enlivened 
to an impression within the observer. This enlivening is understood in terms of 
vivacity. The idea, having by definition a lower degree of vivacity than an 
impression, becomes an impression if the degree of vivacity increases. The 
increase shall be achieved through the related impression of the self. This is the 
account Hume gives. However, this account can only be successful if the 
distinction between ideas and impressions is a purely quantitative distinction by 
degrees of vivacity.
Hume seems, at first sight, to be very clear that the distinction between 
impressions and ideas is only a quantitative one. He writes at the very beginning 
of the Treatise: „The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force
195 T.II,II,IV ,354.
196 ARDAL, P. ibid., p.43.
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and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our 
thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and 
violence, we may name impressions; [...]. By ideas I mean the faint images of 
these in thinking and reasoning;"197 It is this distinction which would enable him 
to explain why an idea can be enlivened to such a degree that the idea of a 
passion becomes an impression, i.e. the passion itself. „lt has been remark’d in 
the beginning of this treatise, that all ideas are borrow’d from impressions, and 
that these two kinds of perceptions differ only in the degrees of force and 
vivacity, with which they strike upon the soul. The component parts of ideas and 
impressions are precisely alike. The manner and order of their appearance may 
be the same. The different degrees of their force and vivacity are, therefore, the 
only particulars, that distinguish them: And as this difference may be remov’d, in 
some measure, by a relation betwixt the impressions and ideas, ‘tis no wonder 
an idea of a sentiment or passion, may by this means be so inliven’d as to 
become the very sentiment or passion."198 These statements clearly support a 
purely quantitative distinction between impressions and ideas.
We will find, however, that Hume is not very consistent in carrying a purely 
quantitative distinction through. There are statements in the Treatise which raise 
more than reasonable doubt that the distinction is a purely quantitative one. 
Discussing the passions Pal ARDAL writes: „lt is a familiar Humean doctrine 
that the difference between ideas and impressions is one of degree of force and 
liveliness only. But, in discussing benevolence and anger, Hume points out that 
impressions can mix with one another, whereas ideas are, as it were, 
impenetrable; they can form compounds and be joined, but they cannot mix. 
Ideas thus always retain some of their identity when conjoined with other ideas; 
they ‘exclude’ each other. But impressions, and in particular the ‘reflective’ 
impressions, are ‘susceptible of an entire union’ (THN II,83/366).“1"  So, if two 
or more ideas build compounds, a complex idea is produced. But the single 
compounds maintain their identity just like a brick in a wall is still the same brick.
197 T.1,1,1,1.
198 T.II,I,XI,318-319.
199 ARDAL, P. ibid., p.61.
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This is different where impressions are concerned. They mix entirely and the 
initial impressions cease to exist and a new one emerges thereby. This process 
can be compared, to some extent, with the mixing of colours. When we mix Blue 
and Yellow we get a new colour: Green. Hume makes use of the analogy 
himself when he writes: „...impressions and passions are susceptible of an 
entire union; and like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each 
of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression, 
which arises from the whole."200 We have to keep in mind that passions are
simple impressions. The new, emerging impression, being a passion, is also a
201simple impression. The ability of impressions to mix and the lack of this ability 
in ideas marks a difference of quality, not of quantity. This ability to mix is a 
quality of impressions, ideas do not possess.
Another argument to support a qualitative distinction between impressions 
and ideas rests upon Hume’s account of the principles of association of 
impressions and ideas. Hume writes: ,,’Tis evident, then, there is an attraction or 
association among impressions, as well as among ideas; tho’ with this 
remarkable difference, that ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity, 
and causation; and impressions only by resemblance."202 If the difference 
between impressions and ideas is only quantitative by different degrees of 
vivacity, it is hard to understand why impressions should be associated only by 
the principle of resemblance. Surely the principles of association of ideas should 
also apply to the association of impressions; perhaps even more so, since 
impressions are said to be more vivid than ideas. Hume’s treatment of ideas 
and impressions suggests that there is an unacknowledged qualitative 
distinction between them. This and the very names he assigns to them, 
indicates that ideas are something ..thought" whilst impressions are something 
„felt“. This is surely a difference in quality.
200 T.II,II,V I,366.
201 Complex impressions are impressions of complexities, like an impression of Paris, for instance, compare 
T.I,I,I,2-3.
202 T.II,I,IV,283.
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I think it is sufficient for the present purpose to notice that the distinction 
between impressions and ideas is not a purely quantitative one. If my 
interpretation of Hume’s account can be accepted, we have to conclude that his 
theory concerning the mechanisms of sympathy is far weaker than it appears to 
be. His account rests very much upon a purely quantitative distinction between 
impressions and ideas. An idea, so Hume, can and must be enlivened until it is 
a proper impression to explain sympathy. At the same time the account requires 
a clear cut distinction between impressions and ideas generally - an impression 
gives rise to an idea and an idea changes into an impression. This distinction is 
difficult to obtain given vivacity to be the only criterion of distinction. Neither of 
these two conditions, therefore, can be satisfied at the same time. Hume’s 
account of sympathy is, so it follows, incompatible with the understanding of the 
nature of the perceptions emerging from his philosophy.
IV.II. Sympathy and the Self
It has already been indicated that the self has an important role in Hume’s 
account of sympathy, especially in respect to his explanation of its mechanism. 
The impression of the self is mainly responsible for the enlivening of the idea, 
changing the perception into a passion (impression) by increasing its initial 
vivacity.
Such an understanding of the self brings up the problem of the impression 
of the self. It is quite clear that Hume’s account refers to and needs such an 
impression. „ln sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an 
impression. This conversion arises from the relation of objects to ourself. 
Ourself is always intimately present to us.“203 To understand fully what Hume 
means when he talks about ourselves being always intimately present to us we 
must remember his statement that: ,,’Tis evident, that the idea, or rather 
impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that our 
consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that ‘tis not
203 T.II,I,XI,320.
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possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it.“204 I have 
stated earlier that the self must be understood as a complex impression. 
However, we need to investigate properly if the self can be claimed to be a 
complex impression, and, for that matter, if there is an impression of the self at 
all. This investigation is necessary for two reasons. Firstly, Hume seems to say 
in Book One of the Treatise, that there is no impression of the self. This seems 
to contradict his statements made in Book Two. Secondly, it is a common 
preconception amongst many philosophers that Hume cannot account for a self 
and that there is certainly no impression of the self to be accounted for in 
Hume’s philosophy. Thus Book One and Two of the Treatise are thought to be 
incompatible with one another.
I have argued before that there is no simple impression of the self which 
can give rise to a resembling idea. But there is the possibility for a complex 
impression of the self, and I have expressed my belief that Hume’s account of 
the self has to be understood in that way. To explain how such complex 
impression must be understood I will, later on, make reference to Hume’s own 
example of a complex impression - that of Paris - which is given at the very 
beginning of Book One. We must resist the temptation to understand the 
complex impression of the self as an unchanging and sharply shaped 
impression. Such an understanding is inappropriate since it does not 
accommodate Hume’s fundamental understanding of the self as a bundle of 
perceptions, an understanding he never denies or rejects throughout the 
Treatise. Pal ARDAL gives a very good description of the problem and exhibits 
much insight when he writes: „What entitles me to say that I am the same 
person now as I was a short while ago? It is in this connection that he denies 
any impression of a self remaining uniformly identical and underlying our various 
interrupted and changing experiences. The fact that we remain the same person 
throughout a lifetime cannot be derived from an impression of a self, for there is 
no such impression that remains numerically and qualitatively the same during a 
person’s lifetime. But Hume does not deny that we can, at any time, identify a
204 ibid., p.317.
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complex set of impressions which constitutes what we call our self at that 
particular time."205 There will always be a set of impressions and ideas (which 
themselves can give rise to reflective impressions) which I know to be mine. In 
the same way as I do not need any criteria whatsoever to identify a memory I 
have as my memory, I do not need criteria to identify an impression (or an idea) 
I have as my impression (or idea).
We have perceptions - impressions and ideas - at all times of 
consciousness. We do not only have one single perception, but an entire set of 
them, such as: impressions of breathing and other bodily functions, writing an 
essay, hitting the keyboard, seeing the keyboard and the monitor, seeing other 
surrounding objects, the impression that it is daytime and Tuesday, that a 
tobacco scent is in the air, that I am moving, have my legs crossed, and so on. I 
have also, of course, all the resembling ideas concerning these impressions and 
many, many more, like ideas of reflection, for instance. I do not only have all 
these perceptions at this particular moment: these perceptions open the door to 
the past and to the future. The keys to be turned are causality, contiguity and 
resemblance. Having my legs crossed now makes it inevitable to uncross them 
later on, that is, in the future. The smell of tobacco is caused by my smoking a 
cigarette earlier on, that is in the past. Every thought I have has risen from 
previous thoughts and will give rise to new ones. If I look at the particular bundle 
of perceptions I am, I find that there is always something I can call my self, 
provided that I am conscious of the perceptions. The contents of sense 
perceptions are usually taken to be representative206 , but not all perceptual 
contents are representative. Passions and desires have content which can be 
taken to be representative, but they also have intentional content. „A number of 
our desires and passions are non-representative and belong to ourselves. They 
form part of what we refer to as our person, as distinct from what is not our 
person. Our impressions of sense, of course, also belong to ourselves; but we
205 ARDAL, P. ibid., p.44.
206 It does not matter whether they really are representative of something external to us or not. I f  we regard 
perception as an act we may well say that the act represents its object. However, the representation does not 
have to resemble the thing represented.
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do take them to represent an external reality, although it may be impossible to 
find arguments that would justify our belief in the independent and uninterrupted 
existence of an external world if this belief were called in question. Yet we have 
this belief, and thus must in fact have a conception of ourselves as opposed to 
what is not to be counted as part of our person. All that Hume needs in his 
account of sympathy is that at any particular time, when we are conscious, there 
should be a complex impression we can identify as the impression of our own 
person. This impression need not remain unchanging, although at all times 
during our conscious existence there is something we can call ‘self, or that 
individual person, of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately 
conscious’ (THN II, 13/286).“207 Although ARDAL’s statement is very helpful 
towards an understanding of Hume’s account, it has to be taken with some 
caution due to the framework of my initial definitions of self and personhood. 
ARDAL seems to use the two concepts synonymously, whereas I use 
personhood to refer to the social aspect of an individual, self to refer to the 
private aspect. Although there is a strong connection and interdependency 
between these two aspects of the individual we must understand that ARDAL’s 
statement is more in line with my definition of the aspect of the self than with my 
definition of personhood.
It is possible to compare the complex impression of the self to another 
complex impression Hume refers to: that of Paris. The impression is complex 
because it is made up of many particulars and their relations to one another. 
There are streets, houses - they are arranged to one another in a certain way as 
well as having a certain look - there are people, landmark buildings, shops, 
traffic, restaurants, the general atmosphere of the city. No city is ever 
unchanging. It is not only that people and vehicles are moving about, there is 
building going on as well. The city changes its face every day. There are 
changes in architecture and infrastructure, as well as there are changes in the 
weather, influencing the impression of the city. At one time the city is a 
monstrosity, dark, dirty and loud. The next day it is a sunny, entertaining place
207 ARDAL, P. ibid., p.45.
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full of business and enterprise, quite a lovely locality to be in. A city is a 
complexity and one perceives this complexity by its particulars but also, and 
most importantly, as a whole. It is quite easy for an experienced traveler to 
distinguish one big city from another without having seen the landmarks. Prague 
feels entirely different from London, Paris is different from Berlin. Paris will 
always be Paris despite the fact that the city is constantly changing. The 
impression of Paris is one which contains change and changeability.
The complex impression of the self can also be said to be an impression 
containing change and changeability. The changes are the changing 
perceptions staged on the theatre of the mind. These constantly changing 
perceptions are connected to one another by the principles of association: 
resemblance, causality and contiguity; in the case of impressions by 
resemblance alone. By these principles the sameness of the chain of 
perceptions can be traced backwards in time as well as it succeeds forwards 
into the future by every new perception. This „tracing back“ emphasizes the 
epistemological aspect of identification and re-identification, but it must also be 
understood that the said principles of association are ontologically important. 
They contribute to the constitution of the chain, or the bundle, of perceptions.
Another such contributing factor, epistemologically as well as ontologically, 
is memory. Memory is a faculty. Particular memories are actual mental events. 
Although memory is not a principle like the principles association, it is not 
independent of them. The actual memory perceptions are connected to one 
another by the principles of association as well as memory perceptions 
themselves come about through the workings of these principles. When I walk 
through my home town and the air smells of the fragrances emitted by the 
coffee factory, I am immediately reminded of my childhood, when I walked by 
the coffee factory every day, making my way into the kindergarten. This memory 
never fails to attend me when this particular smell is in the air. It is brought 
about by the resemblance between the present and past perceptions and the 
contiguity of the impression of smell and the perception of going to the 
kindergarten. The single memory perceptions, i.e. the actual memories, are
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connected to each other in a similar way. We have all experienced the 
phenomenon that once we draw our attention to memories we have, they bring 
about new ones we did not remember initially.
Memory is an epistemological as well as an ontological criterion of 
identity.208 Memory is an epistemological criterion in so far as it is the case that 
when I have memories of certain times and places then I know that I must have 
existed then and there. This is an understanding of memory which is shared by 
Hume himself.209 Memory takes part in constituting the chain of perceptions in 
its sameness (ontological aspect). Without memory we could not track the chain 
back into the past but would be restricted to the present alone. Without memory 
we would not even have a concept of the past, therefore we would not have a 
concept of ourselves. We must understand that even if the perceptions would, 
in fact, be linked together in a chain but this fact were not known by us, then it 
could not make sense to talk about a self. For Hume a self to be existent 
requires that one is aware of it.210 „As memory alone acquaints us with the 
continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, ‘tis to be consider’d, 
upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no 
memory, we never shou’d have any notion of causation, nor consequently of 
that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person."211
Memory does not only constitute identity in Hume’s account, it also 
discovers it. This is not a paradox. By saying that memory also discovers the 
self Hume refers to the epistemological aspect as if it could be separated from 
the ontological one. However, it cannot be separated, firstly because of Hume’s 
own theory of perception; secondly because the self is, ontologically, an internal 
impression. Hume’s account here is far from being inconsistent or paradoxical. 
Once the knowledge that one is a self is acquired (i.e. once one is a self), it is 
possible to go beyond one’s actual, that is recallable, memories. „But having 
once acquir’d this notion of causation from the memory, we can extend the
208 Note that it is not a criterion in the sense that I have to determine whether certain memories are mine or
someone else’s.
209 compare T.I,IV,VI,262.
210 In that sense ontology and epistemology are one.
2,1 T .I,IV ,V I,261-262.
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same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our persons beyond our 
memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we 
have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed."212
Hume’s account of sympathy, however, entails another problem in respect 
to third person identity statements about different selves. Firstly, if the 
observer’s idea of the observed’s impression shall be enhanced into a proper 
impression, then it must be possible for the observer to distinguish between his 
own impression and the impression of the observed. Secondly, it is also 
required that a third person can distinguish between these two impressions. 
Otherwise Hume could not have given his account of sympathy in the first place.
It has been said on several occasions that I don’t need a criterion to identify 
my perceptions to be mine. I can perceive in someone else the external effects 
of sadness and hence can form the idea that the person in question is sad. 
However, to have perceptions of someone else’s sadness does not mean that I 
am sad myself. In most of the cases it is quite obvious that I am not sad. The 
very fact that I am not sad myself can, by itself, cause emotional responses 
such as guilt, uneasiness or helplessness. Even when through sympathy the 
idea of sadness becomes enhanced into the feeling of sadness itself in the 
observer, it is quite obvious that the observer didn’t have to be necessarily sad 
himself when acquiring the idea of someone else’s sadness. It is evident that 
the acquisition of the idea is prior in time to the enlivening of this idea. We also 
don’t think that the observer is experiencing the same sadness as the observed. 
Firstly, the sadnesses have arisen from different causes. The cause of the 
sadness of the observer has other conditions than the sadness of the observed. 
Putting it in a slightly simplified way, we can say that the sadness of the 
observer requires additional conditions. These additional conditions are a) the 
presence of the observed and his sadness; b) the working of sympathy which in 
itself requires that the observer has a self; c) that the observer must have had a 
previous experience of sadness (as his own sadness) himself.
212 ibid., p.262.
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To a): That an observer A should feel sad because of someone else’s 
sadness requires clearly that someone else is present and that he and the 
external effects of his sadness can be observed by the observer. There are 
many possible cases imaginable and it is not always necessary that an 
observed B has to be present in person. We can hear or read stories about sad 
characters and start to feel sad ourselves. It is a well known phenomenon that 
people do cry about films or books. There are several ways to explain these 
phenomena in respect to the presence of the observed person, or character. 
One of them is to say that our imagination makes us forget that the characters 
in question are long dead, fiction, or not known to us personally. It suffices here 
to point out that it is a condition for the bringing about of sadness by sympathy 
that there must be something present which is observable and which is sad. 
The present treatment of the problem of identity in respect to a distinction 
between B’s and As  sadness as As  produced by sympathy disregards all 
instances where As  sadness is genuinely As  own. Cases where A is sad 
because his mother died or his dog was run over by a car do not apply to the 
framework of the problem I just have given. Regarding these cases A is not sad 
because of B’s sadness. A is sad because of events happening to A. Thus the 
problem that A has to distinguish his sadness from B’s sadness does not occur. 
B’s sadness is not related to As  by sympathy. I also disregard cases where 
events happening to B remind A of similar events happening to A or where B’s 
sadness reminds A of As own sadness. Cases like this do not belong to 
Hume’s account of sympathy, which is very unlike the account Adam SMITH 
gives and which would contain such cases.213 Hume’s understanding of 
sympathy does not entail the ‘putting oneself in another’s shoes’. „There is no 
suggestion that in sympathizing one imaginatively puts oneself into the other 
person’s place, which is characteristic of Adam Smith’s account."214
Thus, as a first conclusion we can say that if the observer’s sadness is to be 
induced by sympathy then the presence of some other being which is sad and 
whose sadness is observable, is required.
213 SMITH, A. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis 1984, TMS.I,I,I,3, p. 10.
214 ARDAL, P. ibid., p.45.
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To b): It is clear that for sympathy to operate there not only has to be 
someone who is sad originally, but that there has to be also someone who 
observes that feeling in the other and sympathizes with him. The former is the 
observed and the latter the observer. The mechanisms of sympathy necessitate 
the presence of an impression of the self „in“ the observer. Only so can the idea 
of someone else’s sadness (or of any passion) be enlivened into a real feeling 
or passion felt by the observer. There is no necessity of the presence of an 
observer if I want, to put it crudely, to be alone in my misery. Anyone can still 
feel sad or joyous without anybody witnessing it. Sympathy is the sympathy of 
the observer and is not the sympathy of the observed.215 It is, however, 
necessary for the observer to be a self.
To c): It is also a necessary condition that the observer has previously 
experienced the feeling or passion from an idea of which an impression is to be 
produced. It is impossible, in Humean terms, to have a corresponding idea of a 
simple impression one has never had. Passions are simple impressions. It 
follows that if I was never sad myself I can never have a proper idea of 
someone else’s sadness. „But common to Smith and Hume is the view that one 
can sympathize only with experiences that one has had oneself. One cannot, on 
Hume’s account, form the idea of another person’s emotion unless one has had 
the corresponding impression. This follows from the claim that the passions are 
simple impressions and that all simple ideas are copies of simple 
impressions."216 We must understand that sympathizing with someone else is 
more than just having a belief about the other’s state of mind. I can believe in a 
classificatory way that someone is sad because I have learned to read the 
effects of sadness and I can name the emotion they seem to feel. However, I 
cannot have a proper idea of this person’s sadness if I don’t know what 
sadness is in the first place. If I do not have an idea of sadness at all there is 
nothing which could be enhanced in its liveliness until it becomes the passion or 
the emotion itself.
215 Though, of course, the originally observed person can sympathize back with the original observer. Then the 
roles are reversed and the original observer has become the observed and vice versa.
216 ARDAL, P. ibid., p.45.
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These three conditions don’t apply if only one unobserved person is 
concerned. They are additional conditions in respect to a passion produced by 
the principle of sympathy in an observer. Thus we can say that we have gained 
at least one criterion to distinguish the observer’s sadness from the sadness of 
the observed where third person statements are concerned. Concerning the 
observer’s sadness additional conditions have to be fulfilled. The cause of 
sadness is different in both cases. This applies generally to all emotions, 
passions and opinions in so far as they are transferred by sympathy.
1. event (external or internal) —> 2. B’s impression —> 3. As idea of B’s 
impression —> 4. As corresponding impression
(1) and (2) can occur on their own and do not require (3) and (4). (3) and (4) 
cannot occur unless (1) and (2) are occurring. The cause of B’s impression is 
(1). The causes of As impression are (1) and (2) as indirect causes, (3) as a 
direct cause (together with the impression of the self). (2) is a necessary 
condition of (3). (3) is a necessary condition of (4). The causes of As 
impression are indirectly causes of B’s impression. The former require additional 
conditions. The difference between As and B’s impression is not only 
ontological but is also epistemological. The observer has access to the 
information that he doesn’t feel sad, for example, because his grandmother 
died. It is evident that the observer is aware of the fact that it wasn’t his 
grandmother who died. He does feel sad because the other person he is 
observing, and has a close relation to, is sad.
However, there are cases where the causes of the impression of different 
individuals are the same: C is sad because of X. At the same time, D is sad 
because of X  too. How then can (7s perception be distinguished from D’s 
perception, and consequently: how can C be distinguished from D if both are, 
respectively, the bundles of their perceptions? If the latter is taken in a strict
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sense then it seems to follow that if C and D have the same perceptions, then C 
and D are identical.217
First of all, C is sad (or has any other passion or opinion for that matter) 
because of X. D is also sad because of X, but not because C is sad. Here are 
no given grounds for sympathy to be the principle concerned with /7s sadness. 
„lt is obvious that ‘sympathy’ is, for Hume, a technical term referring to a special 
psychological principle. The criteria for its use seem to be (a) that a person has 
the same feeling or opinion as x, and (b) that this feeling or opinion has come to 
be that person’s feeling or opinion in a certain way, namely through the special 
enlivening of an idea into an impression through the influence of the impression 
of the self. This condition is absolutely necessary, for the bare fact that I and a 
farm worker in China both feel angry in no way indicates that sympathy is 
involved."218 It follows that if the initial problem was a problem of identity of the 
self in connection to the mechanisms of sympathy, entailing the problem of 
criteria distinguishing between Cs and /7s perception, then we can say that as 
soon as sympathy is no longer involved in the production of /7s perceptions the 
initial problem no longer occurs. The identity problems which do occur must be 
classed as the same kind of problems we were discussing in the previous 
chapter, and thus can be treated the same way.
However, if all the perceptions of two different people are supposed to be 
undistinguishably alike (this likeness following from the sameness of their 
causes) then the problem remains that the two bundles, consisting of these two 
identical sets of perceptions, seem to be alike too, not to say that they seem to 
be identical. It could then be argued that they cannot be identical because one 
set of perceptions belongs to A and the other to B, but this doesn’t answer the 
question what it is that makes As perceptions A s and Bs perceptions B’s, 
which has been the crucial question at this point.
217 That is, if we set up the problem here in the way that C’s and D's perceptions don’t only have the same 
cause at that particular time, but that the perceptions seem to be exactly the same at all times, this includes 
own body perceptions.
218 ARDAL. P. ibid., p.46.
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The Circularity of the Bundle Definition
In the light of this problem and in respect to the problem of circularity posed by 
Hume’s definition of the self as a bundle of perceptions I wish to argue that the 
view holding the circularity to be vicious stems from a misconception of the 
relationship between the perceptions making up the bundle/self. The vicious 
circle occurs if we understand the self as the thing which perceives in the first 
place. This is very much REID’s understanding of the self when he says: „My 
personal identity, therefore, implies the continued existence of that indivisible 
thing which I call myself. Whatever this self may be, it is something which thinks, 
and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I am not thought, I am not 
action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers. My 
thoughts, and actions, and feelings, change every moment; they have no 
continued, but a successive, existence; but the self, or I, to which they belong, is 
permanent, and has the same relation to all the succeeding thoughts, actions, 
and feelings which I call mine."219 A vicious circularity only occurs if we adopt, 
knowingly or unknowingly, REID’s understanding that the self has to be prior to 
all the perceptions. If the self is then defined as being the perceptions, it seems
as if this definition suggests that the perceptions have to be prior to the self,
220which cannot be.
However, Hume is not saying that the self has the perceptions. He is not 
saying that the self is a perceiving, thinking, acting thing. What he is saying is 
that the self is the total of the perceptions, that it is the perceptions. By 
understanding the perceptions as constitutive elements of the self he renders 
REID’s understanding of the self inappropriate. The viciousness of the circularity 
rests with the claim that the self is both: constituted (at least partly) by the 
perceptions themselves and carrier of the perceptions, being the „perceiving 
thing". Hume, however, proposes the self to be the former, but not the latter. He 
does not make two irreconcilable claims. The opposite is the case, he gives an 
account of the self as the bundle of perceptions and denies that it is anything
2'9 REID, T. Of Identity, in: PERRY, J. (ed.) ibid., p. 109.
220 I am discussing only this particular circularity here. The problem of necessary ownership of perceptions is 
discussed in the chapter on the principle of unity of perceptions.
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else. „The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively 
make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite 
variety of postures and situations. [...] The comparison of the theatre must not 
mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the 
mind;“221 Thus, the problem REID wishes to address is not a problem Hume’s 
account has to suffer. REID’s criticism is certainly a serious one once it is shown 
that it is necessary for the self to be the carrier of the perceptions. However, this 
is a metaphysical claim Hume clearly wants to deny. It therefore cannot be 
tacitly assumed by REID, or any other critic, that it is unquestionably true that 
the self is the „perceiving thing".
Understanding the self as a complex impression is entirely compatible with 
understanding it as emerging from perceptions. Basic simple impressions alone 
are not sufficient; though necessary, for the existence of a self. They help 
towards the emergence of a self by providing a stock of material for some of the 
complex impressions and for simple and complex ideas. Since the complex 
impression of the self involves the principles of association of perceptions it 
certainly belongs to the kind of complex impressions which needs to be 
provided for by simple impressions. I think that Hume’s account of the self has 
to be interpreted in these terms: simple impressions are necessary, but are 
insufficient on their own. The self is not independent of the perceptions, which 
include the impressions as well as the ideas. It consists of perceptions but 
cannot be set identical with any single one of them. The self is not any single 
simple perception but the complex total, the chain or the bundle of all 
perceptions. In this sense it is emerging and progressive, both as a complex 
impression and as an idea.
When comparing the self of Book One and Two we cannot find a denial of 
the bundle definition of the first book by Book Two. What we find is a possible 
answer to the desparate questions of the solitary self in Book One. Book One’s 
self has been solitary because it has been seen in isolation from the social 
aspect of the individual, personhood, which is explored in Book Two. The public
221 T.I,IV,VI,253.
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aspect and the aspect of the self are interrelated and interdependent. Both have 
to be linked and have to be seen in their relation, not in separation from one 
another. The main topic of Book Two is the passions, which unite and manifest 
this union between the two aspects of the individual in an exemplary manner. 
Passions and sympathy connect individual with individual. The external signs of 
a passion experienced are obervable, but the full impact, the qualitative content 
of the passion is only accessible and liveable by the individual who’s passion it 
is.
The despair of Book One results from the isolation of reason from the 
passions, creating a self isolated from its fellow beings. Hume attempted to 
show in Book One how far reason alone can reach. Although the passions do 
not play a part in the investigations of Book One, it cannot be taken as a denial 
of the existence of passions and of the working principle of sympathy. It has to 
be taken'as an investigation of the „powers“ and possibilities of reason as a 
world creating „force“ when seen in isolation from perceptions like passions and 
emotions. These perceptions have an essential part in human nature, both in an 
ontological as well as in an epistemological sense. We need passions and 
emotions to be human, they are essential to us as human beings, and human 
nature is Hume’s explicit subject of study. They are also essential to find out 
about ourselves and others, the latter is necessary for the former. ANNETTE 
BAIER puts it quite clearly when she writes: „The „real connexion*4 that Book 
One and the „Appendix“ despaired of finding is not to be found by fragmenting a 
person-history into separate perceptions, out of physical or social space, but by 
seeing persons as other persons see them, as living (really connected) bodies, 
with real biological connections to other persons, in a common social space, 
depending on them for much of our knowledge, depending on them for the 
sustaining of our pleasures and for comfort in our pain, depending on them also 
for what independence and autonomy we come to acquire."222
The bundle definition is never denied throughout Book Two, nor is it, as we 
have seen, the cause of inconsistencies or contradictions between the first two
222 BAIER, A. ibid., p.141.
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books of the Treatise. Hume, instead, builds his new investigations of Book Two 
on the foundation he has laid with his definition of the self in Book One. When 
we look at the principles of relation and association as they are presented in 
Book One, for instance, we will find that the origins of these are found in the real 
ties, the real relations of real human beings which are the subject of Book Two. 
Hume sees the blood ties of parenthood as the strongest ties and the strongest 
relation the human mind is capable of perceiving223. He allows for special 
conditions when it comes to love between relations. Here is no need for any 
agreeable qualities in the loved one. The simple fact that a child is the child of 
parents is cause enough to be loved by them. Hume explores at lengths the 
variety of relations occurring in marriages and re-marriages and the passions 
which occur between the child and its (step)mother and (step)father, 
emphasizing the importance of family in respect to one’s passions and to one’s
224perceptions in general
Describing occurring transitions and the ease of the associations we make, 
Hume pays much attention to real people and their real relationships. Family 
ties, as the most important ones, are taken into special consideration. They are 
so important because any other kind of relationship must be compared in its 
strength to the ties of parenthood as the original and strongest conceivable 
relation, not only practically, but also theoretically. The parent-child relation 
contains all three principles of association of ideas: causation, resemblance and 
contiguity. Parents are the causes of their children, as well as they are causes 
of their parents as parents. They tie the family bands backwards in time just as 
they tie them in width by being brothers and sisters to their siblings by the same 
ancestry. It is also common knowledge, and it has been in Hume’s time as well, 
that children resemble their parents, or at least someone in the family, physically 
and even in character. Children are also perceived in conjunction to their 
parents, even if the parents do not exist anymore. The association to the 
parents is always made. The natural relations of family, and especially of parent 
and child, is the origin of the philosophical relations. ANNETTE BAIER writes,
223 compare T .II.IU V ,352 .
224 compare ibid.. p.355.
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after an extended investigation: „But for Hume, I am suggesting, all other 
relations are „cousins-german“ of „the relation of blood", aspects of it, variants of 
such aspects, or abstract descendants of them. The three Humean ..natural 
relations" come together in it, and his philosophical relations are ..remarkable 
effects" of the natural relations at work in our thought."225
It is also apparent that there is a strong presence of the real body in Book 
Two of the Treatise. The book’s contents - the passions and sympathy - are 
unthinkable without the presence of human beings other than oneself. These 
human beings are understood by Hume as made from flesh and blood. Their 
bodies exhibit the effects of the internal impressions as well as they possess 
..external qualities" like beauty and elegance, perceivable by us. If this is the 
understanding of the body in Book Two then it is incompatible with the 
„bodyless“ mind supposed to be the topic of Book One. However, the 
interpretation of the first book in the terms of the latter is mistaken. Book One 
and Two give a different account of the body, but they do not exclude each 
other. Book One does not deny Book Two’s underlying assumptions, since the 
discussion in the first book is ontologically incomplete by concentrating on 
reason alone. There is no incompatibility to be noted once one accepts that the 
mind is not deprived of a body (or bodies) ontologically in Book One of the 
Treatise. It will later be argued that Hume writes as a Basic realist throughout 
the Treatise. This Basic Realism should provide the necessary framework for 
the interpretation of Hume’s identity theory as a combined theory. My claim that 
Books One’s and Two’s accounts of the body are compatible and that both can 
accommodate the combined theory of identity, requires that Hume’s remark in 
respect to the existence of the body in the first book is taken seriously. It must 
not be dismissed as a somehow cheap escape route away from the disastrous 
scepticism of Part IV, nor as a statement which is completely out of the spirit 
Book One exhibits.
For now we can at least accept the bundle definition. Perceptions of body 
are a natural part of the bundle. It has no important bearing upon the plausibility
225 BAIER, A. ibid., p.48.
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of the definition itself whether or not the perceptions are ontologically realistic. 
However, acceptance of the definition naturally gives rise to the question what it 
is that unites the different perceptions into one bundle.
167
3. The Principle of Unity of Perceptions
V. Interpreting the Appendix 
V.l. The Problem
The problem of the principle of unity of the perceptions is of fundamental 
importance for the bundle definition of the self. The plausibility of the definition 
depends upon the success in accounting for a principle which unites all the 
different single perceptions into one bundle. To find such a principle of unity is 
also necessary for the account of personhood I have given in reference to 
Hume’s theory. Personhood and self are interrelated and interdependent. A 
collapse of the account of the self must lead to a collapse of the account of 
personhood also.
One major and very common criticism of Hume’s theory concerning the self 
as a bundle of perceptions is fuelled by the apparent absence of such a 
principle. Hume recognizes the problem and is clearly worried by it: „But all my 
hopes226 vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive 
perceptions in our thought and consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, 
which gives me satisfaction on this head."227 However, we have to notice that 
his statement is not final in admitting a definitely unresolvable problem and an 
inconsistency lethal to his entire theory. Hume acknowledges the antinomy we 
are left with but preserves the possibility to overcome it. „ln short there are two 
principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce 
either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and 
that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. 
Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the 
mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou’d be no difficulty in 
the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that
226 of accounting for personal identity, T.L.
227 T.App.,635-636.
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this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to
228pronounce it absolutely insuperable.“
Considering Hume’s statement it is perhaps not entirely vain to look for a 
possible principle of unity of perceptions, especially not, when the investigation 
focuses on the ontological aspects. As I have argued before, there is a 
preconception that in regard to Hume’s philosophy ontology and epistemology 
should coincide. However, we have seen that this is not necessarily the case. 
We need to consider Hume’s account of externality and have to take seriously 
his belief that the existence of the body has to be taken for granted. We must 
not make the mistake of dismissing it as a whim and a concession which had to 
be made following an attack of common sense. There are indications elsewhere 
in Hume’s work which suggest that the existence of externality (including one’s 
own body) is not denied as an ontological claim. He writes in his essay on taste: 
„The great resemblance between mental and bodily taste will easily teach us to 
apply this story. Though it be certain, that beauty and deformity, more than 
sweet and bitter, are not qualities in the objects, but belong entirely to the 
sentiment, internal or external; it must be allowed, that there are certain qualities
2 29in objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings.“ 
Although this passage, if taken on its own, can be interpreted in the following 
way: object means nothing but the object as it appears in the mind, it does not 
refer to an object out there; a thorough interpretation has to take the context of 
the remark into account. If it really were the case that a quality, producing the 
sentiment of sweetness, were in the object present only in the mind, then the 
mind must have given the object that quality in the first place. Hence the quality 
wouldn’t have to produce the sentiment in (the same!) mind.
There are other statements earlier in the essay which suggest that Hume 
takes here the existence of external objects for granted. Such as: „But all 
determinations of the understanding are not right; because they have a 
reference to something beyond themselves, to wit, real matter of fact [...] Among
228 ibid., p.636.
229 SOT., p.235.
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a thousand different opinions which different men may entertain of the same 
subject, there is one, and but one, that is just and true; and the only difficulty is 
to fix and ascertain it.“230, and: „Because no sentiment represents what is really 
in the object. It only marks a certain conformity or relation between the object 
and the organs or faculties of the mind; and if that conformity did not really exist, 
the sentiment could never possibly have being."231
It is perhaps possible to say, keeping both of Hume’s doctrines alive and 
concentrating on the ontological side of the principle of unity, which is 
doubtlessly required though difficult to obtain, that we have to treat and to 
understand a principle of unity similarly as we have treated and understood 
causation and externality. This will, hopefully, provide us with a possibility to 
reconcile the two doctrines in question. With Hume we can hold the belief that 
our ideas, however fictitious, correspond to something which is really there. It is 
our nature which allows us only certain ways to obtain ideas (and the obtaining 
by imagination is one of those ways). But it is also human nature which is in 
accordance, because it is part of it, with the bigger nature of things. ANNETTE 
BAIER writes, when discussing the fictitiousness of the self: „ln calling these 
assumptions ‘fictions’, Hume is saying not that they are false, but rather that 
they are unverifiable."232 Since we cannot perceive the objects of our 
perceptions we do not know, by reason or these perceptions themselves, 
whether they are there mind-independently. If there are any objects existing 
mind-independently, we certainly cannot know whether our perceptions 
correspond to them or not233. Verification of any beliefs we hold about the mind- 
independent existence of objects is not possible. There is, nevertheless, the 
conviction that, firstly, there really is something out there and secondly, that the 
principles we are unable to perceive are themselves, or something similar to 
them, really there too.234 This conviction, quite clearly, speaks out of the
230 ibid., p.230.
231 ibid.
232 BAIER, A. ibid., p. 103.
233 In this sense it is pretty clear how Hume was anticipating one of the main features of KANT’s 
Transcendental Philosophy.
234 G. STRAWSON argues that Hume is a Basic Realist in respect to causation.
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Treatise and the Essays. I find myself in agreement with BAIER when she says: 
„...order is projected from the contemplating mind back onto the contemplated 
world, and, since the mind is part of that world and sensitive to it, it is no 
accident that what it has to project ‘fits’ as well as it does the facts that stimulate 
the projection. How else could a thinking animal persist unless its thinking were 
adapted to the world it thinks about?"235 When we remember again the famous 
passage in Part IV of Book One we will realize that it is nature which persuades 
the sceptic to the existence of bodies: „Nature has not left this to his choice, and 
has doubtless esteem’d it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our 
uncertain reasonings and speculations."236
In the following I wish to investigate possible candidates to determine 
whether they are able to carry out the function of the principle of unity within the 
framework of Hume’s philosophy. However, before I start this discussion we 
need to consider alternative interpretations of Hume’s problem in the 
Appendix237
V.ll. The Impression of the Self
GARRETT writes, giving an over view of the different interpretations of Hume’s 
remarks on identity in the Appendix'. „Hume’s problem, Kemp Smith argues, is 
that Book II requires an awareness238 of personal identity that his own theory in 
Book I will not allow, and his second thoughts in the Appendix are, Kemp Smith 
infers, a belated recognition of this fact."239 It is certainly true that Hume refers, 
somehow unexpectedly, to the impression of the self in Book Two of the 
Treatise, however, it has been pointed out already that this does not imply a 
contradiction to his account in Book One. Hume never denies „that we have 
impressions of ourselves, in the sense required by Book II"240, he only denies
235 BAIER, A. ibid., p.93.
236 T.I,IV,II,187.
237 I will refer here to the interpretations presented by GARRETT, D. in: Cognition and Commitment in
Hume’s Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1997.
238 Impression of the self, T.L.
239 GARRETT, D., ibid., p. 167.
240 ibid., p. 168.
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the existence of a simple, unchanging and uninterrupted impression of the self 
which could give rise to the idea of a substantial self. The account of Book One 
does not deny the possibility of a perception of the self: „lt must be some one 
impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one 
impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos’d to 
have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression 
must continue invariably the same, thro’ the whole course of our lives; since self 
is suppos’d to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and 
invariable.1'241 If Hume means what he says here and let us suppose that he 
does, then he says, firstly, that the self is not, and cannot be, an impression 
which is capable of giving rise to a resembling idea242. He states, presenting his 
theory of perceptions, that the kind of impressions which give rise to resembling 
ideas are simple impressions. This, however, is not the only kind of impression 
there is. Complex impressions usually don’t give rise to perfectly resembling 
ideas243. This opens up the possibility for the self to be such a complex 
impression. I have argued that the impression of self Hume is referring to in 
Book Two of the Treatise is, by its nature, a complex impression.244
Secondly, with an understanding of the self as a complex impression arises 
the possibility to account for change. This should be very useful considering the 
Humean context of ever changing perceptions. It is important to keep in mind 
that a complex impression of the self must not be understood in the same way 
as we understand simple impressions (this seems to be the common mistake 
made by philosophers). The complex impression of the self is just as fleeting an 
existence as all other perceptions. It is not permanent, is not the one stable, 
ever lasting impression we have throughout our entire life. But, as Pal ARDAL 
points out and as I have argued myself, there is always some one (complex)
241 T.I,IV,VI,251.
242 The real idea Hume is referring to can be understood in two ways: as an idea resembling an impression and 
as a perfect idea. Perfect ideas are ideas which have a lesser degree of vivacity than the ideas of memory, 
(compare T.I,I,II,8.). However, I take it here as a resembling idea because of Hume’s reference to the 
inconstancy and variableness of the impression which makes it impossible to give rise to a constant and 
invariable idea.
243 compare T.I,I,I,2-3.
244 How this complex impression leads to an idea of the self I have discussed when talking about the passions, 
in particular about pride and humility and their connection to the self.
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impression we can refer to as our selves. To make myself perfectly clear I will 
make use of a model of explanation similar to the one used by QUINTON and 
GRICE. This model does not attempt a complete and conclusive explanation of 
how identity can be maintained. This will not be possible before a principle of 
unity, whatever this happens to be, is established.
I understand the complex impression of the self in the following way:
At time t1 I am a bundle of perceptions A of the total sum n. I have a complex 
impression of A and gain an idea of A with the help of the passions. I am able to 
have a complex impression of A in the first place because of the workings of the 
principles of association of perceptions.
At time tn I am a bundle of perceptions A ’ of the total sum n+1.
At time tn+11 am a bundle of perceptions An of the total sum n+(n+1).
A 'is  ontologically identical with A with the addition +1, only if all the perceptions 
which have been part of A are also part of A 'and if only the perceptions which 
have made up A are also making up A'apart from the perception added to the 
bundle AFTER t1. An with the addition n+1 is ontologically identical with A and 
all descendant stages of A245, only if all perceptions which have been part of A 
and its descendant stages are also part of An. And if only the perceptions which 
have made up A and all its descendant stages, apart from perceptions added to 
the set of perceptions after tn, also make up An. A and An are ontologically 
identical only if An is a descendent stage of A.
If my argument is accepted, we have established ontological identity. 
However, we still have to establish identity epistemologically. We would need to 
establish how I know that the complex impression of myself I perceive at the 
moment is identical, with the addition of the perceptions I perceived today, with 
the complex impression of myself I perceived yesterday. I believe that it is 
impossible to establish identity of the bundle in an epistemological sense 
because of Hume’s problem to account for memory. As mentioned earlier, 
SHOEMAKER has pointed out that I do not need any criterion whatsoever to
245 The bundle is in a new stage every time a new perception is added to it.
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determine whether a memory is mine or not, and, by the same token, do not 
need a criterion to determine whether I was the same person at person stage 1 
as I am now at person stage n+1 - but whether or no one needs criteria of this 
sort, one needs, in any case, memory. However, I don’t think it is necessary, at 
the moment, to deal with this particular problem. It will suffice to refer the matter 
again if a principle of unity of perceptions can be found.
V.lll. The Principle of Unity
The second alternative interpretation of the Appendix is very similar to my own 
interpretation of Hume’s statement, namely that Hume recognizes the difficulty 
to account for a principle (or principles) to unite the different perceptions into 
different, discrete, but in themselves united bundles. It becomes apparent that 
philosophers consider here mainly only resemblance and causation in reference 
to Hume’s remark: „The only question, therefore, which remains, is, by what 
relations this uninterrupted progress of our thought is produc’d, when we 
consider the successive existence of a mind or thinking person. And here ‘tis 
evident we must confine ourselves to resemblance and causation, and must 
drop contiguity, which has little or no influence in the present case."246
In my investigation I will consider causality on its own, but I will also look at 
the principles of association of ideas in their entirety, this includes contiguity, for 
the following reasons: Hume’s claim that contiguity is ..unnecessary and 
inapplicable as a principle of union for personal identity"247 is a claim concerning 
the successive perceptions. Contiguity as a principle is embedded in causation, 
and although it may be helpful to discuss the connection between contiguity and 
causation, we are not compelled here to treat contiguity as a principle in its own 
right. However, the matter is different when it comes to co-existent, i.e. not 
successive, perceptions. It seems to be the case that contiguity needs to be 
applied to these perceptions. Some have pointed out that since contiguity can 
be dismissed and since there are co-existent perceptions, these perceptions
246 T.I,IV,VI,260.
247 GARRETT, D., ibid., p. 178.
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cannot be united to one another. Hence, Hume faces a unresolvable 
problem.248 This easy criticism can be overcome. There is no obvious reason 
why one would have to dismiss contiguity generally, unless one wants to say 
that Hume believes co-existent perceptions to be entirely non-existent or 
unimportant. If so, then it would indeed be very odd that he declares contiguity 
to be one of the principles of association of ideas instead of treating it as some 
sort of subserviant mechanism towards the constant conjunction.
GARRETT argues: „Hume’s project in the Treatise l.iv.6 is precisely to 
explain the „wholeness“ of the mind without appealing to a local spatial 
conjunction of all of its perceptions, and to do so by utilizing instead the 
relations of resemblance and causation.1'249 In the present context250 we can 
reply that even if the argument were successful in respect to co-existent sense 
perceptions, it doesn’t seem to apply to co-existent ..internal" impressions. 
Internal impressions have no obvious local spatial conjunction in the sense it is 
here intended. It is perfectly possible that one is in love and is sad at the same 
time, for instance. Therefore, contiguity in respect to co-existent perceptions 
cannot be dismissed generally. Contiguity is not automatically disqualified as a 
contributing principle for the union of our perceptions.
V.IV. Ownership of Perceptions
A third alternative interpretation GARRETT presents goes back to PEARS and 
seems to stem from the second interpretation stated in b). The problem in the 
Appendix supposed to be recognized by Hume is that he cannot allow for the 
necessary ownership of perceptions. The problem is described „as a failure of 
these relations251 to do justice to the necessity of perceptions’ membership in 
the bundles of which they are members."252 This interpretation’s difficulty is that 
the problem of necessary ownership, at least as it is presented by GARRETT in
compare ibid., p. 172. 
ibid., p.178.
The argument needs to be re-considered when we discuss the body as the principle of unity. 
Causation and resemblance, T.L.
GARRETT, D., ibid., p. 173.
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reference to PEARS, is ambiguous. The necessity of ownership of the particular 
perceptions of a particular bundle can be seen in two different ways:
i. as necessity that these, and no other, perceptions belong to this bundle,
ii. as necessity that these perceptions belong to this, and to no other, bundle.
These two different ways of understanding necessary ownership are not 
necessarily related to one another, (i) is embedded into the problem of the 
principle of unity of perceptions. We only have to find a possible principle of 
unity which will satisfy (i). The matter is more complicated where (ii) is 
concerned. The complication arises when one assumes, as some have done, 
separate, distinct and independent existence of the perceptions themselves, 
„that perceptions can be conceived to exist, for parts of their duration, outside 
the mind in which they occur at other times"253. Hence, it is alleged to be 
possible that one and the same perception can be part of different bundles. 
Referring to qualia will not solve the problem because the term stands for the 
qualitative content of the perception. Having the „same perception" implies the 
„same“ qualitative content. If one wants to overcome the problem one has to go 
back to its roots: the debate concerning the separability of perceptions.
V.V. Separability of Perceptions
GARRETT interprets the contradiction Hume claims to have discovered as a 
contradiction between Hume’s account of the principles of connection of the 
perceptions and his inability to accept the consequences of such an account for 
the self. „Hume is not prepared to grant the existence of such connections. But 
he is also not prepared, if my interpretation is correct, to accept it as a logical 
consequence of the „true idea of the human mind" that whenever two perceivers 
have the same experience - whether impression of sensation, passion, or idea - 
at the same time, they are in fact sharing the numerically same perception."254 
The problem Hume supposedly has recognized in the Appendix is that „we
253 ibid., p. 174.
254 ibid., p. 183.
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could not successfully represent to ourselves the existence of qualitatively 
identical but numerically distinct perceptions existing in the minds of different 
individuals at the same time"255. According to GARRETT the problem is caused 
by a) the separability of the perceptions and b), following as a consequence 
from a), the insufficiency of causation and resemblance to account for the unity 
of all perceptions.
Considering the second point it seems to be the case that GARRETT 
implies that causation and resemblance are the only possible candidates for the 
principle of unity. Furthermore, their unsuccessfulness is not believed to stem 
primarily from the unexplained connection between co-existent perceptions in 
one mind, but from the fictitiousness of these relations. This part of the 
argument looses its force once we have established Hume’s Basic Realism. It 
will be sufficient to maintain Basic Realism in respect to the existence of body, if 
the body can be established as the principle of unity of perceptions. However, if 
Basic Realism can be maintained to apply to causation256 then GARRETT’s 
account here would be refuted in its entirety257.
A reply to the first point is less straightforward. Our investigation must start 
with an interpretation of the texts from which the separability claim is mainly 
derived. Hume writes: „Now as every perception is distinguishable from another, 
and may be consider’d as separately existent; it evidently follows, that there is 
no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind; that is, in 
breaking off all its relations, with that connected mass of perceptions, which 
constitute a thinking being."258 Hume also argues, when discussing the notion of 
substance: „that since all our perceptions are different from each other, and 
from every thing else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and 
may be consider’d as separately existent, and may exist separately, and have 
no need of any thing else to support their existence."259 GARRETT proposes
255 ibid., p. 185.
256 As GALEN STRAWSON argues.
257 It seems to me that this can only be partially extended onto the separability argument, although it has an 
impact upon it. Real connection of perceptions does not imply exclusiveness.
258 T.I,IV,II,207.
259 T.I,IV,V,233.
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two connected claims supposed to stem from Hume’s account: 1. Hume 
accounts „for the belief that our perceptions can exist unperceived by us"260, 
and 2. „He allows that perceptions could exist outside any mind, and he would 
presumably allow that a perception could in principle be shared by more than 
one mind."261
I wish to argue that these claims cannot be derived from Hume’s statements 
in the Treatise. Firstly, it seems to me that the claim of existence of unperceived 
perceptions rests upon an assumption Hume does not allow for, namely that the 
mind is the „perceiving thing". It is clear that, for Hume, the mind is the 
perceptions. Even if we grant that there are perceptions which are not part of 
any bundle, it does not follow that they exist unperceived.262 If, however, 
GARRETT wants to say that a perception must not necessarily be perceived by 
me but is perceived by some other human being, then I cannot see how this is 
supposed to support the separability claim, especially not because GARRETT 
himself dismisses the problem of necessity of ownership of perceptions as of 
any concern to Hume.263
Secondly, Hume does not think that all perceptions exist by themselves, i.e. 
independently of other perceptions. This becomes clear when we consider the 
case of simple impressions and their resembling ideas. The idea of the taste of 
a pineapple requires the impression of the taste of a pineapple. If we look at the 
passions, which are simple impressions of reflection, we will find that they 
require other perceptions according to what Hume makes out to be a particular 
passion’s cause and object. Even if we deny the real connection, we will still 
have to face the fact that perceptions have to be attended by other perceptions 
if a passion is to be produced, be the production causal or otherwise.
Finally, GARRETT, agreeing with FOGELIN, writes: „Hume needs both the 
logical separability and the unity or connectedness of the mind’s perceptions"264.
260 GARRETT, D„ ibid., p. 179.
261 ibid., p. 183.
262 We could also ask the question if an unperceived perception would still qualify as a perception?
263 compare GARRETT, D„ ibid., p. 173-174.
264 ibid., p. 179.
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My own interpretation of Hume’s problem in the Appendix is not going to dispute 
this. Hume, I think, recognizes the difficulty to account for a uniting principle; but 
he does not believe that finding one is principally impossible - this, however, is 
what GARRETT seems to suggest. The separability, as GARRETT rightly states 
here, is a logical one; but his treatment of the problem makes it apparent that he 
treats separability as an ontological issue. Such treatment requires some more 
justification than Hume’s text can provide.
In accordance with my interpretation that the difficulty lies with a sufficient 
and reliable principle uniting all the perceptions I start my investigation with the 
discussion of causality.
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VI. The Candidates
Vl.l. Causality
Causality seems to be, in the context of Hume’s philosophy, the most natural 
candidate of all265. Causality plays a paramount role in his theory of human 
nature. For Hume reasoning rests upon the fundamentum of causation. 
Causation itself is built upon the grounds of experience. „AII reasonings 
concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and 
Effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our 
memory and senses. [...] If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature, 
we shall find that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect, and that 
this relation is either near or remote, direct or collateral."266
The relation of cause and effect which I have called here causality is not 
only important when it comes to reasoning about matters of fact, it is also 
important when it comes to the theatre of the mind itself and the way 
perceptions are linked to one another: „As to causation; we may observe, that 
the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different 
perceptions or different existences, which are link’d together by the relation of 
cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each 
other."267 ANNETTE BAIER writes, investigating the role of causality in respect 
to the connections between the perceptions making up the bundle: „The official 
story we are given in this section268 is that we discern causal relations between 
our earlier and later perceptions, as we remember them to have been, and we 
assume a causal relation between our memories of past perceptions and those 
perceptions as they originally occurred. So we discern a complex causal system 
in which vivacity is transmitted, beliefs are dependent on past experience, and 
many of the mental effects are „copies“ of their likely causes. This makes the 
republic analogy269 seem apt, since there, too, the later generations of citizens
265 1 use natural here in a very narrow sense, not in the sense as in human nature or in nature as a biological
term. It is used in reference to Hume’s philosophy and means natural in terms o f Hume’s thinking.
266 ECHU,I,IV,22, p.26-27.
267 T.I,IV,VI,261.
268 T .I,IV ,V I.
269 An analogy Hume uses to describe the self, compare T.I,IV,VI,261.
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depend upon earlier ones, show some resemblance to their ancestors and have 
the sort of complex interrelations to their contemporaries that our various 
coexistent perceptions have to one another."270
For causality to function as the principle of unity of perceptions in a 
satisfactory way it is required that it not only provides a link for the successive 
perceptions but also a link for simultaneous perceptions. We will find that the 
second requirement cannot be fulfilled since, according to Hume, the cause is 
prior to its effect. The first requirement - the link of successive perceptions - 
does not seem to be problematic at first sight, but we will see that problems do 
occur, mainly because of Hume’s theory of perception and because of the 
distinctions he makes in respect to the principles of association of the different 
types of perception.
a) successive impressions
We need to remember that it is entirely possible within the framework of Hume’s 
philosophy for the chain of successive perceptions to be traced back in time. 
However, in my previous discussion I was not only referring to causality as a 
principle of connection" of perceptions, but was also referring to resemblance 
and contiguity. I took them as a triad which, as a whole, makes past perceptions 
traceable. Successive perceptions are linked by at least one of these three 
principles. These principles, therefore, seem to provide the links of the chain of 
perceptions in an ontological as well as in an epistemological sense.
The matter is very different when we take causality in isolation from 
resemblance and contiguity; especially when we look at different types of 
perception, namely impressions and ideas, and their respective principles of 
association. We will find that causality as such a principle does apply to ideas, 
which are related by contiguity, causation and resemblance, but not to 
impressions of sensation which are related only by resemblance. The difficulty is 
serious because these impressions are not only not related by causation, but 
also not by contiguity. If they were, there would be a possibility to make a
270 BAIER, A. ibid., p. 126.
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transition from contiguity and resemblance to causation. This step cannot be 
taken because Hume only allows only for resemblance, which, without 
contiguity, is not sufficient to infer causation. Thus, if only ideas and impressions 
of reflection (via ideas) but not impressions of sensation are related by 
causation, it looks very much as if causality alone cannot be a theoretically 
satisfying principle of unity of the chain of all perceptions (successive or 
otherwise). It cannot account for the link between impressions of sensation 
which succeed each other. This is the first case which can be made against 
causality as the principle of unity.
Before I come to the discussion of the link between impressions and ideas I 
wish to investigate the matter of the link between impression and impression a 
bit further.
b) co-existent impressions
Co-existent impressions are simultaneous with one another. I think it is clear 
that there are impressions which are co-existent. It is not only the case that co­
existent impressions cannot be linked to one another by causation, but it is also 
conceivable that they are not linked by resemblance. Examples of such 
impressions can easily be found: I am standing on top of a mountain and it is 
quite chilly up there. I have the impression that it is cold. I start to freeze. I have 
the impression that I’m freezing. We tend to judge these two different 
impressions as being related to one another. But at the same time as I have the 
related impressions of coldness and freezing, I also have the impression of 
birds flying by. This is seemingly an impression unrelated to the two previous 
ones. That it is cold or that I am freezing have nothing to do with the fact that I 
am seeing birds, neither in a way of resemblance nor in a way of causation. 
Being cold and freezing does not cause me to see birds nor does seeing birds 
cause the impressions of coldness and freezing. It is also quite obvious that 
these impressions do not resemble each other. Seeing birds and freezing as 
sense impressions are attributed to different senses even.
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That co-existent perceptions cannot be linked to one another by causation 
becomes clear when we consider Humes understanding of the relation of cause 
and effect. „The second relation I shall observe as essential to causes and 
effects, is not so universally acknowledg’d, but is liable to some controversy. ‘Tis 
that of PRIORITY of time in the cause before the effect.“271 Hume accepts that 
causes have to be prior in time to their effects, this is apparent throughout his 
entire discussion of causation in the Treatise: Effects are produced by their 
causes, and when it comes to sensation, the „priority of the impressions is an 
equal proof, that our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of 
our impressions."272 Hume also argues that if causes and effects would be co­
existent, then there would be no succession of perceptions (or objects).273 Thus, 
causation cannot provide a link between co-existent impressions. Since there 
are co-existent perceptions, which are part of the bundle of perceptions, 
causation, on its own, cannot be the principle of unity of the bundle.
Hume himself thinks that causation and contiguity cannot be the principles 
of association of impressions. If simple impressions of sensation would cause 
each other a simple impression of sensation X  would cause the simple 
impression of sensation Y, Y would cause Z  and so on. There always would be 
only a certain chain of impressions without escape in the same order, when X  
occurs will follow and so will Z. The pattern of simple impressions of sensation 
would be very narrow indeed. This seems not to be in accordance with human 
experience. There are impressions we inevitably have, like, for instance, the 
impression of breathing. This impression would always have to give rise to the 
same other impression. This impression, in its turn, gives rise to always the 
same other one and so forth, as long as we live. However, the impression of 
breathing does not always give rise to the same impression. If impressions were 
indeed each other’s causes, the matter would even become more complicated 
considering not only ourselves but also others. Then the inevitability of 
causation would make it hard to allow for the variety of different experiences
271 T.I, III, I I ,75-76.
272 T.I,1,1,5.
273 compare T .I,III,II,76.
183
and behavioral patterns. „The same cause always produces the same effect, 
and the same effect never arises but from the same cause."274 We can easily 
deal with the objection that the rules by which to judge causes and effects 
contain another rule which, when applied to the impressions, can account for 
variety. Hume writes: „There is another principle, which hangs upon this, viz. 
that where several different objects produce the same effect, it must be by 
means of some quality, which we discover to be common amongst them."275 
This can be replied to by pointing out that the simple impressions cannot be 
broken down, by their nature, into different qualities. „Simple perceptions or 
impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation."276
Moving onto an ontological level, we can say that it is vital for Hume’s 
account of externality that impressions can be connected by resemblance only 
but not by causation. To understand my argument we have to bear in mind 
Hume’s aim to explain our perceptions and the operations of the mind as well as 
the origins of, amongst others, our idea of externality. He also needs to explain 
our belief in the existence of external objects, the existence of our own bodies 
etc. It is entirely unimportant, at the moment, whether all these things really exist 
or not. It is sufficient that we believe they do and, most importantly, that we have 
concepts of externality and external objects, including our own body. It would be 
impossible to account for these concepts and beliefs if simple impressions of 
sensation were linked to other simple impressions of sensation by causation. If 
it were the case that such an impression has its cause in another such 
impression it would be the case that having an impression l(z), I would have to 
ascribe this impression to its cause impression l(y). In the same manner I would 
have to ascribe i(y) to l(x), l(x) to l(w) and so on ad infinitum. Thus, I would 
never arrive at the belief that l(z) is caused by an external object Z. It follows 
that if causation were the principle of relation of impressions we would never 
have a concept of externality at all. Since it is obvious that we do have such a 
concept, however appropriate to reality it may be, causation cannot be the
274 T .I,III,X V , 173.
275 ibid., p. 174.
276 T.I,1,1,2.
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principle of relation of impressions of sensation277. Though we do not know, by 
reason, what exactly the ultimate causes of simple impressions of sensation 
are, we do know, by reason, that they cannot be other impressions. „As to those 
impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, 
perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and ‘twill always be impossible to 
decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are 
produc’d by the creative power of the mind, or are deriv’d from the author of our 
being."278
In conclusion we can say that the first case against causality as the principle 
of unity of perceptions is properly established. Causation cannot be the principle 
of relation of impressions of sensation. These impressions are perceptions. 
Therefore causation is not the principle uniting ALL perceptions, which it would 
have to be to serve as the principle we are searching for.
c) Causation between different types of perception
The next problem which has to interest us if we want to look at causality as a 
candidate for the principle of unity of perceptions is the problem of causality as 
a possible principle of connection between different types of perceptions. 
Hereby we have to take both directions of possible causation into account: from 
impressions to ideas and from ideas to impressions. Causality has to work both 
ways if it is supposed to be the connecting principle of these types of 
perception, since Hume believes that some impressions can be the result of 
ideas in one way or another. We will have to determine whether or not the way 
by which an idea is transformed into an impression is a purely causal one.
The matter is very straightforward when it comes to the direction from 
impressions to ideas. Hume says quite clearly at the very beginning of the 
Treatise, when introducing the concepts of simple impression and simple idea: 
„that any impressions either of the mind or body is constantly followed by an 
idea, which resembles it, and is only different in the degrees of force and
277 Simple impression of reflection, i.e. the passions, are related by causation. Impressions of reflection arise 
„either from the original impressions, or from their ideas“. (T.II,I,I,276.) In the case of the latter the direct 
cause of the impression is an idea, not an impression.
278 T .I,III,V ,84.
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liveliness. The constant conjunction of our resembling perceptions, is a 
convincing proof, that the one are the causes of the other; and this priority of the 
impressions is an equal proof, that our impressions are the causes of our ideas,
P7q
not our ideas of our impressions."
Thus, it is clear that Hume considers simple impressions to be the causes 
of their correspondent ideas, and not vice versa. The matter is slightly different 
when it comes to complex impressions, because they don’t necessarily have 
correspondent exactly resembling ideas, as I have pointed out earlier. However, 
the case for simple impressions is very straightforward and I accept Hume’s 
account here unreservedly280.
As I have already indicated, it is far more difficult to establish causation as a 
sufficient principle with respect to the connection from idea towards impression. 
First of all, an alteration from idea to impression is possible within the Humean 
philosophy. Such a process occurs in the workings of sympathy. The idea we 
have of someone else’s impression is enlivened, by the relation of the 
impression of our self, into a proper impression. This process, however, cannot 
be ascribed to causation, though causation has a role to play in it. The role of 
causation is limited to the preliminaries of the enlivening of an idea into an 
impression. It is limited to the acquisition of the idea and plays only a minor part, 
by far not a sufficient one, in the enlivening itself.
When we see another person is sad, we have, first of all, an impression of 
the effects of that person’s impression. Causation is certainly important in 
respect to the acquisition of the impression, very much in the same manner as it 
was suggested earlier in respect to the causes of impressions. The impression 
of the effects of someone else’s impression now causes a resembling idea in 
me. This is sufficient and proper causation. The idea so gained is enlivened by 
the workings of sympathy, and especially by the partaking of my own impression
280 It is possible to make a case against Hume’s account on the grounds that there is no reliable criterion to 
distinguish impressions from ideas in every instance. It is also not entirely clear, if impressions and ideas are 
supposed to be only quantitatively distinct. Here however, I don’t think such an investigation is necessary, 
since causation is, in any case, a difficult candidate with respect to the step from idea to impression. To show 
the difficulties of the latter will be sufficient to support a case against causality satisfactorily.
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of my self into an impression proper. Here we can already see that causation 
alone is not sufficient to provide for the enlivening since it is vital that there is an 
impression of the observer’s own self. Hume himself points out that for 
sympathy in its proper way relations other than causation are needed too. „For 
besides the relation of cause and effect, by which we are convinc’d of the reality 
of the passion, with which we sympathize; besides this, I say, we must be 
assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity, in order to feel the 
sympathy in its full perfection."281
However, it could be argued that Hume seems also to allow for causation 
alone being capable of providing for the enlivening of an idea into an 
impression: „And since these relations can entirely convert an idea into an 
impression, and convey the vivacity of the latter into the former, so perfectly as 
to lose nothing of it in the transition, we may easily conceive how the relation of 
cause and effect alone, may serve to strengthen and inliven an idea."282 I 
believe this can easily be replied to: Even if causation alone would be capable 
of enlivening an idea into an impression, it cannot do so without the impression 
of the self in the observer being present and felt. Thus, causation, taken on its 
own, is not sufficient for the purpose.
We must also pay attention to the fact that, firstly, the enlivening of an idea 
into an impression does not actually link an idea to an impression, but 
transforms an idea into an impression. The idea becomes an impression but 
doesn’t give rise to an impression nor is it linked to an impression as a „separate 
entity". Secondly, we have to remember that Hume’s entire account of the 
transition and the workings of sympathy does not rest on very firm grounds for 
he assumes an only quantitative distinction between impressions and ideas.283 
This assumption is not very well supported in the Treatise.
It is, nevertheless, worth mentioning that the Treatise appears to contain 
one exception from the rule that ideas cannot be prior to impressions. „There is
281 T.II,I,X I,320.
282 ibid.
283 A distinction by degrees of vivacity is a quantitative distinction.
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however one contradictory phaenomenon, which may prove, that ‘tis not 
absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent impressions."284 
Hume then goes on to explain his statement by referring to the example of 
colours and their different shades285. He claims that if one would be confronted 
with the entire scale of shades of a colour with one shade missing, then it would 
be possible for the observer to have an idea that a shade is missing. It may 
even be the case for the observer to have some kind of idea which particular 
shade is missing, altough the observer never had a simple impression of the 
missing shade. Hume himself does not think that this exception to the rule is 
particularly important or has to be taken into serious theoretical consideration. 
He seems to regard it rather as an oddity and concludes the Section by saying: 
„Now if we carefully examine these arguments, we shall find that they prove 
nothing but that ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions286, from 
which they are derived, and which they represent."287 However, exceptions to 
the rule do not weaken the case against causation. If causation shall serve as 
the connecting principle in respect to the direction from ideas to impressions, it 
must do so generally and not only occasionally.
So far we have dealt with simple impressions and impressions of the 
senses but there is another kind of impressions: impressions of reflexion. 
Jmpressions may be divided into two kinds, those of SENSATION and those of 
REFLEXION. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes. 
The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas, and that in the 
following order. An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us 
perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. 
Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the 
impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when 
it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion,
284 T.I,1,1,5.
285 The missing shade of blue argument doesn’t seem to illustrate the phenomenon how an idea of sensation is 
prior to its correspondent impression, it rather seems to illustrate the phenomenon how an idea of sensation 
can be produced without its correspondent impression having occurred prior to it.
286 Which are impressions, T.L.
287 T.I,1,1,7.
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hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because 
derived from it. These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and 
become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and 
ideas. So that the impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their 
correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and deriv’d from 
them."288
Considering this statement it will once more be necessary to look at the 
passions and emotions to find out whether or not a transition from an idea to an 
impression is possible by causation alone, without the additional help of other 
impressions or principles. Hume distinguishes the impressions of reflexion 
further into direct and indirect impressions. It must be noted that Hume, making 
this distinction, uses the terms impression and passion synonymously. In his 
understanding all passions are simple impressions though not all direct internal 
impressions, for instance, are passions. The will is a direct impression but Hume
o o q
does not understand the will to be a passion . „By direct passions I understand 
such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect 
such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other 
qualities."290 Direct passions are passions like desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, 
despair, and security. Since the direct passions (impressions) do not seem to 
need mediation to arise from their supposed antecedent ideas (this is what 
Hume’s earlier statement suggested to be the case), they seem to be the most 
interesting ones in the context of our investigation.
First of all, we need to understand what Hume means by direct passions 
arising immediately from good and evil, and from pleasure and pain. We also 
need to understand the mechanism of this process. Good and evil mean the
291same as pleasure and pain to Hume . Therefore we don’t need to treat them 
as different perceptions. It will be sufficient to take only the definitions of 
pleasure and pain into consideration. It is also important to know how pain and
288 T .I,I,II,7-8.
289 compare T.II,III,I,399.
290 T.II,I,I,276.
291 compare T .II,III,IX ,439.
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pleasure are defined, since different kinds of perception have different principles 
of association. - Hume defines pleasures and pains, clearly, as impressions: 
„...we may observe, that there are three different kinds of impressions convey’d 
by the senses. The first are those of the figure, bulk, motion and solidity of 
bodies. The second those of colours, tastes, smells, sounds, heat and cold. The 
third are the pains and pleasures,".292 If pains and pleasures are impressions of 
sensation and give rise to direct passions, then it seems that the mechanism by 
which the passions are produced cannot be one of causation but has to be one 
of resemblance. Impressions, so it seems, can only be linked to one another by 
resemblance but not by causation or contiguity. If this were undisputedly so then 
a problem for the case against causation would not occur and we could happily 
move on to the indirect passions.
Unfortunately, the matter is not straightforward at all. The impression of 
pleasure or pain produces the direct passion immediately without the 
..interposition of its idea"293. The question is whether the passion is produced by 
causation or resemblance. If we look at the direct passions we can see how 
both ways of explanations (one by resemblance and one by causation) are 
theoretically perfectly possible. Both of them, if my previous interpretation can 
be accepted, are able to maintain a distinction between direct and indirect 
passions. Although pleasure and pain are impressions of sensation and not 
impressions of reflection, Hume seems to think that the natural way of transition 
of impressions is one of resemblance. He writes, discussing the transition of 
ideas and the mechanisms of imagination: „As the transition of ideas is here 
made contrary to the natural propensity of the imagination, that faculty must be 
overpower’d by some stronger principle of another kind; and as there is nothing 
ever present to the mind but impressions and ideas, this principle must 
necessarily lie in the impressions. Now it has been observ’d, that impressions or 
passions are connected only by their resemblance, and that where any two 
passions place the mind in the same or in similar dispositions, it very naturally 
passes from the one to the other: As on the contrary, a repugnance in the
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dispositions produces a difficulty in the transition of the passions.*'294 For Hume 
to make such a statement in Book Two of the Treatise shows that he neither 
abandoned nor intended to contradict his understanding of the relation and 
association of impressions and its application to human psychology as it was set 
out in Book One.
Considering these arguments I believe that Hume, in respect to the direct 
passions, favors the transition from one impression to another as one only by 
resemblance. Direct must then be understood to mean that the passage is 
taken by resemblance only. However, if it should be the case that pleasure and 
pain produce the direct passions by causation, the consequences for the case 
against causation as the principle of unity of perceptions are not too grave. 
There are impressions which need to be linked to one another where causation 
cannot provide this necessary link.
When we look at the indirect passions the case against causality as a 
possible principle of unity of perceptions is very straightforward. Causality alone 
is not sufficient to serve as such a principle. Additional conditions are required, 
such as the impression of the self295 or the presence of some perceived quality 
in the mind. It could now be argued that this perceived quality is present in the 
mind as an idea and not as an impression. Therefore the condition of ideas 
causing impressions would remain unaltered. I think we can reply to a 
suggestion of this kind. An association of ideas can never produce an 
impression as Hume says quite clearly when he discusses the indirect passions 
of pride and humility: ,,’Tis evident, that the association of ideas operates in so 
silent and imperceptible a manner, that we are scarce sensible of it, and 
discover it more by its effects than by any immediate feeling or perception. It 
produces no emotion, and gives rise to no new impression of any kind, but only 
modifies those ideas, of which the mind was formerly possess’d, and which it 
cou’d recal upon occasion. From this reasoning, as well as from undoubted 
experience, we may conclude, that an association of ideas, however necessary,
294 T .II,II,II,343-344.
295 Here the transition is not made from only an idea towards an impression.
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is not alone sufficient to give rise to any passion."296 I think that it is perfectly 
within the framework of the Humean thought to apply the statement not only to 
the passions, but also to impressions in general. The justification of this 
extension is drawn from Hume’s account of the distinction between ideas and 
impressions, mainly from the distinction by vivacity (quantitative distinction). 
Although I have questioned the consistency of the distinction and of its general 
application to different parts of Hume’s theoretical account, we can see that all 
the difficulties the distinction faces throughout the Treatise are here of no great 
consequence. The possibility of a qualitative distinction does not deny the 
quantitative distinction Hume sometimes thinks to be the only one. It is merely 
suggesting that Hume himself is not very consistent in claiming that a qualitative 
distinction is the only one which can, and more importantly, must be made.297
The association of ideas is not without influence upon the production of the 
passion. It is necessary to facilitate the transition which may well not have 
occurred without the presence of the associated idea. The idea seems to be a 
necessary condition of the transition but it is not its sole cause: „An easy 
transition of ideas, which, of itself, causes no emotion, can never be necessary, 
or even useful to the passions, but by forwarding the transition betwixt some 
related impressions."298 However, the requirement of an additional condition 
does not necessarily affect causality as a possible candidate for the principle of 
unity of perceptions per se. There are indications that the principle by which the 
transition is actually made is causation. It certainly is the case that if there would 
be one single sufficient principle of transition it would have to be causation 
because of Hume’s line of argument in matters of the indirect passions, but 
especially in respect to pride and humility. Hume uses analogies of equal forces 
to explain why the self cannot be the cause of the passions of pride and
290 T .II,I,IX ,305.
297 Some may want to argue that if a qualitative distinction between the different kinds of perception is 
established then the quantitative distinction becomes obsolete if not impossible. However, it is entirely 
possible to say that the pile of apples in my garden is bigger than the pile of pears, just as I can say that an 
orange is bigger than a cherry. The criterion of quantitative distinction of qualities is some common good, just 
as in Hume’s case the criterion is vivacity. We can also say that apples, pears, cherries and oranges are all 
fruit, just as Hume can say that impressions and ideas are all perceptions.
298 T .II,I,IX ,306.
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humility. The underlying understanding of the mechanism of the coming about 
of the passions is clearly essentially causal.
Regarding the relation of different types of perception to each other we can 
conclude that a case in favor of causality can be made if we look at the ideas 
which are produced by corresponding impressions. But it is certainly clear that a 
case against causation can be established in respect to the enlivening of an 
idea into an impression by the workings of sympathy. Where the direction from 
ideas to impressions is concerned generally we can say that even if ideas can 
causally give rise to impressions, as it was the case with indirect passions, they 
cannot do so without additional conditions being fulfilled. This is the second 
case against causation as the principle of unity of perceptions.
At this point it is certainly true that there still is a variety of problems affecting 
causality as the principle of unity which are worth investigating, such as, for 
instance, the problem of the first perception and its cause. However, I believe 
that the presented two cases against causation are sufficiently strong to show 
that causation, on its own, is unfit to be the principle of unity of perceptions. The 
reasons leading to my conclusion are plainly rooted in Hume’s theory of 
perception itself.
VI.II. The Principles of Association of Ideas
Ideas can, just as impressions, be associated with one another. They are 
associated by three principles: resemblance, causation and contiguity. They are 
unlike impressions not only in the sense that impressions can only be 
associated by resemblance but also in the sense that ideas always maintain 
their particular identities when associated, whereas impressions can mix 
properly, thereby giving up their original identities and melting together into a 
new one. Ideas can never form a total union: „ldeas never admit of a total union, 
but are endow’d with a kind of impenetrability, by which they exclude each
193
other, and are capable of forming a compound by their conjunction, not by their 
mixture."299
Keeping this in mind the matter concerning the principles of association of 
ideas as principle of unity of perceptions seems to be pretty straightforward. 
Ideas are related by causation, contiguity and/or resemblance. The ideas 
themselves are dependent on impressions (at least where simple ideas are 
concerned). The impressions themselves are related and associated by 
resemblance, and resemblance is also a principle of association of ideas. Given 
any combination of perceptions it seems clear that at least one of these three 
principles will apply and it also seems clear that there are no cases where 
perceptions are related or associated by principles other than these three. 
Hence the principles of association of ideas seem to be most promising 
candidates for the purpose of uniting the different perceptions. Where one of 
these principles fails to provide for a link between different perceptions, one of 
the others steps in and produces the needed link.
However, now that it seems as if the three principles of association of ideas 
together can account satisfactorily for the unity of perceptions we have to pay 
attention to a first problem which surfaces as a consequence of such an 
understanding. The problem occurs because it is not only one principle which is 
used here to establish proper relations between the different perceptions, but 
there are, in fact, three principles. The problem is most serious then when we 
feel some inclination to identify the principle of unity with the self, which has to 
be, in the common understanding, one. This problem can be easily dealt with by 
pointing out that, of course, the principle of unity does not have to be identical 
with the self. Nevertheless, it still seems to be the case that the principles of 
association of ideas present themselves as a plurality and not as a singularity, 
not as one principle. The three principles of association of ideas do not seem to 
have an intrinsic link to each other apart from the fact that they are principles by
299 T .II,II,V I,366., This is of some interest in respect to the distinction between impressions and ideas. It 
certainly supports my claim that impressions and ideas are qualitatively distinct. However, our present interest 
lies not with the nature of perceptions but with the relations the perceptions, in our case ideas, have with one 
another, although it seems to be only fair to say that both aspects are certainly connected since a relation is not 
independent of its relata.
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which the human mind operates, meaning that the plurality of independent 
principles cannot be overcome. When it comes to the principles being principles 
by which the mind operates, it even looks as if the role of the uniting principle is 
pushed back to the human mind as the „bearer“ of the principles of association 
of ideas. Thus, we are faced with a vicious circle. On the other hand, if we were 
to find a new principle uniting the three principles in question would this new 
principle then not be the true principle of unity of the perceptions? If not, what 
would be its role in respect to the self?
The problem, however, does not develop its full strength if there would be 
an intrinsic link between the principles of association of ideas. Hume leaves no 
doubt that causation and contiguity are connected to one another: „We may 
therefore consider the relation of CONTIGUITY as essential to that of 
causation.1,300 It must be noted that Hume allows contiguity to be a relation 
which exists mind-independently and quite prior to the operations of the mind: 
„As to what may be said, that the operations of nature are independent of our 
thought and reasoning, I allow it; and accordingly have observ’d, that objects 
bear to each other the relations of contiguity and succession; that like objects 
may be observ’d in several instances to have like relations; and that all this is 
independent of, and antecedent to the operations of the understanding.“301 
Contiguity is, in a sense, observable whereas causation is not, but the latter is 
certainly linked to the former. I think we are right to understand contiguity to be a 
necessary condition of causation in an epistemological sense as well as in an 
ontological one: 1. We have to observe contiguity to make the inference towards 
causation. 2. For objects to be causally related it is necessary that they are 
contiguous. „l find in the first place, that whatever objects are consider’d as 
causes or effects, are contiguous-, and that nothing can operate in a time or 
place, which is ever so little remov’d from those of its existence. Tho’ distant 
objects may sometimes seem productive of each other, they are commonly 
found upon examination to be link’d by a chain of causes, which are contiguous
300 T .I,III,II,75.
301 T .I,III,X IV , 168., compare the passages immediately following for an understanding of Hume’s form of 
Basic Realism.
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among themselves, and to the distant objects; and when in any particular 
instance we cannot discover this connexion, we still presume it to exist.“302
However, the story of resemblance is a more complicated one. Whereas 
contiguity is important in respect to causation and the „discovery“ of causality 
epistemologically and ontologically, resemblance is of importance only in the 
former sense and here it is strongly connected with memory. Hume states, 
when discussing probability: „But beside these two species of probability, which 
are deriv’d from an imperfect experience and from contrary causes, there is a 
third arising from ANALOGY, which differs from them in some material 
circumstances. According to the hypothesis above explain’d all kinds of 
reasoning from causes and effects are founded on two particulars, viz. the 
constant conjunction of any two objects in all past experience, and the 
resemblance of a present object to any one of them. [...] If you weaken either 
the union or resemblance, you weaken the principle of transition, and of 
consequence that belief, which arises from jt.“303 To arrive at the notion of 
causation we need not only to observe that two events are contiguous, we also 
need to recognize their constant conjunction.304 Perceiving once that a billiard 
ball hits another which then begins to move is not, in itself, sufficient to acquire 
the notion of causation. I have to perceive such an event several times and I 
have to know that the event I perceive today resembles the event that 
happened yesterday or three weeks ago. I have to know that my present 
perception resembles previous perceptions. In that sense resemblance is an 
essential requirement towards the notion of causation.
However, though resemblance is necessary to arrive at the notions of 
causation and constant conjunction, is it also necessary for causation and 
contiguity themselves, whether they exist mind independently or not?305 To 
show a necessary ontological link between resemblance and contiguity will 
suffice to establish such a link between resemblance and causation. The link
302 T .I,III,II,75.
303 T .I,III,X II, 142.
304 compare T .I,III,X IV ,163-164.
305 This would be necessary if one wants to claim intrinsic links between resemblance, contiguity and
causation.
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between contiguity and causation has already been established, in an 
epistemological as well as in an ontological sense and resemblance and 
causation can be mediated by contiguity quite easily. Whether a necessary link 
between resemblance and contiguity can be established or not depends largely 
on what we think the term contiguity means. Do we feel compelled to 
understand it, in the context given by Hume’s philosophy as a whole, as the 
constant conjunction, or do we understand it as conjunction only? If we take the 
term to mean something along the lines of constant conjunction the matter 
promises to be straightforward, ie. it should be easy enough to conceive of the 
necessity of a link between the two principles under discussion. The very word 
constant, in the meaning Hume gives to it throughout the Treatise, implies 
resemblance because it implies repetition and repetition implies resemblance. 
„Causal association always depends on the force of association of resembling 
sequences of events - the constancy of a conjunction is a matter of the 
resemblance between a given conjunction and the other past conjoinings of 
objects resembling the first conjunct, with objects resembling the second. 
Causal association is always a special case of association by resemblance, and 
also of association by contiguity. The special feature is repetition, which is itself 
a matter of resemblance of pairings."306
It is difficult to link resemblance to contiguity, and consequently to 
causation, once we allow contiguity to occur only in singular cases which will 
never be repeated. Let’s say it occurs that a unicorn dips its horn into the river 
and, by doing so, frees the water of all poisons. Let’s also say that the 
detoxification of the water is caused by the unicorn’s horn. In this case there 
exists a conjunction of the unicorn’s horn and the water as well as a conjunction 
of the polluted water at time 1 and the clean water at time 2 (conjunction in the 
succession of time of cause and effect). If this particular event only occurs once 
and never again then we have, within the context of Humean philosophy, no 
possibility to develop the idea that the events in question (dipping of the horn - 
detoxification of water) are connected by causation, because the event is never
306 BAIER, A. ibid., p.75.
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repeated.307 If, on the other hand, people have observed the miracles performed 
by this very secretive animal only once and have implied that the unicorn’s horn 
holds magic powers because it is responsible (in terms of causation) for the 
cleaning of polluted fluids then we could argue, that they made an inference by 
using the concept of causation they had already acquired by the observation of 
constant conjunctions of other events. Resemblance would obviously be linked 
with contiguity where the latter repeated occurrences are concerned but the 
idea of causation cannot be gained by the observation of the unicorn itself. 
Thus, once contiguity is taken on its own and not as constant conjunction no 
intrinsic link can be found between resemblance and contiguity. To arrive at the 
needed link in respect to Hume’s Treatise it is necessary to establish that Hume 
understands contiguity to mean nothing else but constant conjunction. This is, 
by all means, hardly conceivable. He writes: „But tho’ I cannot altogether 
exclude the relations of resemblance and contiguity from operating on the fancy 
in this manner, ‘tis observable that, when single308, their influence is very 
feeble and uncertain."309 The absence of an intrinsic connection between 
resemblance and contiguity becomes also clear, in an indirect manner, when we 
consider Hume’s discussion of the idea of necessary connection: „When we 
look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, 
we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary 
connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one 
an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, 
in fact, follow the other."310 When contiguous events occur only in one single 
instance the idea of necessary connection can not be formed. Only if similar 
contiguous events occur more than once can resemblance between the events, 
taking place at different instances, be recognized. By doing so, we recognize 
their constant conjunction. This does not suggest an intrinsic link between
307 It would here suffice to say that a repetition of the events has never been observed, though, in fact, it did 
happen.
308 My own accentuation.
309 T .I,III,IX , 109.
310 ECHU,VH,I,50, p.63.
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contiguity and resemblance. The link which can be maintained here is one 
between constant conjunction and resemblance.
Another way to attempt to establish an intrinsic link between contiguity itself 
and resemblance is one which makes use of the relationship between causes 
and their effects. That is to argue that effects resemble their causes and are in 
conjunction to them. Hume argues, talking about effects and resemblance in 
respect to the motion of bodies: „These suppositions are all consistent and 
natural; and the reason, why we imagine the communication of motion to be 
more consistent and natural not only than those suppositions, but also than any 
other natural effect, is founded on the relation of resemblance betwixt the cause 
and effect, which is here united to experience, and binds the objects in the 
closest and most intimate manner to each other, so as to make us imagine them 
to be absolutely inseparable."311 1. However, I don’t think one is justified to take 
this statement as a confirmation of the claim that Hume believes that effects 
necessarily resemble their causes. Motion is found to be caused by motion and 
Hume uses the found resemblance between cause and effect to explain the 
enforcement of the causal association. The fact that here cause and effect 
resemble each other makes the causal association ..consistent and natural". But 
to allow some cases of resemblance between effects and their causes is not to 
maintain that effects necessarily have to resemble their causes. „We have 
remark’d, that the conclusion, which we draw from a present object to its absent 
cause or effect, is never founded on any qualities, which we observe in that 
object, consider’d in itself; or, in other words, that ‘tis impossible to determine, 
otherwise than by experience, what will result from any phaenomenon, or what 
has preceded it."312 Resemblance between cause and effect is also not an 
issue in Hume’s list of rules by which we judge of causes and effects.313 
Resemblance necessary for the notion of causation is the resemblance we 
observe between contiguous events which take place at different instances in
311 T .I,III,IX ,1 11-112.
312 T ,I,III,IX ,1 11.
313 compare T.I,HI,XV,173-175.
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time. „From causes which appear similar we expect similar effects."314 Hume 
states here that causes which resemble each other are expected to have similar 
effects, but he does not say that effects have to resemble their causes. 
Although the cause is proportionate to its effect in, at least, a quantitative 
way315, it is the case that „any thing may produce any thing"316 . So, a claim 
towards a general resemblance between effects and their causes cannot be 
made in a strong enough fashion to uphold intrinsic links between resemblance 
and contiguity because of Hume’s account of externality and of the origin of the 
simple impressions. 2. Even if it were the case that all effects always resemble 
their causes the needed link could not be established successfully. Not all 
relations between perceptions are causal relations, neither are all objects which 
resemble each other causally related.
It seems to me that the unity of the three principles of association and 
relation of ideas can only be achieved by maintaining interdependency between 
these three principles., Causation, for instance, requires conjunction and 
resemblance in an epistemological sense; and requires at least conjunction, but 
not necessarily resemblance, in a real sense. However, interdependency as I 
think it necessary to account for the unity of these three relations, would have to 
mean that whenever two objects have a causal relationship to each other they 
occur in conjunction and they resemble each other. Furthermore, it would also 
have to mean that whenever two objects are in conjunction to each other they 
also have a causal relationship. On the other hand, if we want to maintain a 
necessary link between contiguity and resemblance it would be necessary that 
either conjoined objects/events always resemble each other or that resembling 
objects/events are always conjoined to one another. The latter is certainly 
necessary in an epistemological sense (we need to make a comparison) but the 
former is hardly the case. We can think of many things which are conjoined to 
one another but don’t resemble each other or are related causally. We also can 
think of many things which resemble each other but are not conjoined in an
314 EC H U ,IV ,II,31 ,p.36.
315 compare ECHU,XI,105,p.l36.
316 T .I,III,X V , 173.
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ontological sense. Although we can say that causation requires conjunction and 
resemblance of sequences; conjunction does neither require causation nor 
resemblance.
One could, of course, argue that the meaning of conjunction has to be 
narrowed so that it does not apply, in its proper sense, to entirely contingent 
assemblies of objects or processes. So that conjunction should always be 
understood, properly speaking, as necessary conjunction. It is quite obvious, 
however, that in respect to matters of fact the very term necessary implies 
causality. I think that it would not be logically sound to accept conjunction in this 
sense into the present context.
If these arguments can be accepted it follows that there is no 
interdependency between causation, contiguity and resemblance. There is 
certainly dependency in the sense that causation requires contiguity, but this 
dependency does not work „both ways" because contiguity and resemblance do 
not require causation. Although resemblance requires contiguity 
epistemologically, it does not ontologically. Simple (not constant) contiguity does 
not require resemblance in any case. Thus, we are left with three principles 
which are not interdependent. Therefore, they cannot be understood as being a 
unity in themselves apart from the fact that they are principles by which the 
human mind operates. This is not sufficient to allow us to regard the three 
principles of association of ideas as one principle of perceptions, their union is 
provided by something other than the three principles themselves.
This statement brings us close to another problem which needs to be 
discussed. Namely, that the self of the bundle definition cannot be reduced to its 
principle of unity alone but that it has to include the perceptions united by the 
principle (or the principles) we are looking for. It seems now possible to argue 
that it is of no importance in terms of the creation of a proper unity, whether the 
principles themselves are intrinsically related to each other or not. It could be 
argued that it is sufficient that there are principles which unite all one’s different 
perceptions into one bundle. I have to admit that I don’t find this sufficiency to 
be obvious. There are also further reaching implications once one considers
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that the three principles of association of ideas have to be classified as 
operations of the mind. This, in itself, poses a new, but already recognized 
problem, which is the identity of the mind. The question springs to mind if it 
wasn’t exactly this in the first place the principles are supposed to account for?
So far we have taken for granted that the three principles - causation, 
resemblance and contiguity - can link all perceptions, including impressions, 
with one another. One or the other principle can provide a link between almost 
all possible combinations of perceptions, co-existent or in succession: idea to 
idea, impression to impression, idea to impression (when idea is prior to the 
impression) and impression to idea (when impression is prior to idea). However, 
we have to keep in mind that although all three principles can be applied to the 
association of ideas and causation and resemblance can be applied to the 
association of ideas and impressions, it is still the case that impressions of 
sensation can only be associated by resemblance, but not by causation and 
contiguity. Thus, we are still left with the problem of impressions of sensations 
which do not seem to be linked to one another.
This problem is very interesting in, at least, two ways: Firstly, if there are 
perceptions which are not linked to one another then the three principles cannot 
serve towards the inclusion of these perceptions into the bundle. If this is the 
case then the principles of association of ideas cannot be the principle of unity 
because they do not connect all perceptions with one another. Secondly, a 
possible negative outcome of the above consideration (i.e. the principles are not 
applicable to all perceptions of an individual) will give rise to the question what it 
is which makes these unassociated perceptions part of a particular bundle. If 
such a principle can then be found it will have to be understood as the true 
criterion of identity. If, on the other hand, we cannot find any connecting 
principle or category whatsoever, identity cannot be properly accounted for and 
this has, evidently, disastrous consequences for Hume’s theory as a whole. But 
before we can draw any conclusion we need to look at the seemingly 
unassociated perceptions themselves.
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Resemblance can occur between successive perceptions (via recall) and 
simultaneous perceptions. However, simultaneity of two or more perceptions 
does not imply resemblance between the simultaneous perceptions; neither 
does resemblance imply simultaneity. This poses a problem when it comes to 
impressions of sensation because they are related by resemblance only. I can 
have two or more impressions of sensation at the same time, which do not 
resemble each other. Thus, there seems to be no link between them. We all 
know such seemingly unassociated impressions. I can see a bird flying in the 
winter sky and, at exactly the same time, can smell the smoke in the air, can 
see clouds and mountains, hear the noises of traffic and can feel the cold of a 
December morning. All these perceptions are sense impressions and are 
simultaneous, but they do not resemble each other.
We have to note that Hume does not think that there is any difference 
between our different sense perceptions in a Lockean sense. Hume 
distinguishes three different kinds of sense perceptions. One of them is the 
pains or pleasures. He argues, as an objection to LOCKE’s theory of 
perception, that none of the sense perceptions corresponds to any primary or 
secondary qualities: „Now ‘tis evident, that, whatever may be our philosophical 
opinion, colours, sounds, heat and cold, as far as appears to the senses, exist 
after the same manner with motion and solidity, and that the difference we make 
betwixt them in this respect, arises not from the mere perception. [...] Tis also 
evident, that colours, sounds, &c. are originally on the same footing with the 
pain that arises from steel, and pleasure that proceeds from a fire; and that the 
difference betwixt them is founded neither on perception nor reason, but on the 
imagination. [...] Upon the whole, then, we may conclude, that as far as the 
senses are judges, all perceptions are the same in the manner of their 
existence."317 Although sense perceptions of the three different kinds „are the 
same in the manner of their existence", it cannot be implied automatically that 
they are the same in the manner in which they appear in the senses. We cannot 
necessarily assume resemblance between the three different kinds of sense
317 T.I,IV,II,192-193.
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perception. Smell is different from colour and sound is different from touch. 
Hume himself refers to the different senses we possess when discussing space 
and extension: „The first notion of space and extension is deriv’d solely from the 
senses of sight and feeling [...] and when several sounds strike our hearing at 
once, custom and reflection alone make us form an idea of the degrees of the 
distance and contiguity of those bodies, from which they are deriv’d."318 If it is 
possible, and Hume seems to think it is, to distinguish different senses (whether 
they exist as features of a mind-independently existing body or not will be let 
aside for the moment) then there must be distinguishing features of these 
different senses which are the criteria of the distinction. Therefore it can be said 
that the senses, in this respect, do not resemble each other. Given Hume’s 
understanding of the senses and their respective perceptions, sense 
perceptions of different senses do not resemble each other in this respect.
It becomes already apparent that the question whether or no resemblance 
can always be a connecting principle of impressions, be they successive or 
simultaneous, is not as straightforward a matter as it seemed to be. It also 
becomes apparent that presence or absence of resemblance of impressions of 
sensation is very much a matter of the criterion of resemblance we want to allow 
for, and especially, Hume can allow for. It is clear that all sense perceptions 
resemble each other in so far as they are perceptions of the senses (whatever 
the sense ontologically happen to be) and they do not resemble each other in 
so far as they belong to different senses. Furthermore, non-resemblance of 
particular sense impressions can be extended towards impressions which 
belong to the same sense. The looks of an orange (sight) are different from the 
looks of a dog. We usually don’t think that oranges and dogs resemble each 
other. We also do not think that there is a resemblance between the smell of a 
rose and the smell of rotting meat, Schonberg does not sound a bit like Mozart 
and fur feels completely different from steel. So, although the elements of these 
pairings resemble each other in general: they are either both looks, or smell, or 
noise, or touch; they do not resemble each other as particulars.
3,8 T.I,IV,V,235.
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We now have to determine the level of resemblance necessary for Hume’s 
account. It is my opinion that Hume, given his theory of perception and its 
consequences, has to place resemblance as a principle of association of 
impressions not only on a general level319 but also on a level of particulars. 
Since particular sensations do not always resemble each other resemblance 
cannot serve as the connecting principle of all impressions. First of all, the 
bundle of perceptions is a bundle of single, particular perceptions. A 
classification of these different perceptions is possible by reasoning and 
imagination, but the perceptions appear first in the mind as particular 
perceptions. This, I think, is also supported by the fact that Hume is an atomist. 
In this context we also have to remember Hume’s statements in the Appendix of 
the Treatise, where he highlights the distinctness and separateness of our 
single perceptions.
Secondly, we find some more indication that resemblance would have to 
occur on the level of particular impressions, but sometimes does not, when we 
look at Hume’s account of experience. Hume clearly states, on several 
occasions, that to know what a certain experience is like one has to have had 
this experience oneself. It is not sufficient that the experience is described or 
that a comparison is made to other experiences one has had. This applies not 
only to the impressions of the senses but also to the impressions of reflection, 
that is, the passions. Hume writes at the very beginning of the Treatise: „...that 
where-ever by any accident the faculties, which give rise to any impressions, are 
obstructed in their operations, as when one is born blind or deaf; not only the 
impressions are lost, but also their correspondent ideas; so that there never 
appear in the mind the least traces of either of them. Nor is this only true, where 
the organs of sensation are entirely destroy’d, but likewise where they have 
never been put in action to produce a particular impression. We cannot form to 
ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine-apple, without having actually tasted 
it.“320 It is obvious that Hume refers here to the connection between impressions 
and ideas. However, we can clearly see that one cannot know what the
319 This, of course is always necessary as soon as one wants to account for classifications.
320 T.I,I,I,5.
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impression of the taste of a pineapple is like without having had the impression 
of a pineapple. If I have never, for instance, tasted oysters and somebody tells 
me their taste resembles that of sea water, I still do not know, though I know 
what sea water tastes like, what oysters exactly taste like. Hume allows for 
different degrees of resemblance. The taste of an oyster resembles the taste of 
sea water more than it resembles the taste of a prawn. However, without having 
tasted an oyster I cannot have a „just idea" of an oyster’s taste.
The same applies to impressions of reflection, such as the passions. When 
we remember Hume’s account of sympathy we will also remember that I can 
only sympathize with somebody’s state of mind (that is, his impression) when I 
have had a previous experience of such an impression myself. „...one can 
sympathize only with experiences that one has had oneself. One cannot, on 
Hume’s account, form the idea of another person’s emotion unless one has had 
the corresponding impression. This follows from the claim that the passions are 
simple impressions and that all simple ideas are copies of simple 
impressions.“321 Similarly to the examples concerning sensations we can say 
that I cannot know that the other person is angry if I have never been angry 
myself prior to the observation. I cannot form the appropriate idea of someone 
else’s anger because I do not have any idea of anger myself, independently of 
the other, since I never experienced that particular passion to give me its 
corresponding idea in the first place. I could not, then, even read the behavioral 
signs appropriately because I would have no idea whatsoever that passions like 
anger even exist. Given this situation and also given that I do not live in a social 
vacuum - there will be people who tell me that the person I am observing feels 
anger - I still could not form an appropriate idea of it. There is nothing within me 
the name „anger“ I have just been given could refer to.
It seems, therefore, to be the case that resemblance has to occur on a level 
of particular impressions. It also seems to be the case that „not all of our 
perceptions seem to be related by causation and resemblance - particularly not 
our impressions of sensation. An impression of a coffee cup [...] neither
321 ARDAL, P. ibid., p.45.
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resembles nor causes the succeeding impression of a pen.“322 The impression 
of a coffee cup does also not resemble or cause the impression of a pen if both 
impressions are simultaneous. This poses a problem when the impressions in 
question are not impressions of reflection. If they are impressions of reflection 
they will principally be derived from ideas or from impressions of pain or 
pleasure. Impressions which are unrelated to antecedent ideas are simple and 
complex impressions of sensation. Complex impressions of sensation are made 
up of simple impressions of sensation.
It is possible to argue that Hume does think that simple impressions, though 
they are different on the level of particular impressions, still resemble each 
other. This is not very apparent in Book One of the Treatise323, but there is a 
passage in the Appendix which could be taken to support such an argument. 
Hume writes: ,,’Tis evident, that even simple ideas may have a similarity or 
resemblance to each other; nor is it necessary, that the point or circumstance of 
resemblance shou’d be distinct or separable from that in which they differ. Blue 
and green are different simple ideas, but are more resembling than blue and 
scarlet; tho’ their perfect simplicity excludes all possibility of separation or 
distinction. Tis the same case with particular sounds, and tastes and smells. 
These admit of infinite resemblances upon the general appearance and 
comparison, without having any common circumstance the same. And of this we 
may be certain, even from the very abstract terms simple idea. They 
comprehend all simple ideas under them. These resemble each other in their
0 0 4
simplicity.“ Here it could be argued that, since simple ideas are produced by 
resembling simple impressions, Hume’s statement does not only apply to these 
simple ideas, but can also be extended towards the simple impressions. So that 
simple impressions, though they do not have any circumstances in common,
322 GARRETT, D. ibid., p. 172.
323 Apart from the Missing-shade-of-blue-argument, compare T.I,I,I,6. However, as has already been 
discussed: Hume argues that „the simple ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions". 
He does not argue that the simple impression of the missing shade of blue can be derived from either its idea 
or the set of (not exactly) resembling impressions of the available shades of blue.
324 T.App.,637.
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resemble each other in their simplicity.325 One could even go further and say 
that there is a basic resemblance between all perceptions, namely in so far as 
they all are perceptions.
This certainly is all very plausible. However, the question must be asked if 
resemblance in this sense is good enough to provide a uniting link between the 
different simple impressions. The sensations are hereby the most interesting 
subject because simple impressions of reflection, i.e. the passions, naturally 
give rise to one another by their resemblance. „Now it has been observ’d, that 
impressions or passions are connected only by their resemblance, and that 
where any two passions place the mind in the same or in similar dispositions, it 
very naturally passes from the one to the other."326 Simple impressions of the 
senses don’t seem to do this. It does not really matter whether the resemblance 
between blue and green is greater than the resemblance between blue and red. 
The needed principle of unity of the perceptions requires that the impression of 
green would have to give rise naturally to the impression of blue. It is pretty 
clear that this is not so. It does not make sense to believe that the taste of a 
banana gives naturally rise to the taste of a pineapple or the taste of a sea 
water gives naturally rise to the taste of an oyster.
We have to keep in mind that the principle of unity of perceptions has to 
connect particular perceptions to one another. It must provide for a particular 
set, i.e. a particular bundle of perceptions. Resemblance as the sole principle 
which connects simple sense impressions with one another is not good enough 
for this purpose. Resemblance as a connecting principle has to work on the 
level of particular impressions. This is the condition of the claimed connection 
between different simple impressions in Hume’s account of the natural 
association of the simple impressions of reflection. That resemblance has to be 
resemblance between particular perceptions is also apparent when Hume writes 
in the Appendix of the Treatise: ..Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and 
whatever is distinguishable, is separable by the thought or imagination. All
325 As well as they resemble each other in that they are impressions and not ideas and in that they all belong to 
the senses in general, and, sometimes, even to particular senses.
326 T.II,II,II,343.
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perceptions are distinct. They are, therefore, distinguishable, and separable, 
and may be conceiv’d as separately existent, and may exist separately, without 
any contradiction or absurdity."327 It is, however, important to note that I do not 
wish to argue that distinctness and separateness make resemblance 
impossible. Resemblance occurs between distinct and separate perceptions, 
but Hume’s statement highlights the fact that we have to consider perceptions in 
their particularity. Resemblance has to occur on the level of particular 
impressions of sensation as a principle of association in ALL instances, and not 
only in some. And, following from my preceding discussion, we can say that 
resemblance is unable to fulfill this requirement.
If these arguments can be accepted then we can draw a first conclusion, 
namely that the principles of association of ideas are very unlikely to serve as 
the principle of unity of perceptions. Not ALL perceptions, especially in respect 
to the impressions, are related by at least one of these principles in a necessary 
way. Neither are these principles themselves necessarily linked to one another. 
They are not interdependent principles.
However, we still have to explore the possibility of a natural link between the 
three principles provided by the fact that they are principles by which the mind
opQoperates. So that the criterion of their unity would lie with, and in, the mind.
To begin with, we must look at Hume’s understanding of the mind. Once this 
has been done we will become aware of the fact that the mind itself cannot 
provide a unifying framework, neither for the principles of association of ideas 
nor for the perceptions themselves. Hume is very clear in Book One of the 
Treatise and also in the Appendix, that the mind itself is nothing but the 
collection of perceptions. „lt follows, therefore, that the thought alone finds 
personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that 
compose a mind329, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and 
naturally introduce each other."330 And, as Hume points out in Book One: „We
327 T.App.,634.
328 This would create a variety of new problems necessary to adress. These problems would occur especially in
respect to a combined theory of self identity and personal identity.
329 My own accentuation.
330 T.App.,635.
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may observe, that what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of 
different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos’d, tho’ 
falsely, to be endow’d with a perfect simplicity and identity."331 When we look at 
the latter part of this definition, we find that we don’t have to worry about the fact 
that Hume doesn’t ascribe any perfect simplicity and identity to the mind. We 
can be perfectly at ease with the understanding of the self as a complex 
impression because neither perfect simplicity, as is obvious, nor perfect identity 
can be ascribed to it. There is, as we may remember, still identity, but not in a 
metaphysically strict and perfect sense.
My remark regarding the understanding of the self anticipates a certain 
understanding of the mind as it is presented in Hume’s statements as they have 
been given so far. Hume regards the mind and the self as identical. Hume refers 
to mind and self synonymously in Section VI of Part IV, which is the section 
dedicated to personal identity. To explain the self he refers to the mind: „The 
mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their 
appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of 
postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor 
identity in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that 
simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They 
are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the 
most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the 
materials, of which it is compos’d."332 When we also consider the passage of the 
Appendix referring to the particular problem that a uniting principle of all 
perceptions could not be found by Hume himself, then we must surely conclude 
that what was said there does not only apply to the unity of perceptions needed 
in respect to the self, but must also apply to the unity of perceptions needed to 
account for the mind itself. It does not matter here whether the mind is identical 
with the self or not because we can, at least, be certain that the former is 
required to account for the latter. What does matter is that the mind cannot 
provide us with a principle to unite the different perceptions and it was this we
331 T.I, IV ,11,207.
332 T .I,IV ,V I,253.
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were looking for. It also follows that a mind of Hume’s understanding cannot 
serve as a uniting principle for the principles of association of ideas. No intrinsic 
links suggesting interdependency between the principles of resemblance, 
contiguity and causation can be established, not even in the sense that these 
three principles have a common origin in reference to the mind. Thus a proper 
unity of the three principles cannot be established. This would have been 
necessary, however, to account for the unity of particular bundles of 
perceptions, i.e. the different selves.Therefore the conclusion has to be drawn 
that the principles of association of ideas cannot fulfill the role of a principle of 
unity of perceptions. The principles, although they are certainly important, if not 
necessary, are not sufficient to account for connections between perceptions in 
all conceivable cases.
Vl.lll. The Self
After having been unsuccessful in establishing either one of the commonly 
acknowledged candidates for the function of a principle of unity of perceptions, 
we have to look at less obvious, and even prima facie unlikely candidates. One 
of these is the self itself.
Causation and resemblance have attracted the attention of philosophers 
and Hume himself, and have been believed to be able to serve as the principle 
of unity of perceptions. If we look away from the Appendix of the Treatise where 
Hume expresses his doubts concerning the principle of unity of perceptions, but 
look at the Treatise itself, we will remember that Hume himself argues in favor 
of causation as such a principle: „As to causation; we may observe, that the true 
idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or 
different existences, which are link’d together by the relation of cause and 
effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other."333 
ANNETTE BAIER focuses also on causation, although she offers a relatively 
open account in respect to the principle of unity when she writes, using a
333 ibid., p.261.
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„Humean“ definition of substance: „Siich a cleaned-up version of substantial 
union is indeed what the thinker about personal identity, in Part IV, has found for 
the ‘successive existence’ of one mind. The contiguity is, in the nature of the 
case, temporal only. This loose flexible concept of what a ‘substance’ is allows 
nations also to be substances. The substantial person, like the nation, unites 
many perceptions at one time (the data of different senses, thoughts, pleasures, 
anxieties) as well as over a stretch of time. The latter union of non-coexistent 
‘modes’ must be there, if causation is to unite the various modes of the
0 04
substance, since causation is taken by Hume to imply temporal passage."
Others have suggested that a possible principle of unity of perceptions 
could be seen in the principles of association of ideas. Although causation is 
closely connected to resemblance and contiguity, it is still the case, as I have 
argued, that resemblance and contiguity can occur independent of causation. It 
is for these reasons that causation alone is not sufficient to provide for every 
conceivable relation between different perceptions. We have seen that the 
principles of association of ideas can also not fulfill the purpose they are needed 
for. In this light, we may want to consider the self as a candidate, provided we 
interpret Book One’s bundle-definition in a certain way: the self, which is 
„nothing but a bundle"335 of perceptions is understood not only as an assembly 
of perceptions but the notion is also supposed to contain the union of the 
perceptions. If I refer to a wreath of flowers I do not refer to all the single flowers 
of the wreath, but I refer to the wreath which consists of flowers.
I wish to argue that the self itself cannot be understood as the principle of 
unity of perceptions, and this for several reasons: Firstly, because of Hume’s 
theory of perception and the lack of intrinsic links between all perceptions. 
Secondly because I understand the self as having a progressive nature. It is of 
special importance to remember that it is impossible, for Hume, to have an 
internal perception and not to know that one has it. Thus, it makes sense to talk 
about a self only if there is self-awareness. If self-awareness is necessary then
334 BAIER, A. ibid., p. 127.
335 T.I,IV,VI,252.
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it is surely impossible that one can have perceptions, united by the self fulfilling 
the role of a principle of unity of perceptions, without knowing that one is a self. 
We all know, however, that there are times in our lives when we do have 
perceptions but don’t know that we are a self - when we are very small babies, 
when we are asleep and when we have fainted, for instance. Furthermore, if we 
consider that I claim the self to be of a progressive nature and that it emerges, 
plainly speaking, when „enough“ perceptions have occurred and the operations 
of the mind had a „enough“ material to work on336 then it is equally impossible 
that the self is existent, if only as a principle, to unite these perceptions without 
me knowing about it or being able to refer to it in language.337
It could be argued, however, that in respect to the speech of small children 
the matter is not as clear cut as I make it out to be. That, in fact, small children 
happily employ nouns, they say their name (they refer to themselves in the third 
person), say Mummy, employ verbs but do not employ terms like I and you and 
don’t always employ terms like here and there meaningfully. That is to say that 
small children generally do not employ indexicals and that I and you are not 
different from other indexicals. This, it could be argued, indicates only that the 
child hasn’t grasped the meaning of these terms yet, but no assumption can be 
made regarding the existence of entities or relations these terms refer to. 
However, I believe that small children don’t have the concept of / for the reason 
that the term has, in the child’s perception, no reference. If the term has no 
reference then the child can also not have an impression or an idea of its own 
self, because if it had there would be a reference and if so it would employ the 
word I. The child simply doesn’t know to what the term refers, but it knows to 
what the term cup refers. By employing the term meaningfully the child shows 
that it can distinguish cups from spoons, cars from dogs and that it has, in 
Humean terms, impressions (and ideas) of cups, spoons, cars and dogs. It is 
also the case that small children, as anyone who had the opportunity to observe 
their own children will know, employ other indexicals like here and there quite
336 Which accommodates the fact that children do not say I under the age of three.
337 Note that children just under three have usually acquired quite considerable language skills.
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often. They might not always get them right and may say here instead of there 
and so on, or they might not pronounce them properly, but they certainly try to 
make use of them and have also an idea that they usually refer to spatial 
coordinates. This is very apparent when one considers the German language 
where the word there is very easy to speak, the German word for there is da. 
Babies will often point at objects they want but cannot say the names of 
(because they are either unknown to them or very difficult to speak) and say Da. 
They give thereby an indication of their interest in the object and wish to have 
it.338 Children are also very quick to learn the meaning of articles with changing 
reference. So even if the German da is not interpreted to mean there but is to 
mean das {that), the child would still employ a term of changing reference.
If these inductive arguments can be accepted then I think it must also be 
accepted that small children are capable of grasping the meaning of indexicals 
and know that they have changing references. It then seems to be the case that 
a changing reference does not pose a problem to the child. However, what 
poses a problem is that with certain indexicals a reference cannot be found at 
all, which clearly indicates that there is nothing (yet) the term is supposed to 
refer to. A toddler of speaking age does certainly have perceptions of bodies 
and consequently refers to itself and also to others without using any indexicals. 
Mummy is always mummy and never you. Thus, there is phenomenological 
support and support in the field of philosophy of language for my claim that the 
self is progressive also in the ontological sense, i.e. that it has to emerge and 
that it is not innate. We have also seen that in a Humean context it is necessary 
that one is aware of one’s self if one is to be a self. Since these conditions 
would be contradicted were the self the principle of unity we have to conclude 
that the self itself cannot be such a principle.
338 They could easily have pointed to the object in question and could have said Pa or Ma or just A.
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VI.IV. Is there a Fourth Possibility?
Now that we have ruled out causation, the principles of association of ideas and 
the self itself as possible candidates for the principle of unity of perceptions it 
very much looks as if we have no candidates left and therefore have to 
conclude that Hume’s philosophy cannot provide us with such a principle. The 
consequences of such conclusion would be dramatic. The conclusion would 
lead to an immediate collapse of the Humean philosophy as a whole: neither 
Book One nor Book Two can give an account of the self which doesn’t fall into 
absurdity. Book Two especially, resting upon the existence of a self (of whatever 
kind this happens to be) would be completely incoherent. Hume’s entire theory 
of the passions would rest upon an impossible assumption.
However, I think that there is a fourth possibility which must be considered. 
We can set up the hypothesis that the principle of unity of perceptions is 
the body. First of all, disregarding Hume’s alleged ontological scepticism for the 
moment, we can say that this hypothesis would not run into immediate 
difficulties where the bundle definition is concerned. It also has no particular 
problems with the additional claims I have made in respect to the nature of the 
self and the criteria of its identity. The body can unite the perceptions in the 
sense that the particular sets of perceptions, making up different individuals, are 
united in these particular, individual sets by the particular, individual bodies they 
belong to. Once we can accept the body as a principle of unity of perceptions 
we also have no difficulties to comprehend that the body unites the seemingly 
unrelated perceptions. They would be naturally related to one another in so far 
as they are perceptions of one and the same body.
Secondly, if the body should be accepted as the uniting principle it would 
not follow that, therefore, the body has to be the true and only criterion of self 
identity and personal identity. The bundle-definition itself makes clear that the 
body alone is not sufficient to provide an entire bundle. It would to provide a 
unifying principle of the perceptions only. There cannot be a bundle without the
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perceptions themselves, thus the body, taken on its own, is not enough to 
account for a self as it is understood by Hume. Furthermore, perceptions come 
in different kinds according to Hume’s theory. Not all perceptions are 
perceptions of sensation. It follows that even if a theory can be put forward 
which maintains that the body alone is responsible for producing perceptions of 
sensation339, it does not automatically follow that the body on its own is also 
able to produce perceptions of reflection, be they impressions or ideas. It is 
perfectly clear that something like this would be necessary if the body shall be 
the true and ultimate criterion of identity. It is equally clear that, regarding 
perceptions of reflection, the identity-theory has to be maintained if one wants to 
make the body the sole provider of the self.
Although it is perfectly legitimate and comprehensible to be an identity- 
theorist, there are also serious shortcomings of this theory which make it 
impossible to follow such a theory and, at the same time, keep within the 
framework set by Hume’s philosophy. Since the latter is a declared requirement 
of this work the identity theory has to be dismissed as not fitting the purpose of 
my investigation. The only reason to discuss the identity-theory here is that it 
may turn out that one would have to be, necessarily, an identity theorist to 
maintain the body as the principle of unity of the perceptions. However, I hope 
that the following discussion will make perfectly clear that this is not so and that 
the body can be understood as the principle of unity of perceptions without 
contradicting Hume’s basic claims.
I will attempt to establish the body as the principle of unity of the 
perceptions in two steps. Firstly, for the body to be acceptable as a legitimate 
candidate it will be necessary to argue that Hume was a Basic Realist in his 
ontology, and not a sceptic. If it were the case that the body’s existence, 
ontologically, would be dependent upon the existence of a mind as a unified 
phenomenon, the body could not serve as a principle of unity of perceptions. 
For that reason the body has to be ontologically independent of the mind.
339 Regardless of whether they have external causes also or external causes are sufficient for bringing about 
these perceptions of sensations.
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Secondly, it must be shown that the body is not only a possible candidate in 
terms of the principle of unity of perceptions, but that it can also fulfill this role 
within Hume’s philosophy. No contradictions must occur between the 
statements made in the Treatise and it’s general tenor and the claims having to 
be made, or arising in consequence of the body being the uniting principle.
Hume’s Basic Realism
Before we begin a discussion of Hume’s Basic Realism it will be necessary to 
define what I mean by it. I will take GALEN STRAWSON’s definition of Basic 
Realism as my starting point. Discussing whether or not Hume was a Basic 
Realist in respect to causation STRAWSON understands Basic Realism to 
mean the following: „lt is not simply (1) that there is something ‘external’ or ‘out 
there’ just in the sense of being independent of, or something other than, our 
perceptions. For to this is added the idea (2) that this something somehow 
affects us, and so gives rise to our perceptions, and is the reason why they are 
as they are (leaving aside any contribution we may also make to their 
character)."340 The context of my discussion requires two remarks concerning 
this definition. Firstly, I have accepted STRAWSON’s version of Basic Realism 
for my purposes because if the body can be established and maintained as the 
principle of unity of perceptions we certainly have to think of the body in the way 
that the body affects us and our perceptions as they are. A minimalist account 
of such an affect will suffice to show the truth of the claim. If the body is 
understood as the principle of unity of the perceptions, then particular sets of 
perception (which are, in other words, particular individuals) will be united to 
these particular sets by the respective body each of these sets belongs to (each 
particular set belongs to a particular body, different from all other particular 
bodies). In accordance with Hume’s basic claim in Book Two of the Treatise that 
there is an impression of the self (complex impression) it can now be said the 
body affects us in so far as we have a complex impressions of the bundle which 
makes up our own self. The perception is what it is through the particular
340 STRAWSON, G. The Secret Connexion - Causation, Realism and David Hume, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1989, p.60.
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assembly of all the different perceptions making up the total. Since this 
assembly is guaranteed, as this particular assembly, by the body, the body has 
an affect upon our perception.
Secondly, the definition must not mislead us to think that the only ‘external’ 
objects it refers to are objects other than our mind AND body. Such a mistake is 
easily made because we intuitively assume that I am my body and my mind (in 
whatever relation these two stand to each other), and that ‘out there’ means 
nothing but objects I don’t associate necessarily with myself, objects like tables, 
carrots, children, the sky and the rain. The objects the definition is referring to 
are the objects outside my realm of perception. These objects include my own 
body just as they include tables and the sky. Hume draws a first conclusion in 
his discussion of scepticism with regard to the senses that „as far as the senses 
are judges, all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence."341 
Sense perceptions of my own body cannot be distinguished „in the manner of 
their existence" from sense perceptions I have of tables, dogs and carrots. 
Nothing in the form of the perceptions themselves justifies the belief that the 
body I call my own has real existence. „...’tis not our body we perceive, when we 
regard our limbs and members, but certain impressions, which enter by the 
senses; so that the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these 
impressions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain, as 
that which we examine at present."342 However, though it is clear that the form, 
or the „manner of existence" of sense perceptions does not suggest that there 
should be any differences between perceptions of one’s own body and 
perceptions of other objects, it is less clear that this is still the case once we 
have drawn our attention to the contents of our sense perceptions. There are 
undoubtedly sense perceptions of the content that they are perceptions of our
343own body and there are sense perceptions which are not.
341 T.I,IV,II,193.
342 ibid., p. 191.
343 The problem how identity for all those objects is established does not concern us here. Identity of those 
objects and of one’s own body is established, epistemologically, in similar ways.
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Having clarified the meaning of STRAWSON’s definition, we will find that he 
distinguishes two versions of Basic Realism: a strict, natural version, very much 
in line with LOCKE’s philosophy344 and a weaker version. „According to the 
‘strong’ version, which is also the most natural version, the objects are entirely 
distinct from our perceptions: our perceptions are not only not the objects, but 
are not even any part of what the existence of the objects consists in. The 
objects’ simply names what our perceptions are perceptions of (relationally 
speaking). According to the weak - and far more puzzling - version, the objects 
are certainly not to be identified with our perceptions or their content (as in strict 
Idealism), because the existence of the objects essentially involves the 
existence of something more than our perceptions; but our perceptions are 
nevertheless part of what the existence of the objects consists in.“345
Looking at STRAWSON’s version of weak Basic Realism it becomes 
apparent that this theory can be embraced by various, quite different 
philosophies, reaching, perhaps as the two marking stones, from BERKELEY’S 
strict idealism to KANT’s Transzendental Philosophie. But whereas philosophers 
like Locke, Kant and Berkeley have adopted one or the other version of Basic 
Realism the matter is different where Hume’s theory is concerned. STRAWSON 
argues that Hume is not committing himself, and given his theory, never could 
do, to a particular version of Basic Realism. Instead, he believes that one of 
these versions must be true but because of our epistemological position we 
cannot determine which one. „For it really is very implausible to reject the claim 
that some version of Basic Realism is true, and to claim instead that there does 
not in fact exist anything which (1) is other than our perceptions and which (2) 
affects us and which (3) is the reason why our perceptions are as they are - 
even if it is important to insist that we could never know which version is true 
(and to insist that we can never even prove the truth of Basic Realism).1,346
To support STRAWSON’s claim, which is very much like my own, we only 
have to look at Hume’s texts with an open mind. We have to look at the first two
compare LECHU, especially Book II, Chapters I I  - IX , pp. 119-149.
345 STRAWSON, G. ibid., p.61.
346 ibid., p.64-65.
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Books of the Treatise as a union and not as if they were two completely 
separate outputs of an inconsistent and somewhat confused mind. It will also be 
helpful to give weight to the Enquiries and the Essays. The vast majority of 
literature concerning Hume’s Treatise displays some hesitancy by interpreters to 
regard the three Books in unison. Some interpreters concern themselves only 
with Book One, whilst others restrict themselves to the two following Books. 
Each of these interpreters is more or less quick in pointing out contradictions 
and inconsistencies between the different Books. Some of these alleged 
inconsistencies also remain if Hume’s work is taken as a whole, but some of 
them disappear once the effort is made to employ a less restricted 
interpretation. The majority of misconceptions, mainly the result of considering 
the sceptical Book of the Treatise only, have their roots in a misunderstanding 
of Hume’s ontology, reducing it to the epistemology he develops. „Yet current 
misinterpretation - travesty - of Hume as some sort of prototypical logical 
positivist rests almost entirely on supposing him to restrict his view of what could 
exist to what his epistemology admits as knowable or directly experiencable. 
And so it is that the great sceptical expositor of the vast extent of human 
ignorance is held to believe that there is definitely nothing we cannot know 
about (or is at least considered as a heroic foreshadower of this view). I can 
think of no greater irony in the history of philosophy.“347
If we look at the second and the third Book of the Treatise we will 
immdediately be aware of the fact that Hume writes there, clearly, as a Basic 
Realist. The passions are simple impressions which arise in relation to other 
human beings and to our surroundings in general. The introduction of sympathy 
as a principle of communication is only necessary if there is another human 
being I can communicate with. Hume also claims that our pains and 
pleasures348 are not entirely independent from other persons’ response to it. 
„We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society. A perfect solitude 
is, perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer. Every pleasure languishes 
when enjoy’d a-part from company, and every pain becomes more cruel and
347 ibid., p.66-67.
348 Pains and pleasures are not passions.
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intolerable."349 And Hume continues his statement, with regard to the passions: 
..Whatever other passions we may be actuated by; pride, ambition, avarice, 
curiosity, revenge or lust; the soul or animating principle of them all is sympathy; 
nor wou’d they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts 
and sentiments of others."350 In Section IV of Book Two Hume highlights the 
importance of company and the claim he expresses takes the existence of 
company very much for granted. „Hence company is naturally so rejoicing, as 
presenting the liveliest of all objects, viz. a rational and thinking Being like 
ourselves, who communicates to us all the actions of his mind; makes us privy 
to his inmost sentiments and affections; and lets us see, in the very instant of 
their production, all the emotions, which are caus’d by any object."351
This alone might not necessarily be acceptable as support for Hume’s Basic 
Realism since it could be argued that one just imagines other persons, one’s 
object-possessions and one’s general environment. However, such an 
argument can hardly be in accordance with the impetus of Hume’s statements 
here. If we were only imagining other people, then this fact could hardly be 
concealed from us. We would not only feel lonely again but we would also have 
no reason to make other people and society an issue in our theories, apart from 
wondering why we have to invent them in the first place. To investigate 
phenomena of the latter kind is certainly not Hume’s intention. He discusses 
why we believe other people and objects to be of permanent existence and 
why we ascribe identity to them, but he never expresses, especially not in Book 
Two of the Treatise, any doubt whatsoever that they really do exist, that they 
exist permanently and that they possess identity. He is also adamant that we 
cannot observe someone else’s state of mind directly, but can only observe the 
external signs this person is exhibiting. It is clear that the body is of great 
importance here and it is equally clear that Hume does not concern himself with 
the possibility that we only imagine it. If he would take the possibility of 
imagining things seriously he would certainly have to discuss the oddity why
349 T.II,II,V,363.
350 ibid.
351 T.II,II,IV,353.
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imagination doesn’t simplify the matter and just imagines other minds instead of 
imagining other minds being hidden in their respective bodies.
These arguments sound, admittedly, trivial, but they appear less trivial once 
one considers that they highlight the absurdity of a strict idealist interpretation of 
Hume’s account. The absurdity of some interpretations of Hume’s theory 
becomes apparent when we look, for instance, at WAXMAN’s account. He 
makes the claim that: „For Hume’s predecessors, perceptions were thought to 
be dependent on and/or representative of external objects and/or the faculty- 
endowed mind; for Hume, neither is true.“352
WAXMAN’s statement allows several different interpretations, each of them 
expressing different ontological claims.
(1) perceptions depend on external objects which they represent
(2) perceptions depend on external objects but cannot be said to represent 
them
(3) perceptions represent external objects on which they don’t depend
(4) perceptions depend on external objects which they represent and on a 
faculty of the mind
(5) perceptions depend on external objects which they cannot be said to 
represent and on a faculty of the mind
(6) perceptions depend on the mind and represent external objects on which 
they don’t depend
(7) perceptions depend on the mind only
The possible interpretations (1) to (7) represent every possible ontological stand 
which could have been taken by Hume’s predecessors and contemporaries. (1) 
to (6) are realist accounts. (1), (3), (4) and (6) belong to strict Realism and (2) 
and (5) belong to weak Realism, whereas (7) is not a realist, but a strict idealist 
version. To say that Hume believes that none of these versions is true is a 
serious misunderstanding of Hume’s account. WAXMAN proposes a further
352 W AXM AN, W. Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, Cambridge University Press 1994, p.213.
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version not held by Hume’s predecessors and contemporaries. This version has 
been discussed previously.
(8) Perceptions don’t depend on anything
WAXMAN wants to claim elsewhere that Hume’s account of perceptions is 
ontologically neutral353, that Hume was ontologically an agnostic: .there can
be no denying that the senses are responsible for verdicts on the reality of the 
objects immediately present to them, or that these beliefs weigh in our thoughts 
and actions just as surely as do those of associative imagination. These, like all 
other verdicts about perceptions, must be construed as claims about their 
verisimilar reality, not their „absolute“, or „ontological reality“, regarding which 
Hume was necessarily agnostic (for want of any ideas to enliven).11354 However, 
to be agnostic, or to be ontologically neutral, is not compatible with making 
ontological statements of any kind, including negative ontological statements of 
the kind that none of the proposed ontologies is true. The only possible agnostic 
stand would be to say that one cannot know whether one of these ontologies is 
true and if one is true, which one it is.
WAXMAN’s claim is not only incorrect in this respect. It is, for instance, 
debatable if „agnostic“ and „ontologically neutral" really have the same meaning. 
One could be an agnostic as far as reason is concerned but is not bound to be 
ontologically neutral. Whatever the outcome of this discussion, it is quite clear 
that the claim that Hume writes as a Basic Realist is contrary to WAXMAN’s 
claim. It is equally clear that the claim made by WAXMAN is not in accordance 
with Book Two of the Treatise nor is it a claim which, in my opinion, can 
reasonably be made: Firstly, on a minimum level, an agnostic or an ontological 
sceptic cannot make strong claims of the suggested kind at all. Secondly, to 
deny the truth of any ontological possibility is utter nonsense. It denies that 
there is anything which is real, whatever this „real“ is thought to be. Dispute has 
arisen between philosophers because of disagreements in regard to the 
question what the „real things" really are, or, in other words, what reality really is
compare ibid., p.219.
354 ibid., p.215.
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- whether or not reality is mind-independent, for instance, and if the latter, what 
role has fallen to the mind in creating reality or parts of it. In this context, which 
is the philosophical context Hume was aware of, the question whether reality 
exists in the first place is absurd.355 If we agree, which indeed we must, that 
there is something which is real, then we must also agree that this something 
has to be a certain way. We may not know, and perhaps never will, how this 
something really is. However, we still know that it is. „One has to separate the 
notion (1) that there is, in fact, a certain way things are, from the notion (3) that 
it is possible to give some definitely true account of how things are. (3) does not 
follow from (1) - not so long as we are concerned with finite sensory-intellectual 
beings like ourselves, at least. [...] the supposition that reality is in fact a certain 
way, whatever we can manage to know or say about it - is as remarked 
obviously true. Some have denied it, of course. Every absurd position has its 
defendants..."356
At the moment it is perhaps advisable to leave version (7) aside. This then 
leaves us to consider the first six options. It appears to be the case, at least at 
first sight, that versions (1) - (3) can be ruled out when it comes to Hume’s 
philosophy because of the important role Hume gives to the mind in creating 
beliefs, which are perceptions, about continued identity, externality, etc. 
However, the matter is less straightforward than it appears to be because the 
mind is the bundle of perceptions. Hence the perceptions cannot depend upon 
the mind but the mind has to depend upon the perceptions. Since the mind is 
the compound of all particular perceptions it does not make much sense to 
speak of a facu lty of the mind" which enables the mind to perceive in the first 
place. Nevertheless, it can be said that perceptions depend in some sense upon 
the mind, since perceptions depend to some extent on other perceptions by 
certain principles of relation and association. The mind, which is the compound 
of all previous perceptions, also contains all present ones. Now we can narrow 
the claim that Hume writes as a Basic Realist by saying that Hume believes that
355 Even DESCARTES had no doubts that the reality of the thinking thing, when thinking, cannot reasonably 
be denied.
356 STRAWSON, G. ibid., p.72.
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either one of version (4) - (6) must be true. We can narrow the claim further to 
the versions (4) and (5) when we remember that impressions of sensation, 
although they have causes unknown, still are supposed to have causes. Hume 
also believes that we have no reliable means by which we are able to determine 
which of the two versions is the true one. Book One of the Treatise is certainly 
dedicated to establish the latter belief, but it does not deny the assumption of 
Basic Realism as the only plausible and the only natural option. The latter 
becomes especially clear when we remember that Hume, in the most sceptical 
Part of the most sceptical Section of Book One, is never doubting that the body, 
i.e. the existence of one’s own body, cannot reasonably, or otherwise, be 
denied. „We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of 
body? but ‘tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, 
which we must take for granted in all our reasonings."357 The question of 
whether a body does or does not exist cannot reasonably be asked. It is simply 
the wrong question. Hume’s question is clearly an epistemological one, there is 
no ontological problem here at all.358
Another important point concerning the causes of our perceptions has to be 
made. This point concerns version (7) of the ontological options. Hume writes: 
„By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be 
caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling 
them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind 
itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some
359other cause still more unknown to us?“ And he continues: „lt is a question of 
fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, 
resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; 
as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be
337 T.I,IV,II,187.
338 It could be argued that, in Hume’s account, ontology and epistemology are necessarily one. However, it is 
pretty clear that this is not so, especially when we turn our attention to perceptions of memory and 
imagination. To understand ontology and epistemology as one, one has, at the minimum, to maintain their one­
ness in respect to internal, i.e. immediately available perceptions. Hume, however, believes that we can 
mistake memory perceptions for perceptions of imagination and vice versa. I f  the ontology is epistemology - 
doctrine does not even apply to internal perceptions, how can it apply to „external“ perceptions?
359 EC H U ,XII,I,119, p. 152-153.
225
entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, 
and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects."360 
Therefore it seems that the option expressed in (7) has to be a possible 
ontological option. If so, then this seems to endanger the success of the claim 
that Hume is a Basic Realist. I wish to show that we are not compelled to accept 
version (7) as Hume’s ontological claim..
First of all, we have to note that Hume, in the Enquiry, not only shows that 
our sense experiences don’t give us any reason to believe in the existence of 
external objects, whether or not our perceptions resemble them, he also argues 
that any other ontological possibility cannot be penetrated by experience or 
reason alone. This ..impenetrability" is given by the way our perceptions are. The 
emphasis must lie with the notion of perception Hume employs. What Hume is 
essentially saying is that sense perceptions, as they are, cannot give us 
grounds to believe that they are caused by objects beyond the perceptions, 
including the human body. Thus, we are not able to make any claims, well 
founded on experience and reasoning, of whether or not these perceptions 
resemble those objects. However, statements or claims of these kinds are not 
necessary in terms of a Realist account. To be a Basic Realist it is only 
necessary to claim that objects beyond the perceptions exist, regardless of 
whether or not we are able to perceive them or something similar to them. There 
can also be the claim that the perceptions (as they are) are in some way 
influenced by these objects but that beliefs concerning the influence cannot be 
verified. The perceptions themselves don’t allow verification in the usual sense. 
So, a belief in the existence of such objects and in their influence upon our 
perceptions may well exist - to hold such a belief is sufficient for Basic Realism - 
although this belief can never be verified due to the nature of the perceptions.
It becomes clear that with such an understanding of Basic Realism (which is 
certainly closer to weak Basic Realism than to the strong version) the criterion of 
whether one is a Basic Realist or not lies not so much with the perceptions 
themselves, though they are undoubtedly interesting to the philosopher,
360 ibid., p. 153.
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especially if he favors strong Basic Realism, but with the acknowledgement or 
the denial of the existence of external objects. It must be perfectly clear that the 
question of Basic Realism is very much an ontological question. And though 
ontology and epistemology go often hand in hand, they cannot be reduced to 
one another. To deny Hume his Basic Realist conviction is doing exactly this. 
The claims: I hold a belief in the existence of external objects, and: I know that 
this belief is true, are two different claims. It is probably only fair to say that 
when I hold a belief I also believe that this belief is true. But this does not mean 
that I know that this belief is true when knowing requires the belief to be 
verified. The latter is certainly what Hume had in mind when discussing the 
acquisition of certain beliefs. There are beliefs we hold to be true, which are not 
verifiable. The belief in the existence of external objects, i.e. in something other 
than perceptions, is certainly one of them. It must also be noted that to say that 
we have nothing but perceptions is quite different from saying that there isn’t 
anything but the perceptions. A philosopher, like Hume, who wants to hold the 
former is not compelled to also hold the latter.
Hume, who made it one of his main tasks to point out to us the restricted 
nature of our epistemological realm and who was interested in human nature 
would, rhetorically speaking, be the last person to claim that the world is just as 
restricted as we are. If he really wanted to make claims of this kind, the entire 
discussion in Book One of the Treatise would be entirely obsolete. Our limits 
would certainly not be of any philosophical interest whatsoever. It is because of 
these limits that we cannot determine what the nature of this something out 
there really is. Nature, well „aware“ of our limitations, compells us to believe in 
exactly this something out there. „As a sceptic, Hume does not claim to know 
the correctness of any Basic realist position about the nature of objects. As he 
rightly says, one cannot know for sure what gives rise to one’s perceptions. [...] 
Hume is clear that we could never decide between these various Basic Realist 
options. At the same time he takes it for granted that there does exist an 
external reality, i.e. something other than our perceptions, something which 
affects us and gives rise to our perceptions; and in this sense he does
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positively, and crucially, adopt a Basic Realist position of some sort with regard 
to ‘the objects’.1'361
It also has been pointed out that the body has some influence upon our 
perceptions, which is important if we want to understand the body as the 
principle of unity of the perceptions. This means we must be able to, at least, 
determine one influence of the body upon the perceptions. This is the influence 
upon the set of perceptions, perceived as my set of perceptions, which is 
created, as this particular set, by the body.362 This influence, or, as we could 
also call it: dependency, is not a direct one. What I perceive are the perceptions 
only. The body is also epistemologically nothing more than a perception (of the 
imagination).
If we turn our attention back to Book One of the Treatise we will find 
manifold passages which strongly suggest that Hume did never seriously doubt 
the existence of external objects, including the human body. Hume believes, as 
has already been mentioned, the true nature of body or of bodies to be 
undiscoverable, but his remarks made on several occassions in Book One 
suggest that he takes the existence of the body for granted: „...that my intention 
never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain the secret causes of 
their operations. [...] I am afraid, that such an enterprize is beyond the reach of 
human understanding, and that we can never pretend to know body otherwise 
than by those external properties, which discover themselves to the senses."363 
And later on, when discussing causation, he writes: „The uniting principle
among our internal perceptions is as unintelligible as that among external
objects, and is not known to us any other way than by experience1-.364
Furthermore, Hume’s discussion of causation seems to imply the existence of
external objects: „Here then it appears, that of those three relations, which 
depend not upon the mere ideas, the only one, that can be trac’d beyond our 
senses, and informs us of existences and objects, which we do not see or feel,
361 STRAWSON, G. ibid., p.67-68.
362 In my hypothesis, the body alone is necessary and sufficient to unite all the different perceptions. But the
body itself is not a self without the perceptions.
363 T.I,II,V ,64.
364 T.I,III,X IV ,169.
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is causation.“365 Causation „informs us“ about existences. It may well be that our 
information in their detailed content are non verifiable, Hume does not claim that 
they are nor is verification necessary to hold a Basic Realist account. If there 
were nothing beyond the senses (i.e. beyond sense perceptions) it would not 
make sense to employ terms like information at all (we would be more inclined 
to use terms like invention, for instance) nor would it be possible to have some 
information about this something, even if the information consists of nothing but 
that this something exists, whatever it happens to be.
GALEN STRAWSON, who argues that Hume is a Basic Realist in terms of 
the existence of causation366 , writes: „Hume believes in Causation ‘in the 
objects’ (it never really occurs to him to doubt it) in so far as he ever adopts any 
Basic Realist position with respect to objects: any interpretation of ‘the objects’ 
according to which their existence involves the existence of something other 
than our perceptions, something which affects us and gives rise to our 
perceptions and is the reason why they are as they are (leaving aside any
00*7
contribution we ourselves make to their character.)1 We may also take an 
enlightening passage from Of the Standard of Taste as additional evidence that 
Hume is, at heart, a Basic Realist. „Because no sentiment represents what is 
really in the object. It only marks a certain conformity or relation between the 
object and the organs or faculties of the mind; and if that conformity did not
368really exist, the sentiment could never possibly have being.“ Hume is here not 
merely a Basic Realist who does not venture from the assumption that there 
really are objects existing „out there1'. He expresses an even stronger conviction, 
which, as such, would be impossible to adopt for someone who wants to deny 
Basic Realism, namely: that our perceptions (sentiments) conform somehow to 
the true nature of the objects. This conformity is certainly just as impossible to 
prove as the existence of objects beyond perceptions. However, it is Hume’s
365 T.I,III,II,74.
366 The meaning of existence here is opposed to the meaning it has when thought of only as an invention, a 
fabrication of the imagination. STRAWSON argues that causation is a real relation between, at least, real 
perceptions.
567 STRAWSON, G. ibid., p. 145.
368 SOT., p.230.
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aim to show that our ontological beliefs cannot be proven in a way strict 
epistemological demands require. Reason has its shortcomings - and it is these 
shortcomings Hume wants to draw attention to.369
To conclude the argument for Hume’s Basic Realism I wish to refer to a 
discussion Hume undertakes in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. 
Hume’s statements here should make absolutely clear that Hume’s scepticism 
is an epistemological one. He himself attacks ontological sceptics in the Enquiry 
as they are making unreasonable (in the very sense Hume wants to understand 
the role as well as the limitations of reason) and absurd claims. Strict sceptics, 
to sharpen up Hume’s own opinion, deny theoretically not only the possibility of 
any philosophy but they have also no understanding, as theorists, of what it is to 
be a human being. Furthermore, the Enquiry contains a discussion of 
scepticism which is not directed at a distinction between ontological (strict) 
scepticism and epistemological (moderate) scepticism, but refers to a 
scepticism about the nature of our perceptions. This is scepticism towards the 
belief that our perceptions are the external objects themselves. This is very 
much the type of scepticism which is Hume’s very own and belongs, in kind, to 
moderate scepticism. Hume starts out to argue that we cannot answer the 
question of whether our perceptions are the external objects themselves or 
representations of them. „Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, 
may they [the sceptics] say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these 
lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external 
object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational 
opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? 
You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments; 
and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing
369 There will be the occasional philosopher who wants to point out that the Essays are not only concerned 
with completely different topics than the Treatise, but that they also stem from different assumptions. Though 
the former may well be true, I believe that because the Essays as well as the Treatise were written by the same 
man we must not only see them according to their topical differences, but also in relation to one another, both 
based on the same set of philosophical beliefs. Philosophers seem to have no difficulties whatsoever in taking 
W ITTGENSTEIN’S work as a whole, although he renounced his early philosophy later in life. Why should 
they not take the same attitude towards Hume, who didn’t renounce his philosophy at all?
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argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any 
external objects."370
An interpretation of the passage has to pay attention to two points. Firstly, 
by suggesting that there is a natural propensity to take our perceptions (of the 
senses) as the external objects themselves, Hume refers to what he believes to 
be the view of the vulgar. „’Tis certain, that almost all mankind, and even 
philosophers themselves, for the greatest part of their lives, take their 
perceptions to be their only objects, and suppose, that the very being, which is 
intimately present to the mind, is the real body or material existence."371 This 
view is not entirely consistent, not only because of the reasonable suggestion 
that the vulgar are far more likely to adopt a representationalist account than the 
naive understanding of perception Hume suggests. It is also possible to 
question Hume’s account of the vulgar beliefs on logical grounds.372 Secondly, 
though Hume is suggesting in the Enquiry that the question must remain 
undecided since experience cannot provide a completely satisfying answer 
either way, we can easily expand the scope of the problem towards the question
373whether our perceptions are representations of external objects or are non­
representative of the object’s nature but dependent, in whatever way, on that 
object. This is surely the more pressing question and the crucial one in terms of 
Hume’s Basic Realism.
A theory of perception such as Hume’s can tell us that our perceptions are 
not the objects themselves (note that the vulgar do not have a philosophical 
not ion of perception) but it cannot tell us whether these are representational or 
non-representational. Hume’s scepticism targets any attempt to answer this 
question positively either way. But it doesn’t raise the ontological question of 
whether there are such objects or not. The entire problem of a 
representationalist account would be a second order problem once we have 
doubts about the very grounds it rests on, namely that there are objects „out
370 ECHU, XII,1,121 ,p. 154.
371 T.I,IV,II,206.
372 See for a discussion STROUD, B. Hume, Routledge, London, 1994, esp. pp. 105.
373 This would be LOCKE’s account, especially where primary qualities are concerned.
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there". Hume’s attack on ontological scepticism in the Enquiry is quite severe 
although it is also good-natured and carried by common sense. There can be no 
doubt that Hume does not question the existence of something beyond one’s 
perceptions. „On the contrary, he [the ontological sceptic] must acknowledge, if 
he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his 
principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would 
immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of 
nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an 
event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle."374 
And a little later on Hume is quite hopeful for the sanity of an ontological sceptic 
when he writes: „When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in 
the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere 
amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical 
condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not 
able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the 
foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be 
raised against them."375 So it is not that we could choose, or convince ourselves 
by theoretical means, to be something other than Basic Realists. This is not only 
true of the vulgar but also of the philosopher. Though the vulgar may have 
misconceptions regarding the nature of the perceptions, their basic belief in the 
existence of external objects is shared by the philosopher who is nothing but a 
human being too. Thus, to deny Hume’s Basic Realism is to deny one of the 
cornerstones of Hume’s philosophy. It is to deny the very point of his scepticism 
concerning matters of reasoning.
A common objection to Hume reflects the difficulties we have in accepting 
the limitations of reason. It can be argued that although we all hold the belief 
that external objects exist, once we look at the way this belief is acquired we will 
find that it rests upon fiction. The question: „Do you believe in the existence of 
body?", must be answered in the affirmative (it is „vain“ to ask the question). 
However, the question „Does the body exist?" must remain undecided or must
374 ECHU,XII,II, 128,p. 160.
375 ibid.
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be answered in the negative if the question is taken to mean „Are you justified to 
hold the belief of yours to be true?“. It is my opinion that such an argument 
disregards wholly the criticism of reason as an almighty tool of understanding 
Hume is expressing. The success of an argument such as the above implies 
that one sees an inconsistency between the initial belief and the „irrational“ 
acquisition. By trusting the logic of how we come to hold such a belief one must 
be persuaded that the belief cannot justifiably be true.
First of all, even if this were truly so we could not abandon the initial belief, 
because nature didn’t leave us any choice in this matter. However, it could be 
argued that although it may be impossible to abandon the belief in external 
existence on a every day level, the philosopher should see its 
unreasonableness. I believe, it is exactly Hume’s point not to deny that the 
belief in external existence is unreasonable. But for Hume reason is not half as 
reliable and informative about matters of real existence as we usually take it to 
be, and as especially DESCARTES argued for. Hume sets the instinct to hold a 
belief that body exists as embedded in our nature and almost as a first principle 
which is untouchable by reason and which therefore does not require any 
justification in regard to its truthfulness. The fact that the belief rests upon a 
fiction is an epistemological, not an ontological point. This is just as enlightening 
about human nature as is the fact that this belief cannot be tested by reason or 
reasonable means.
Secondly, if we look again at Hume's remarks in the Enquiry, there cannot 
be any doubt that Hume is a Basic Realist. He says quite clearly: ..that all
human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. 
The sceptic principles, however, cannot prevail. Nature is too strong for them 
nor does the sceptic convince us that our basic belief in the existence of body is 
false. We cannot prove the opposite to be true either, but the matter is not open 
to proof, it is simply not within the realm of reason. We must remember: the 
sceptical argument rests upon reason too. „That is the point of Hume’s 
discussion of scepticism. They are intended to show that reason, as traditionally
376 ibid.
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understood, is not the dominant force in human life.“377 In the light of the 
criticism Hume places against reason as the ultimate supplier of true beliefs - 
especially the one in the existence of body - appears the claim that Hume was 
not a Basic Realist as what it truly is: a claim which destroys the Humean 
philosophy as a whole.
The body as the principle of unity of perceptions in Hume’s theory
Now that it has been determined that Hume’s account is ontologically a Basic 
Realist account it still remains to be shown that the body can be the principle of 
unity of the perceptions. It has to be established that the human body has not 
only existence beyond the perceptions (whatever its true nature happens to be) 
but that the body can fulfill the role given to the principle of unity without 
contradicting Hume’s account of the body in the Treatise.
The body is the principle of unity of perceptions as all perceptions belonging 
to a particular body form a particular set of perceptions which belongs only to 
this particular body and to no other. It is quite clear that there is a great number 
of perceptions which, in kind, are common to a great number of particular 
bodies, given the right circumstances. X  has the perception of a table, so do Y 
and Z  X, /  and Z  may have the perception P at the same instant in time. They 
are, for instance, in the same room and all of them perceive P visually. It can 
also occur that X, Y and Zhave the perceptions P at different instances in time. 
When my son has been to the Zoo and tells me that he has seen penguins I 
know that he had the perception of penguins on this day, and indeed, had 
similar perceptions on all previous visits to the Zoo. I also had the perception of 
penguins previously, but not all of them at the same time as Niklas. This gives 
already some indication that we use the body as a criterion of presence at a 
certain location (space), and since we are capable of memory and do have 
memories, also of presence in time. However, we will see that the body alone is 
not a sufficient criterion to determine my presence or Niklas’ presence. If it were 
sufficient we could not hold that self identity and personal identity have a mental
377 STROUD, B. ibid., p. 116-117.
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as well as a bodily criterion nor were we in accordance with Hume’s theory 
which defines self identity as the bundle of perceptions.
Firstly, we have to note that if the body which is usually referred to as my 
body (by me and by others) were present in the Zoo, but would not perceive 
anything, then it would not make much sense to say that I (or that Thurid) was 
present. To maintain the body as the principle of unity of perceptions is not to 
say that the body is identical with the perceptions. The latter is a complete 
impossibility given Hume’s account of perceptions. To say that the body is 
identical with perceptions is an ontological statement about the nature of the 
body; and, as we have seen, such statement cannot be made. Secondly, 
regarding the great number of similar perceptions, such as seeing a table, and 
their affiliation to a certain body it must be said that, first of all, each one of 
these perceptions may or may not belong to one particular body. We cannot say 
that the perception of a table at a certain time belongs only to X. Y may as well 
perceive a table at this particular time. However, the question of affiliation of 
perceptions is relatively straightforward. A particular perception P(a) is X s  
perception if, and only if, it belongs to, or is affiliated to the body X  at this
070
particular time and is therefore an element of the set of perceptions which is 
united by the body X.379
We must also keep in mind that the body, as an object beyond our 
perceptions, nevertheless influences them as it was pointed out during the 
discussion of Basic Realism. This means that a particular body will have some 
influence upon the affiliated perceptions. It does not matter that we cannot 
determine this influence further due to the epistemological restrictions, it is 
sufficient that such an influence is given to say that the perceptions of one body 
will be unique as far as this body is one and no other. This, of course, implies 
the uniqueness of the entire set of perceptions, i.e. the bundle. This uniqueness 
is given by the oneness of the body and by the uniqueness of the perceptions
378 The problem of the local conjunction is discussed elsewhere. Note that ontological statements about the 
nature of the body, i.e. that it is extended, divisible but has no intelligent features etc., cannot reasonably be 
made.
379 This expression shall prevent mistakes of believing that X  is X ’s body.
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themselves in their relations to each other and to the body. The what-it-is-like of 
the perception, including the complex perception of the self, is provided for by 
the very nature of the perceptions themselves, harnessed in the philosophical 
concept of perception per se. Even if we allow for shared perceptions it is still 
the case that each particular set’s impression of itself will be unique,as far as 
the particular set is unique. This could also account towards a certain 
uniqueness of every particular perception because the perceptions is in relation 
to a particular set. Although we cannot perceive any real connection between 
the perceptions it is still possible that every single perception is what it is (and is 
what it is perceived as) partly because of the relation it is has to its antecedent 
perceptions.380
Ontologically, it is not necessary to make any statements concerning the 
nature of our body. We don’t have to be able to give a detailed account of the 
way our body influences our perceptions either. It is sufficient to believe that 
there exist different bodies and that one of them is mine. This basic belief is 
unverifiable, but it is a belief which I, like any other human being, necessarily 
hold. The question is not whether one can verify the belief that all perceptions 
which make up my self are united by one body they are affiliated to or not. The 
question is whether such a belief contradicts any claim Hume makes in the 
Treatise and elsewhere.
To answer this question should be relatively straightforward since Hume's 
statements about our idea of body are epistemologically, not ontologically, 
inclined. Before we can enter this discussion it is, however, necessary to 
investigate another important issue: It could be argued that the claim of the 
body as the principle of unity of perceptions makes an ontological claim about 
the nature of the body which cannot reasonably be made. This would, if it were
o  o -j
true, contradict the necessary claim that nothing about the nature of the 
object (something) beyond the perceptions can positively be known. This
380 To look at a single perception in separation would, epistemologically, still be possible.
381 Hume’s Basic Realism must not contradict his theory of perceptions.
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objection can be taken even further by arguing that to identify this something 
with the body is a step completely unjustified and unaccounted for.
To the latter criticism it is possible to reply that there should be no difficulty 
in calling this something beyond perceptions body as long as no further 
statements about, let’s say, its appearance are believed to be justified. When 
we consider that Hume attributes the perceptions to the mind, or better, claims 
them to be the mind, we should find no difficulty in employing the term body in 
the historical context of pairing these two concepts. Our idea of one mind 
identical with itself is epistemologically just as fictitious as our idea of the body, 
so far as Hume is concerned. Both are, in this sense, beyond the perceptions 
themselves. Since the mind is an idea gained by reflection upon the permanent 
succession (when we are conscious) of the perceptions themselves, which in 
itself (the reflection) is a perception (the complex impression of reflection Hume 
calls the self) and since there is nothing in the perceptions themselves which 
can reach beyond them in content, we can mark out the difference between our 
ideas of mind and of body. The idea of body does not depend upon the constant 
succession of perceptions generally, but does only depend upon the succession 
of perceptions resembling each other to a certain degree. For the following 
arguments to be understood correctly it is important to keep in mind that I will 
use the term perception and the expressions perception of and perception of X 
in the Humean and not in a representational sense.
Apart from other factors, such as our propensity for constancy and 
coherence, the corning about of the idea of the rnind rests not upon perceptions 
as particular perceptions (particular in terms of particular objects of perception). 
It only requires, firstly, that there are perceptions recognized, by reflection, to be 
perceptions (but not necessarily what they are perceptions of) and secondly, 
that they succeed one another permanently in times of consciousness. 
Whereas the idea of body, and especially the ideas of particular bodies, require 
that perceptions are recognized as what they are perceptions of, i.e. they have 
to be recognized in content, and not only in kind.
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If we have a sequence of perceptions this sequence will not only contain 
perceptions of bodies like perceptions of the sun (S), an apple (A), my boy­
friend (J), a goldhamster (G), my own body (B), but also perception such as love 
(L), willing (W), perceptions of having an idea (I) or being confused (C). The 
latter perceptions, perse, do not contain any bodily contents. For the acquisition 
of the idea of the mind it is sufficient that the sequence (or any sequence) is 
perceived. Further more, sequences of the form:
(1) SSSAAABBBBBBLLLLAASSCCCCIIIIAAAAGGGGWWWW
(2) SSSAAAAJJJJGGGGBBBB
(3) LLLL WWWWIIIICCCC
will all be able to lead to the idea of the mind. To make the matter even clearer,
(1) can be reduced to containing mental (M) as well as bodily (B) perceptions,
(2) contains only bodily and (3) only mental perceptions. So that we can reduce 
the description of these sequences to
(a) BBBBBBBBBBBBMMMMBBBBMMMMMMMMMBBBBBBBBMMMM
(b) BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
(c) MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM
However, the idea of body can only be gained from sequences (1) and (2), that 
is, sequences (a) and (b), but not from sequence (3). i.e. (c). This is certainly an 
epistemologically important difference between the idea of the mind and the
idea nf the body.
We can extrapolate this argument onto the acquisition of the idea of one's 
own body as distinct from other bodies. Every perception of the senses contains 
a perception of one's own body: I see with my eyes382, smell with my nose, 
touch with my skin etc. Since, in Hume’s terms, the sun is just as ‘external’ and 
reasonably inaccessible to me as my nose, the question arises how I am able to 
arrive at a distinction between my nose and the sun. In more general terms: how
382 I leave here aside thought experiments suggesting that I can perceive someone else’s body parts as my own 
body parts.
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am I able to come up with a distinction between my own body and its parts and 
bodies and their parts I do believe not to belong to my body.
As I have suggested, the sequence of perceptions-argument can be applied 
in answering this question satisfactorily. To begin with, we can say that to have 
a perception of the sun (or to have any sense perception whatsoever) it is 
necessary that this perception contains a perception of my own body in virtue of 
its parts, whereas to have a perception of my own body (as a whole or in its 
parts) does not require any other content. Some ‘objects’ are perceived as being 
my body or parts of it and some are not. This alone is sufficient to give rise to 
the belief that some perceptions are perceptions (or contain perceptions) of my 
own body and some don’t. From this it can be inferred that there is something I 
call ‘my own body’ and that there is also something I believe to be different from 
it and would not call ‘my own body’. Here, we have to take perceptions very 
much as what they are.
If we go back to our example involving the perception of the sun (S) and the 
perception of my own body (B) we will find that sequences of perception can 
have the following form:
(1) SSSSSS
(2) BBBBBB
Or. in more general terms, the sequences can be understood as sequences of 
percept ion of one's own body (B) and of objects other than one's own body (O).
(a; OOOOOO
(b) BBBBBB
P(O) contains P(B) but that P(B) does not contain P(O). Thus, it follows that to 
have a perception as in (a) I also have to have a perception as in (b), but I can 
have sequence (b) without sequence (a) having to occur or having to have had 
occurred. The idea of my own body can be inferred from sequence (b) alone 
whereas the idea of any object other than my body can only be gained by (a)
239
and (b) both having taken place, (a) necessarily contains (b) because (a) is a 
sequence of sense perceptions.
However, it could be argued that P(b) must necessarily imply P(a), as, in our 
example of the sun and seeing, it is impossible to see without light, that is, 
without something ‘external’ other than my own body. It is certainly true that the 
sense of vision requires something else than a human body equipped with this 
sense, and so does, indeed, the sense of hearing. The latter requires a medium 
transporting sounds, such as air or water and something similar has certainly to 
be said about the sense of smell. But these requirements do not apply to all 
senses generally. And if they do not, then it cannot be said that the senses 
necessarily require something other than the respective human body itself. 
Therefore it cannot be true that own-body-perception implies the perception of 
something other than the body in question.
It is also my opinion that a distinction has to be made between the 
perception of an object other than my own body and the mediator of the 
perception. In the ordinary way of perceiving we are not aware of natural 
mediators, such as light or air. The mediator, as a mediator, does not feature 
strongly in the content of perception unless the circumstances of perception are 
difficult because of absence, distortion or turbulence of the natural mediator. In 
cases like this, we become aware of the mediator as the object of our 
perception in the strict sense, which gives it a complete ly different role in the 
perception. In any case, we are certainly more aware of our own body or the 
objects other than one ’s own body than of the mediator if we are consciously 
aware of the latter at all. At times when we cannot see because it is dark or 
cannot hear because of the wind blowing strongly in the opposite direction we 
are most prominently aware of the shortcomings of our own senses which are 
not fit to fulfill their function in such an environment. It seems to be the case that 
we become aware of the mediator and by doing so make it to the very object of 
our perception because of the improper function of our senses, and not vice 
versa.
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Returning to the argument itself we will find that the sense of touch, and 
perhaps the sense of taste also, require no additional external objects or 
circumstances to function properly. I can touch my own body, taste my own skin 
and everybody who has participated in the children’s experiment of stroking two 
fingers, one one’s own and one someone else’s, at the same time with the 
same hand will know the very strange feeling it produces because of the 
contrasting yet similar sensations of touching my own body and touching 
someone else’s.
If my argument can be accepted then it follows that a general distinction 
between own-body-perceptions and perceptions of other objects can be made. 
This distinction is twofold. Firstly, own-body-perceptions are different in nature 
from perceptions of other bodies as the sequence argument has shown. 
Secondly, the experiential content of own-body-perceptions differs from 
perceptions of other bodies because all sense perceptions are either entirely, or 
in contentual parts, taken to be own-body-perceptions by the manner they 
present themselves to the mind. For this to be true it is not required that one 
already knows that there is something we call our  own body. It is not necessary 
to have already acquired either idea: the idea of body or the idea of my own 
body. The occurrence of impressions of sensation (without them having 
produced their respective ideas) is quite sufficient to account for the distinction 
epistemological ly .
I bel ieve one can even go so far to claim that the idea of one 's own body, 
apart  f rom all addit ional  condit ions in a Hum van context  (working of imaginat ion 
etc.). is acquired because of the fe lt dist inct ion in the first place. There  are 
percep t ions  and perceptual  contents which foe! di f ferent than  others,  they feel 
to be about  someth ing  different in kind than other  perceptions. Perceptions of 
my own body are of a different quality in what they feel like than other 
perceptions. „...obvious examples are acting with our bodies and feeling 
sensations in them. Both are unique to our relation with our own bodies, in
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contrast to our relations with all other objects.1'383 Seeing a tree is not just seeing 
a tree but also seeing a tree. It is the latter, though both can be objects of 
perception, which one can describe as being part of the experience one has of 
something one is rather than being the experience of something one is 
not.384
At this point it is perhaps necessary to address problems brought up by 
philosophers concerning what M.G.F.MARTIN calls the sole-object view. The 
problem, so it is claimed, occurs when one makes the thought experiment that a 
person could feel the sensations in another person’s body. According to this 
such ability leads to the overstepping of the boundaries of one’s own body and 
implies that the one mind-one body idea has to be abandoned. ..Wittgenstein 
rightly claims that one can easily conceive of a case in which it feels to one as if 
there is pain in one’s left hand and one indicates one’s neighbor’s hand when
ooc
asked where it hurts." The problem this example is supposed to generate is 
not only the problem of whether bodily experience of one ’s own body is 
experience of a sole object or of a multiplicity of objects. The implications reach 
further, because if the latter were true it could be denied „that sensation is 
perceptual awareness of one ’s body."386 This argument has to be taken into 
consideration because it denies my claims to be true.
One way to refute the multiplicity-argument is to say that such a perception
would be a hallucination or an illusion, similar in kind to illusions occurring in 
cases of missing limbs (pseudo-pains). This is hardly conclusive. Even if we 
consider „thai such experiences can only be genuinely perceptual and count as 
the awareness of some body part, rather than as a case of illusion or
1:11.AN . N.. M ARC F.L.  A.. B H M ldD E Z . J.L. Sel f-Consciousness and the Bodx:  An Interd is t ip l i na rx  
Int roduct ion,  in: B E R M U D E Z .  J.L.. M A R C E L .  A.. L1LAN . N. (e d s j  The Bodx and  the Self. A  Brad lord 
Book. M I T  Press 1995. p.4.
vVl 1 have avoided to use the term /, because the body is not the sole criterion of self-identity and is, on its own, 
not sufficient for the self to come about. However, the body is still a criterion for self-identity and it makes 
perfect sense that little children, who only refer to themselves in the third person, can say what they are not 
without being able to say that they are I. Niklas was not quite sure what I meant when I  asked: „Are you 
you?“, but he answered questions like „Is Niklas a cat?“ immediately in the negative by pointing at our cat 
saying ..That’s cat,“. Of course only then when he wasn’t pretending to be a cat.
38 MARTIN, M.G.F. Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership, in: BERMUDEZ, J.L., MARCEL, A.,
EILAN, N. (eds.) ibid., p.274.
386 ibid., p.273.
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hallucination, if the body part in question is actually part of one’s own body.“387 I 
don’t believe this is a very good argument, especially not in an empiricist context 
such as Hume’s, because we would have to know what our own body is before 
we can determine whether or not a certain perception is a perceptions of one’s 
own body. MARTIN wants to strengthen the objection by removing the 
hallucinatory part and writes: „To avoid any trace of illusion, we must suppose 
that this new area of pain does not feel to the sufferer as if it is within his own 
left hand. Rather, it must feel as if it is in some new part of his body, as if he had
og o
grown a new hand.1 However, although I can understand why someone would 
think that scenarios such as these are problematic, I find it difficult to 
understand why they should necessarily pose a problem. I believe the problem 
only occurs if we have a certain definition of what the body (as a whole and 
composition of its parts) is. If it is part of the definition that the human body is 
one big lump of organized matter and all its parts are connected by the same 
matter then, of course, the multiplicity argument is a problem. First of all, the left 
hand of my neighbor is not connected to my lump of carbo-hydrates by other 
carbo-hydrates. If I believe, secondly, that I have suddenly grown a new hand 
then this contradicts the definition that humans only have two hands. If I have 
lost one hand and believe I have grown a new one (which is actually my 
neighbor’s), then I know that I lost one hand just as I also know that hands don’t 
grow back. I am faced with a conflict between my new perception and my 
definition of the human body, especially when we consider that, when I point out 
the hand I have perceptions in, it will not be a lump of carbo-hydrates attached 
to my other body-parts by carbo-hydrates. The latter also applies when I am not 
aware that I lost one hand but believe my neighbor's hand to be mine.
I believe it is clear that the problem only arises in view of a certain definition 
of my own body and its boundaries. If everybody would perceive one’s 
neighbor’s hand as one’s own, the definition of what one’s body is would be 
quite different. It is perfectly possible to extend the body’s boundaries onto 
one’s neighbor’s hand. In that case I would not have to believe that I have
387 ibid., p.275.
388 ibid.
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several bodies. My neighbor’s hand can be easily included into what I believe 
my own one body. Under these circumstances I would not call my third hand 
„my neighbor’s hand" but „my own". Even if we suppose that there could be 
some overlapping of ownership of body-parts, i.e. my middle hand I have 
perceptions in is my neighbor’s right hand he has perceptions in, there is no 
necessity to abandon the perceptual criterion of body-awareness and 
ownership. In a Humean account our notion of the body, epistemologically 
fictitious, would simply change in its detailed contents if experiences like the 
above would commonly occur. Since they don’t, there is no need to change the 
notion of our own body in its detailed contents. The notion is what it is because 
of the experiences of our own body we commonly do have. If we adopt a third 
person’s view point we will find that we can perceive others as other people (in 
terms of identity) only in so far as we believe them to be bundles of perceptions 
and in so far as we can observe the external signs of their perceptions by their 
bodies. If so, the matter is very straightforward: if we observe that Frank cries 
out in pain every time Paul puts his hand into fire and we are also convinced 
that Frank feels the pain in Paul’s hand (and is not just faking it) we may well 
adapt our notion of what Frank’s body is accordingly.
If we look at the matter in terms of the claim that the body is the principle of 
unity of perceptions it is not too complicated either. There is no necessary rule 
which postulates that bodies cannot overlap, that is that the perception A cannot 
..belong” to body X  and to body Y at the same time. This does not pose a threat 
to self identity and personal identity. The same perception belonging to different 
bodies also belongs to different sets of perceptions. A(X) is e lement of the set 
BCDA(X) because B,C and D are perceptions affiliated to X  and occurred in 
this order. A(Y) is part of the set EFGA(Y) which is a set of different perceptions 
apart from A. It may also be so that X and Y belong to sets with „same“ 
elements but they are in a different order. This suggests that these are different 
sets just as the sets must be different sets if they are composed of different 
elements. Only if two sets are entirely identical in all their elements and in the 
order of their elements we would have to say that these two sets are identical.
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They both are then (the bundle/set is the self) one and the same individual. 
Considering the bundle-definition it is clear that two identical bundles cannot be 
understood as two different individuals but have to be understood as one. This 
does not bring us into conflict with the bodily criterion of identity, since the 
bundle of perceptions contains the own-body-perceptions.
This does not set the perceptions, and the body they are affiliated to, 
identical. If we would set them identical we would make an ontological 
statement about the nature of the body, and such statements cannot reasonably 
be made. Instead, we use the areas of perceptions perceived as a criterion to 
identify ownership of body. Here we seem to be confronted with a circular 
argument: The body shall, on the one hand, serve as a principle of unity of 
perception, on the other hand, we use perceptions as a criterion to determine 
what body belongs to which perception. I believe that this circularity is not a 
vicious one but does highlight the point that the body can be thought of as the 
principle of unity of perceptions. If the body is this principle then, and only then, 
can we use the perceptions themselves to determine ownership of body 
(whatever this body happens to be).
We have seen the epistemological difference between the idea of mind and 
the idea of body in terms of the perceptions and their contents. We also have
seen the epistemological difference between the idea and the perception of
one's own body and the ideas and percept ions of bo die s other  than one's own. 
This c lear  d if ference,  toge ther with Hume 's  Basic Real ism. is a good basis for 
ii ie claim that the body is ;he principle of unity of pew ep i ious .
In reply to a possib le argument :  to say that  the body is the principle of unity 
or perceptions is to make an ontological claim about the true nature of body, 
must be pointed out that no such ontological claim is being made. Claiming the 
body to be the principle of unity of perceptions is not the same as, nor does it 
imply, any claims about the nature of the body if nature is understood in the 
Aristotelian way. The claim in question is about the role, or the function of the 
body and is arrived at by Hume’s very own method: observation and inductive 
reasoning. We arrived at the idea that the body could be the principle of unity of
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perceptions by employing Hume’s own scientific and naturalistic method, by 
looking at the perceptions, in their contents and in their relations to one another.
We have looked at our basic beliefs and the role of reason as it was discussed 
by Hume and have, testing different candidates, employed an eliminative 
method. „Hume’s theory sees every aspect of human life as naturalistically 
explicable. It places man squarely within the scientifically intelligible world of 
nature, and thus conflicts with the traditional conception of a detached rational 
subject.1,389 To make statements about something’s functions is to make 
statements about what this something does, not about what its nature, in terms 
of powers or capacities, is. It is true, the former suggests some understanding 
of the term nature, Hume uses it quite frequently in the Treatise, its title refers to 
human nature. However, the meaning of the term employed by Hume differs 
from the Aristotelian meaning. And it is the latter we usually employ when we 
talk about ontological claims about the nature of something. The suggested 
accusation employs an Aristotelian meaning of the term nature. The claim that 
the body can be understood as the principle of unity is perfectly compatible with 
the meaning Hume gives to the term, since we only refer to what the body does. 
The body is seen here as a principle in relation to something else, i.e. the 
perceptions. Such view of the body does not necessitate any knowledge about 
the intrinsic nature of body, the only other claim which is necessary is the claim 
that the body really does exist, i.e. that Hume is a Basic Realist. If this can be 
accepted then we can conclude that the suggested criticism can be dismissed 
on the grounds of a shift in meaning of terminology.
Now that it has been shown that the claim that the body is the principle of unity 
of perceptions is. firstly, accommodating Hum e’s view upon perception and 
secondly, is also in accordance with Hume’s Basic Realism it still remains to be 
demonstrated that the claim in question does not contradict important parts of 
Hume’s account. In the following I will examine the two most relevant of Hume’s 
claims concerning the body in the Treatise. The first, the claim of fictitiousness 
of the idea of body, is commonly known and can be expected to be brought
389 STROUD, B. ibid., p. 13.
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forward against my interpretation of Hume’s theory almost automatically, 
although I believe that this claim poses no threat to my account but is perfectly 
compatible with it. The second claim I wish to discuss concerns the local 
conjunction which can serve towards a most serious objection.
1. The fictitiousness of our idea of body390
Fictitiousness of the idea of body and real existence of body do not exclude one 
another since they are maintained on different „levels“ in Hume’s philosophy. 
The fictitiousness of the idea of body is epistemological fictitiousness, whereas 
real existence is ontological real existence of the body, not of its idea. It is 
because of the epistemological fictitiousness that our ontological convictions are 
non-verifiable. Hume, however, is far from questioning these ontological 
convictions themselves, instead he is interested in the mechanisms of their 
acquisition. To understand one’s own body as the principle of unity of one’s 
perceptions does not require the idea of one’s own body not to be a fiction 
epistemologically - it only requires real existence of body, whether or not it can 
be observed or demonstrated is completely irrelevant. Thus, an objection 
against the body as the principle of unity must show, that Hume, in fact, is not a 
Basic Realist. Epistemological fictitiousness of body alone will not suffice as 
such an objection, it can, if anything, only be instrumental towards the denial of 
Hume's Basic Realism. To utilize the fictitiousness of body in this way is a 
distor tion of Hume 's  ent ire phi losophy.  It is to say that  a) because  the certainty 
of our senses to sense someth ing  which is real can be des troyed by reason and 
bi because we cannot  gam the idea of body by reason,  body  does not exist. 
This is to declare reason to be the u lt imate cri terion of what  is and what  is not. 
Reason Is supposed  to have dem ons t ra ted  the falsity of our  bel ief in the 
existence of body. This is hardly Hume’s point, it is true that reason cannot 
verify our belief in the existence of body, but neither can it falsify this belief. „ln 
calling these assumptions „fictions“, Hume is saying not that they are false, but
390 The term body is used here in a general sense, it shall refer to one’s own body and to the things we usually 
call external objects.
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rather that they are unverifiable, and so unverified.391 [...] They are indeed 
precisely the sort of beliefs that Kant was to dub ..synthetic a p r io r iThey are 
neither assured nor ruled out by the definitions of the terms combined in them. 
They do not assert merely what Hume called ..relations of ideas," so they are 
..synthetic." They are not empirically verifiable or falsifiable, so they are „a 
priori1: 392
The fictitiousness of the idea of body is not only compatible with the claim 
that the body is the principle of unity of perceptions, it is also required. It is one 
of Hume’s postulates Jhat the mind never perceives any real connexion
q q q
amongst distinct existences“ , that is, the perceptions. The body as the
principle of unity can be said to form, ontologically, a „real connexion" between 
the perceptions. But the connection itself must remain unperceivable. It would, 
however, be perceivable if the idea of body would not be a fiction.
If my arguments are accepted then we can say that the fictitiousness of the 
idea of body is not a problem, but rather serves the claim that the body can 
function ontologically as the principle of unity of perceptions.
2. The Local Conjunct ion
Hume writes in Of the Immateriality of the Soul: „an object may exist, and yet be 
no where [...] Now this is evidently the case with all our perceptions and objects, 
except those  of the sight and feeling. [...] ‘Twii l  not now  be necessary  to prove.
C i v  i 11, i \ v , - iu i.> . i i ' .1 h i :  I cv ’ 11 io n p i n i v i i i  o f  I l k '  c m , t i n n e d  u s t c i c v  i f  h, .dy m  I v  Li  H e  by
re I e r r i n g  l o  T .I . IV .1 1,20b.  u  h e r e  l ie u i \  v  . . N o w  u p o n  t h a t  s u p p o r t  i o n .  ' l is a l a  I sc o p m n  m l h a t  a m  o l  o u r  
> i :c« ! v  i >i' pci cc pi i <m.  me i icai cm 11 ■ the s a m e  a l l c r  an mien u p l i -  m: caul  c o i i ' - e q u e n l h  Hie opin ion cl d , c 11 
a I c m  11 \ c a n  nc  \ c r  ai  i ' C  l i m n  ix , m  m . m :i n n i s i  a n > c  I m m  t he  i m a p  m a t  i o n .  j ... | 'I h i s  p r o p u l s i o n  l o  I v m  " x  an 
i d e n t i t x  o n  o u r  r c s c i n i  - I i up pci ccpln ms. pi  i \  l uc e s  l l ic I ic l ion ol a c o i i l n u i  d e x i s t e n c e :  since t ha t  I ic l io i i.  as w e l l  
as the identi ty. is really false"'. However, the sort o f  f ic t ion Hume declares here lo be false is not the fiction o f  
the continued existence o f  body, but il is the f ic t ion o f  the vulgar o f  the continued existence o f  the perceptions. 
Hume uses here the terms object  and pc rc< pt ion synonymously, not because he thinks they really have the 
same reference (it is quite obvious throughout the Treat ise that they' do not), but because he thinks the vulgar 
believe them lo have the same reference. Hume stales this change o f  term ino logy on p. 202: ..In order, 
therefore, to accommodate m yse l f  to their notions, I shall at f irst suppose; that there is on ly a single existence, 
which I shall call indifferently object or perception, according as it shall seem best to suit my purpose, 
understanding by both of them what any common man means by a hat, or shoe, or stone, or any other 
impression, convey’d to him by his senses. I shall be sure to give warning, when I return to a more 
philosophical way of speaking and thinking.11 
592 BAIER, A. ibid., p. 103.
393 T.App.,636.
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that those perceptions, which are simple, and exist no where, are incapable of 
any conjunction in place with matter or body, which is extended and divisible"394. 
These statements seem to make it impossible even to consider the body as 
candidate for the principle of unity of perceptions, because perceptions (being 
no where) and body (being spatial) could never be affiliated to one another.
However, Hume’s remarks become less forbidding, though more puzzling, 
once we put them into the full context of his discussion in I,IV,V of the Treatise. 
Here Hume puts the notion of substance, especially the Cartesian version, 
under close scrutiny. The conjunction of perceptions (mind) and matter, seems 
only to be ontologically, as well as epistemologically, impossible if one believes 
them to be substances. Epistemologically, the imagination clearly feigns „a 
conjunction in place, in order to strengthen the connexion"395 between objects of 
perception. We face the classical Humean dilemma between imagination, which 
puts the smell of a rose within this rose, and reason, „which shows us the 
impossibility of such an union"396. The problem which Hume wants to make us 
aware of is not the problem of a never occurring conjunction of thought and 
motion, nor a problem of their difference, but that we believe the conjunction 
between them to be a local conjunction and that by doing so, we taci t ly assume 
the substantial notions of matter and mind. I have to admit that I am uncertain 
whether or not Hume wants to make any ontological claims concern ing the 
conjunc t ion  of mind and body  here. In our  pe tcep i ions  at least. . . fwwghi  and 
motion aie dif ferent f rom each other,  and lay exper ience [...] are constant ly  
un i ted " " ^  . There is a conjunct ion be tween motion (body) and thought  hmndi .  
a l though it is not a local conjunct ion,  especia l ly  not because our idea of body is 
opis temo logicalh  fict i t ious. So what  seem s os w be a local conjunct ion,  nwst  
be a fiction. It can be identified as fiction because it is incompatible with our 
notions of mind and body.
394 T .I,IV ,V ,235-236.
395 ibid., p.238.
396 ibid.
397 ibid., p.248.
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However, at the end of the section Hume’s strict epistemological claims are 
not accompanied by equally strict ontological ones. Firstly, when we apply our 
idea of cause and effect „to the operations of matter, we may certainly conclude, 
that motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and perception"398. 
Hume seems to refer here to a real connection between body and mind, but, 
secondly, it seems to be one which cannot be described by using the notions of 
them he has criticized. That he regards these notions, and especially the notion 
of body, as inadequate becomes clear when he states: „my intention never was 
to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain the secret causes of their 
operations."399 Discussing the will, which Hume understands to be an internal 
impression, he argues: „l do not ascribe to the will that unintelligible necessity, 
which is suppos’d to lie in matter. But I ascribe to matter, that intelligible quality, 
call it necessity or not, which the most rigorous orthodoxy does or must allow to 
belong to the will. I change, therefore, nothing in the receiv’d systems, with 
regard to the will, but only with regard to material objects."400 Hum e’s denial of a 
local conjunction turns out to be a denial of the orthodox notions of mind and 
body, employing these notions cannot explain their union, but from here it does 
not follow that there is no such union. I believe that the body, as a principle of 
unity, is thus theoretically possible. The claim that the body could be the 
principle of unity would only state what the body operates as and not why and 
how it operates. Such a claim does not imply any notion of its nature or ,.the 
secret  causes" of its ooerat ions.
398
399
400
ibid.
T.I,II,V,64.
T.II,III,II,410.
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Conclusion
If my interpretation of Books One and Two of the Treatise and the arguments I 
have presented throughout this work can be accepted then, I think, we have 
good reason to regard Hume’s account of the self, which entails an account of 
personhood, as successful as such. The perceptions of particular bundles can 
be understood to be united by their respective body, whatever the body 
happens to be. This union is aided by the principles of association of 
impressions and ideas, connecting the successive perceptions with one 
another. Such an understanding is in accordance with Hume’s claim that we 
never perceive a „real connexion1' between our perceptions, since my 
interpretation maintains the epistemological fictitiousness of causation and of 
body.
Hum e’s assumption of the impression of the self in Book Two of the 
Treatise does not contradict his account given in Book One. The impression of 
the self is a complex impression without perfect identity. Thus, Book Two is not 
a denial of Book One’s understanding of the self, but it connects the self to 
personhood by placing it into the social context. If self and personhood are 
interdependent as I have claimed, then it is only consistent that a self in 
isolation from its social context is difficult to maintain against the sceptical 
doubt.  A l though  our idea of our  self requires reason, reason is not all it regimes.  
If reason is not accom pan ied  by the passions,  if v e  ate devoid of others, 
especia l ly  of other  thinking beings,  then there is no th ing  but despa ir  because- 
the think ing being has reasoned itself out of its existence.  So I bel ieve that 
instead of denying each other Book One and "I wo require one another. Hume 
himself divided the problem of identity into two aspects. Both are necessary, 
and each of the two first Books of the Treatise deals with one of these aspects. 
Furthermore, H um e’s task was to inquire into human nature: „Here then is the 
only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical 
researches, to leave the tedious lingring method, which we have hitherto 
followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, 
to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to human nature
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itself; which being once masters of, we may every where else hope for an easy 
victory."401 If we are interested in human nature, we cannot only be interested in
reason. We are beings who think and feel, who reason and who love, not one of 
us is not amongst others. Reason and passion do not exclude each other in 
Hume’s account, nor does the I exclude the other. Book One and Two 
complement each other, they refer to different, but interdependent aspects of 
the individual.
If my view upon the subject can be accepted then we can also see how and 
why Hume’s account is compatible with the combined theory of identity. For this 
theory, both mind and body are necessary criteria of identity. But each of them, 
on its own, is not a sufficient criterion. This, I believe, is in accordance with 
Hume’s own theory: the existence of body has to be taken for granted but it 
cannot provide for anything without the mind. The identity of the self, as well as 
the identity of a person, lies with the perceptions and it is the bundle of 
perceptions which is the mind. On the other hand, ontological scepticism leads 
to the perishing of all human life402. If human nature is our subject then we 
would destroy the very topic of our own investigation if we were to submit to this 
brand of scepticism. W hether we believe in the existence of something beyond 
our perceptions cannot be up to reason alone. Reason cannot verify a basic 
realist belief. But instead of asking us to abandon our basic belief Hume advises 
us to acknowledge the limitations of reason and to follow our natural instincts. 
Reason,  on its own. ..entirely subverts i tse l f "10'' and H u m e vehem en t ly  asserts 
h imsel f  when he says. ..and whether I he really one of those scept ics,  who he lei 
that ail is uncertain, and that our judgment  is not in any thing possesst of any 
measures  uf truth and faishood: I shou'd lepiy, that this quesiion is entirely 
superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and 
constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity 
has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more 
forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of
T.Introduction,XVI.
compare ECHU,XII,II,128,160.
T.I,IV ,V II,267.
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their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder 
ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding
bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine1'404
However, Hume’s account of identity, although successful as such, is 
seriously flawed when one considers the assumptions underlying this account. 
Hume’s understanding of identity is in accordance with his theory of perception 
but it is this theory of perception which does not allow for one of the most 
essential conditions of identity: memory. I have shown that since perceptions 
are fleeting existences it is impossible to a) compare a present perception with a 
past perception, and b) to recall a past perception. It is even impossible to 
recognize some familiarity with a present perception, because this implies that a 
past perception has, at least, left some traces of itself in the mind. The mind, 
however, is nothing but the perceptions, which have no duration worth 
consider ing.  I have argued that  it is possible to t race the chain of perceptions 
backwards, but to this requires a notion of causation for instance, which cannot 
be acquired without memory in the first place. The problem of the 
unaccountability of memory does also not disappear when we look at the 
percept ions  in their  division into impress ions and ideas.  Ideas are percept ions  
and are thus just as fleeting in their existence as impressions.
BAIER argues that  because  the percep t ions  are f leet ing exis tences and 
since . there are no last ing hum an  brains to store our  memor ies  of constant  
conjunc t ions ' " ' ' '  H u m e ’s theory ..needs the supposi t ion of an external world,  and 
one that  is p eop le d ”” H This, however,  will not solve the p iob iem  because  
al though Hume wri tes as a Basic Real ist  it cannot  be denied that all that is 
epis temological ly  avai lable to us are the percept ions.  So. even :f the percept ion 
of my friend today resembles yesterday’s perception of my friend and must do 
so because it is a perception of my real existing friend, I still need memory to 
know that I had a perception of my friend yesterday, not to speak of the 
comparison I have to make between these perceptions to know that they
404 T.I,IV,1,183.
405 BAIER, A. ibid., p. 108.
406 ibid.
253
resemble each other. I believe that the problem could be solved if we can 
establish some storage place for the perceptions, and it may well be that the
body as the principle of unity of perceptions could present a possibility in this 
respect. I don’t think that the problem of the local conjunction necessarily 
endangers such a solution, since the ontological matters do not necessarily 
affect epistemological availability. But it is an important question whether such 
perhaps possible account would still be true to Hume’s philosophical intentions. 
However, the here indicated problem requires a thourough investigation which 
cannot be the purpose of this work.
I believe, despite the problem caused by the theory of perception, that 
Hume’s philosophy has a lot to offer. The philosophy of David Hume is critical to 
the preconceptions of its time. But it also reaches beyond its own historical 
context. It is a philosophy which has as its subject human beings as they are 
and tries to explain people in their complexity as thinking, social and political 
beings. H u m e  wants to enquire into human nature as the nature of concrete 
human beings in concrete contexts. The subject of his investigation is not an 
abstract entity, it always retains its humane side. The despair of Book One is a 
real despair of a real human being of flesh and blood just as Book Two takes 
courage  on the full and social life we usual ly  lead. I think that  phi losophy,  
besides all its other tasks, should always keep an interest in the real experience 
of real people to find our place in an ever expanding universe and to aid us to 
use our potent ial  for doubt  construct ive ly.  Therefore  it is necessary  that we 
obtain som e  unders tand ing  of our  own n a tu w  as human beings and as thinking 
and feel ing individuals.  So Hume, as the phi losopher.  a/as interested in Hume, 
the man. ..I was.  I say. a man of mi ld d isposi t ions,  of c o m m a n d  of temper ,  of an 
open,  social  and cheerfu l  humour,  capab le  of at tachment,  but little suscept ib le 
of enmity, and of great  moderation in all my pass ions . "" ' ’'
407 Hume, D. M y  Own Life, edited by J.C.A. Gaskin, in: Principal Writings on Religion including Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion and The Natural History o f  Religion, Oxford University Press, The World’s 
Classics, 1993.
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